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ABSTRACT
Rhetorical Criticism  o f Absence and Silence o f University Presidents
at the Grokster Court
by
Lawrence Eyo Ita
Dr. Gerald Kops, Exam ination Committee Chair 
Professor of Education 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
In the peer-to-peer file sharing case of MOM v. Grokster, university 
presidents and university associations did not subm it any am icus curiae 
briefs.
The purpose of this study was to conduct a  rhetorical criticism of 
this absence and  silence as symbolic action. Using legal research and 
situational criticism, the study explores the reaction of university 
presidents during the earlier phases of the file sharing phenom enon as 
well as their absence and silence at the Suprem e Court in light of the 
questions th a t litigants urged the Court to decide.
It was found th a t escalating peer to peer file sharing degraded 
university network functionality to a degree which threatened both 
institutional autonom y and scholarly freedom and th a t university 
presidents employed a variety of strategies to mitigate these threats.
However a t the Suprem e Court a t which petitioners and respondents 
respectively urged a reversal, on the one hand, and affirmation on the 
other hand, of the Ninth Circuit Grokster ruling, university presidents
111
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were absen t and  silent. The study found th a t th is absence and  silence of 
university presidents a t the Grokster Court did not constitute a  fitting 
response to the exigencies th a t faced core university values of scholarly 
freedom and institu tional autonom y had  the Court decided as urged by 
litigants.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
In May 2007, the United S tates Suprem e Court handed down its 
decision in the MGM v. Grokster copyright infringement case which 
petitioners in the case described as one of the m ost im portant copyright 
cases ever to reach the Court and  one whose resolution of the question 
presented by petitioners would largely determ ine the value and 
significance of copyright in the digital era (MGM v. Grokster, 2004, 
Petition for certiorari).
Copyright has rem ained an  issue of substan tia l public importance 
as well as also, an  essential com ponent in academic and research 
activities in higher education. As observed in “Copyright, fair use, and 
the challenge for universities: Promoting the progress of higher 
education” (Crews, 1993), Crews has explained tha t by virtue of both 
their combined teaching and  research goals universities use  copyrighted 
m aterial in a  variety of ways and also produce enorm ous am ounts of 
works for which their faculty own copyright.
Copyright is entrenched in the 1st article of the C onstitution along 
with 17 other powers th a t are exclusive powers of Congress. Article 1, 
section 8 empowers Congress ... “To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” (U.S.C. Art. 
1, Sect. 8).
Following prom pt action by the first Congress, the first Copyright 
legislation was signed into law on May 25, 1790 by President George 
W ashington. This act for the encouragem ent of learning conferred 
exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution of m aps, charts and 
books to au thors for a  limited period of 14 years subject to renewal for 
another term  of 14 years.
Num erous am endm ents th a t followed through a period of alm ost 
two centuries successively extended the period of exclusive rights and 
expanded the category of works for which exclusive rights are granted. 
Perhaps the m ost significant am endm ent for higher education and the 
public in general was the Copyright Act of 1976 which codified under a  
Fair Use doctrine, the right of others to reproduce artistic works for the 
purpose of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship 
and research provided th a t such reproduction did not violate any one of 
four conditions in a  fair use inquiry.
Advancement in technology m ade reproduction and eventually 
distribution of copyrighted works progressively easier and  tended to shift 
the balance between protection of exclusive rights of copyright owners, 
on the one hand  and access to their creative products for the public 
good, on the other hand. The expectation has been th a t Congress and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Courts would act to m odulate these shifts of balance which 
invariably accom panied the development of new technologies.
In 1984, eight years after codification of the copyright fair use 
doctrine, the Suprem e Court in a  landm ark case in which Universal 
Studios sought to ban  the production and sale of the Sony Video Tape 
Betamax recorder, held th a t users of the recorder were engaging in a fair 
use for which the copyright owner does not posses an  exclusive right to 
such a use (Universal Studios v. Sony Corp., 454 U.S. 417).
The Suprem e Court decision in this case also established the 
principle th a t distribution of a  product which was even merely capable of 
substan tia l noninfringing uses did not render the developer of such  a 
product vulnerable to secondary liability charges even with constructive 
knowledge of infringement.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 dealt a  blow to fair 
use  by criminalizing circumvention of technological protective m easures 
in order to gain access to copyrighted works for purposes covered under 
fair use  principles. One year later in 1999, Congress passed the Digital 
Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act which 
essentially increased m onetary penalties for infringement.
In the same year, a  college student, Shawn Fanning created 
Napster, an  Internet tool for finding and downloading mp3 m usic files 
from connected com puters. The peer to peer file sharing features of 
Napster greatly im pacted college and university networks. From early
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2000, universities reported abnorm al bandw idth usage on their cam pus 
networks and soon traced th is problem to increasing use  of Napster.
According to McCollum (McCollum, 2000a), the initial concern of 
cam pus adm inistrators was not copyright infringement b u t the shrinking 
availability of their network for routine adm inistrative and  academ ic 
purposes. This focus changed when record industry  executives began to 
issue unm itigated dem ands backed by th rea ts of lawsuits, urging 
university adm inistrators to sh u t down unidentified mp3 archives on 
their networks.
The record industry  represented by A8&M Record Company filed 
su it in the Northern District court of California against Napster for 
secondarily contributing to copyright infringement. Affirmation of the 
lower court decision by the 9 th  Circuit appellate court effectively sh u t 
down the centralized N apster operation and set the stage for a  new wave 
of peer to peer (p2p) services with new p2p network designs th a t were 
cleverly crafted to avoid vulnerability to the plaintiffs argum ents th a t 
overcame N apster’s legal defenses.
Notably, Grokster launched its p2p services which, unlike Napster, 
operated w ithout any centralized involvement in the file sharing 
processes th a t their software enabled between users of their file 
swapping application. Congestion of university networks escalated with 
the availability of p2p system s which were now capable of swapping not 
only audio files, bu t also entire movies
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The reaction of copyright owners with the birth  of these new p2p 
system s was no different th an  their reaction to Napster. However, in a  
startling tu rn  in the case against Grokster, the Federal Court of the 
Central District of California in 2003 sum m arily dism issed a  su it brought 
by MGM on behalf of copyright owners in the entertainm ent industry  to 
sh u t down the p2p Grokster operation. Even more startling, the 9 th  
Circuit appellate court th a t sh u t down Napster in 2001, now, three years 
later, in 2004, affirmed the sum m ary judgm ent of the California Central 
District court in favor of Grokster. University networks became even 
more vulnerable to congestion as the use of p2p file sharing system s 
soared to new heights.
Internally, in the lnternet2 Consortium  which included over 200 
research universities in its m em bership, groups of u sers designed the 
ihub file sharing system  th a t ran  on the super-fast private network of the 
Internet2 consortium , the Abiline network. As reported in the media, 
ihub enabled users to swap full length movies in a m atter of seconds.
Even as the 9 th  Circuit decision enabled Grokster to rem ain in 
operation, a  W ashington DC court decision empowered copyright owners 
to compel ISPs such  as Verizon (RIAA v. Verizon, 2003) to release 
information on identified infringers. As virtually all universities provide 
Internet services to their faculty, staff and studen t dormitories, this 
W ashington DC court ruling opened the gate to a  flood of requests by
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external copyright in terests for information on users, mostly studen ts , 
whom copyright owners intended to prosecute for copyright infringement.
The ineffectiveness of tracking down and individually prosecuting 
each and  every copyright infringer (MGM v. Grokster: Petition for 
certiorari, 2004, p. 22) increased the resolve of copyright holders to 
pursue  and destabilize providers of p2p services, such as G rokster and 
dozens of other p2p services th a t emerged on the wake of the Grokster 
appellate court decision.
The Suprem e Court granted certiorari in 2004. At the Court, 
petitioners represented by MGM urged the Court to reverse the 9th  
Circuit affirmation of the California Central District sum m ary judgm ent 
th a t absolved Grokster from secondary copyright infringement liability. 
Such a reversal in Grokster, which had  survived lower court scrutiny on 
the basis of the well established “dual u se” Sony principle, was 
considered by many, an  invitation to “prior restra in t” on research and 
researchers as well as on developers of products or system s th a t were 
capable of both infringing and non infringing uses.
Reversal or substan tia l review of the Sony principle, for university 
faculty involved in research, would am ount to a  prior chilling restra in t in 
clear violation of the Association of American University Professors 
(AAUP) dictum  th a t faculty research m ust be free from all restra in t 
(AAUP, 1940; Dworkin, 1996; Capen, 1948). This principle is widely 
accepted throughout public and major private research universities as a
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condition for generation and dissem ination of knowledge; as well, it has 
enjoyed firm declaration of support a t the highest level of American 
jurisprudence, the Suprem e Court.
Views on the role of education in society have m aintained 
significant commonalities from the early periods of the American republic 
to contem porary times. In comparing and contrasting the approach of 
Thomas Jefferson and tha t of Jo h n  Dewey to the role of education in 
society. C arpenter (2001) has stated  th a t both th inkers viewed 
“education as a  m eans to promote individual growth and lifelong 
learning, education as a  basis for political stability and personal 
protection, education being comm unity based, and education being 
morally grounded.” (Id., p. 127).
Americans have long endorsed education as being vital to the 
republic. For Jefferson, education helped both the governed and  the 
government by producing citizens able to pursue  their own pa ths of 
improvement while a t the sam e time able to responsibly exercise their 
rights and responsibilities particularly the ability to ward off the 
potentially corrupting influences of power. Ultimately "the stability of 
republicanism  is not in the institu tions of government bu t in the 
citizenry who will use those institu tions to protect republican virtues 
such as individual liberty (Carpenter, p. 90)."
Education institu tions are empowered to produce citizens 
equipped with knowledge, ethics, morality and intentionality in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
committed and  deliberate promotion and preservation of individual 
freedom and democratic society. The symbiotic relationship between 
education and society, a  relationship emphasized, by Thomas Jefferson 
and a century later by Jo h n  Dewey continues to impose substan tia l 
responsibilities on educational institu tions, on their faculty on their 
leaders and on their values (Carpenter, 2001).
At th is junctu re , it is relevant to consider the s ta tu s  of universities 
a t the height of the p2p crisis. First, from 2000, dem ands of external 
entertainm ent m edia in terests in the internal operation, m anagem ent, 
and adm inistration of university networks had  become a  regular 
occurrence (McCollum, 2000a; Carlson, 2001a; Carlson, 2001b) ; 
secondly. Universities continued to serve as major centers for research, 
innovation and scholarship; thirdly universities owned and operated high 
capacity digital networks with powerful com puters and processors 
uniquely suited to be com m anded into p2p system s operation protocols 
for file sharing activities; and  fourthly, no indications emerged to 
suggest th a t the use of copyrighted m aterial by university faculty would 
diminish.
Consequently, the urge to search for university perspectives on 
Grokster a t the Suprem e Court a t which Petitioners urged the Court to 
essentially reverse the protective veil th a t the Sony 1984 decision had 
afforded researchers who developed dual use products capable of 
infringing and noninfringing u se s ...th a t urge was irresistible.
8
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The public significance of the Grokster case is perhaps 
underscored by the fact th a t in the entire history of American 
jurisprudence, only two cases generated more m easured public in terest 
than  Grokster.
In 2003, Bollinger v. G rutter, otherwise known as the University of 
Michigan case, 539 U.S. 306, the Suprem e Court held th a t the narrowly 
tailored use  of race in adm issions decisions to further a  compelling 
in terest in obtaining the educational benefits th a t flow from a diverse 
studen t body is not prohibited by the Equal protection clause of Title VI. 
In this case, 92 parties participated through am icus curiae briefs.
In 1989, W ebster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 
the Suprem e Court held th a t a  sta te  may not adopt one theory of when 
life begins to justify its regulation of abortion. In this case, 78 parties 
participated through am icus curiae briefs.
In Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, although 55 parties participated 
through am icus curiae briefs, it was interesting and curious th a t 
university leaders and their associations were completely absen t and 
silent (MGM v. Grokster: Suprem e Court Docket 04-480). To more fully 
understand  this curious rhetorical event, a  formal methodology is 
required.
Copyright
Congress exercised its constitutional m andate to promote the 
progress of science by enacting paten t laws to protect inventors while to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
promote useful arts, it enacted copyright laws. Constitutional 
intentionality of encouraging both, the “progress of science” and “useful 
a rts” is constantly challenged by fundam ental differences in the inherent 
characteristics of the two goals which find harm onious coincidence only 
a t the condition th a t both ultim ately serve the public good.
Although the Constitution provides for time lim itations on 
exclusive rights of both au thors and  inventors. Congress has consistently 
constructed argum ents th a t favored au thors with more liberal time 
periods in which to exercise their exclusive rights th an  it has granted 
inventors. Congress has progressively increased the duration of copyright 
protection from an  absolute 14 years in 1790, to, retrospectively, 70 
years beyond the au th o r’s life in 1998, paten t protection has virtually 
stagnated a t 14 years.
Since the enactm ent of the Copyright Act of 1790, copyright 
holders, through the use of injunctive relief, infringement liability, and 
legislative influence have sought not only to m aintain, bu t in some cases, 
to expand their privileges as new technologies m ade copying easier. 
Congress am ended the 1790 Act in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1976 to 
m odulate the effect of new technologies on the statu tory  privileges of 
copyright holders (ARL, 2006).
The courts have been called upon to resolve d isputes over the 
interpretation and application of these legislative am endm ents (White­
sm ith  Music V. Apollo, 1908; Teleprompter v. Columbia, 1974; Sony v.
10
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Universal, 1984) endeavoring to m aintain  the balance between the 
exercise of exclusive rights on the part of copyright holders on the one 
hand, and on the other, the right of public access to creative works as 
well as First Amendment directives prohibiting laws th a t abridge the 
freedom of speech, or of the press (U.S. Const, am end. I).
Remarkable also are persisten t a ttem pts by copyright holders to 
seek expansion in the scope of statu tory  protection afforded them  
through a two pronged strategy of litigation and legislative maneuvering. 
While according to Association of Research Libraries (ARL), “ [for] alm ost 
three hundred  years... U.S. law has been revised [by Congress] to 
broaden the scope of copyright, to change the term  of copyright 
protection, and to address new technologies”, the Courts have been 
cautious in resisting attem pts of copyright holders to expand the scope of 
statu tory  protection granted by Congress as well as to extend control 
over products which are not the subject of copyright laws (Grokster 
2003).
Copying activities continued to expand in the public arena as well 
as in universities and colleges. The environm ent for these developments 
was nu rtu red  in the mid 1980s when a  new era of commerce emerged 
and expanded on the Internet. Advances in technology throughout the 
1990s m ade personal com puters and  Internet access more affordable.
The culture of m alls and mall commerce lost increasing num ber of visits 
as shoppers tu rned  to the Internet to purchase an increasing array  of
11
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goods and services. As reported by Mutz (2005), increased social tru s t led 
to greater in ten t to participate in, as well as to actual participation in 
Internet commerce. Consum er m usic transactions increased in volume 
as e-commerce expanded.
By the late 1990’s, Internet users began downloading digital 
versions of m usic, movies, and books. In response to the increasing ease 
of copying protected works, Cotigress passed the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998. (H.R. No. 2281, 1998). This act included 
provisions th a t addressed copyright infringement liability for Internet 
Service Providers (ISP’s) to the extent th a t Congress believed the 
Committee of Conference (H.R. 2281, House of Representatives Report 
105-796) appropriately balanced the in terests of content owners, on-line 
and other service providers, and information users in a way designed to 
“facilitate the robust development and world-wide expansion of electronic 
commerce, com m unications, research, development, and  education in 
the digital age” (Senate Report 105-190, p. 1).
Reaction to DMCA was mixed. On behalf of en tertainm ent industry  
interests, Rosen (1999) declared th a t the DMCA’s m andate to Internet 
service providers (ISP’s) to take down infringing m aterial from their 
networks minimized harm  to the a rtists and  m usic copyright owners. On 
the side of consum er electronics m anufacturers, Shapiro (1998) 
expressed concern over the provisions of the bill th a t outlawed products 
th a t circum vent undefined technological protection m easures.
12
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Case: MGM v. Grokster 
Because higher education institu tions owned networks with 
powerful com puters suitable for conscription into p2p file sharing by 
highly skilled constituents, universities became directly or indirectly 
embroiled in all major cases involving peer to peer file sharing (CNN, 
2001; Madigan, 2002).
The first of three major cases th a t relate to p2p file sharing of 
copyrighted m usic and video was A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
lower court decision to sh u t down the operation of the Internet file 
swapping services of Napster.
In 1999, the Napster architecture required a new u se r to login with 
a  u ser nam e and passw ord to download N apster’s M usicShare software. 
The u ser could then  add files identified by filenames into shared 
directories which became available whenever the com puter was online. 
These com puters were equipped to copy lists of files from their share 
directory to N apster’s servers which organized and m aintained such  lists 
in searchable format. N apster’s servers kept track of changes in sharing 
directories and prime directories on connected com puters for searches by 
other com puters. In case of a successful search, N apster’s servers using 
IP addresses of the requesting com puter instructed  the source com puter 
to transfer the requested file directly to the requesting com puter. Though 
Napster operated a centralized indexing system, at no point did N apster’s
13
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servers store the actual contents of downloadable files. For Napster, th is 
feature was sufficient to avoid being treated as a  prim ary or direct 
infringer. However the centralized role of N apster’s servers in indexing 
and exchanging linking IP information for the searching and offering 
com puters could not escape tests for contributory and vicarious 
infringement liability (Napster, 2000).
The second major p2p case was In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert, denied, 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004) in 
which the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court decision to sh u t down 
the operation of the Internet file swapping services of Aimster. The 
Aimster architecture m aintained central indexing servers b u t used  
encryption to m ask file nam es which users created and uploaded to 
Aimster’s central servers.
With encryption, Aimster claimed lack of knowledge of the file 
nam es which were being offered and requested. When a  searching 
com puter located a m atching enciypted filename on Aim ster’s servers, 
the searching com puter contacted the offering com puter directly and 
downloaded the requested file. The pair encryption and decryption stages 
slowed down the Aimster service, bu t more importantly, failed to im press 
the court.
The Seventh Circuit court faulted the self serving na tu re  of the 
encryption feature and used  the long established principle th a t “eye 
closure”, where infringement was active, cannot absolve an  operator like
14
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Aimster who had the “right and capability” to police its system. The 
encryption variation from the Napster architecture was not sufficient to 
save Aimster from closure (Aimster, 2004).
The th ird  case is Metro-Goldwyn-Mayor Studios, Inc. v. Grokster 
Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the lower court decision not to sh u t down the Internet operation of 
Grokster and  Stream  Cast (“M orpheus”). The lower court decision laid 
the grounds which escalated dispute over issues involved. (Metro- 
Goldwyn-Mayor Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, C. 
D. Cal., 2003). The three appellate cases, Napster, Aimster, and  Grokster 
relied substantially  on an earlier case. Universal City Studios v. Sony 
Corp. of America, Inc. 464 U.S. 417 (1984), (“Sony-Betamax”), in which 
the U. S. Suprem e Court reversed a  Ninth Circuit decision to end the 
production and sale of the Sony’s Betamax recorder.
In the United States District Court, Central District of California, 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, MGM with twenty five other movie and 
entertainm ent companies as plaintiffs, filed actions against Grokster, Ltd 
and Stream  Cast Networks, Inc as defendants for copyright infringement 
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 501. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed cross-m otions for 
sum m ary judgm ent with regard to contributory and vicarious 
infringement under the copyright law (MGM v. Grokster, 2003a; MGM v. 
Grokster, 2003b). *
15
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Plaintiffs contended th a t Defendants distributed software by 
m eans of which users of their software freely downloaded copyrighted 
m aterial and  th a t their conduct of distributing such software rendered 
them  liable for copyright infringement. Defendants argued th a t they 
merely provided software to users over whom they had  no control and 
thus th a t no liability may accrue to them  under copyright law.
On April 25, 2003, the presiding judge. United S tates District 
Judge, Stephen V. Wilson issued an  order and opinion granting the 
G rokster’s and S tream cast’s m otions for sum m ary judgm ent and denied 
the plaintiffs’ motion (Grokster, 2003). Defendants proceeded to appeal 
Judge W ilson’s decision a t the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit (Grokster, 2004).
A panel of three circuit judges Robert Boochever, Jo h n  T. Noonan 
and Sidney R. Thomas heard  the appeal with MGM Studios and twenty- 
four movie and entertainm ent com panies as Plaintiffs-Appellants against 
Defendants-Appellees Grokster Ltd., and Stream  Cast Networks, Inc., 
formerly known as Musiccity.Com, Inc. The appeal panel’s decision 
rendered by Judge Thomas and  filed on August 19, 2004, affirmed the 
district court decision. The Plaintiffs-Appellants proceeded to file a  
petition for a writ of certiorari on October 8, 2004.
The Suprem e Court granted certiorari on December 10, 2004 on 
the 9 th  Circuit decision (380 F.3d 1154 ). Plaintiffs sought the Suprem e 
C ourt’s determ ination of the following question:
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W hether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to long- 
established principles of secondary liability in copyright law (and 
in acknowledged conflict with the Seventh Circuit), th a t the 
Internet-based “file-sharing” services Grokster and  Stream  Cast 
should be immunized from copyright liability for the millions of 
daily acts of copyright infringement th a t occur on their services 
and th a t constitute a t least 90% of the total use  of the services. 
(MGM V. Grokster, 2004).
At the Suprem e Court, in the m erit phase, fifty five parties 
subm itted am icus curiae briefs, nineteen supporting petitioners, twenty 
seven supporting respondents and  nine supporting neither party. On 
March 29, 2005, the Court heard argum ents. Appearances were Donald 
B. Verrilli J r . for petitioners, Richard. G. Taranto for respondents, and 
Paul D. Clement, Acting Solicitor General, D epartm ent of Justice , for 
United S tates as am icus curiae. The Suprem e C ourt’s opinion was 
delivered in Ju n e , 2005, in effect debunking the theory th a t providers of 
system s th a t facilitated copyright infringement cannot be held liable 
provided th a t such  system s are capable of substan tia l non infringing 
uses. This decision also fell short of imposing any design constrain ts on 
software and system  developers among whom Microsoft is a  prom inent 
player.
Grokster and  M orpheus were based on a radically different 
architecture in which central servers played no role in discovery, storage
17
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and indexing of file nam es and com puter information. In less 
sophisticated system s, com puters searched other com puters for the 
presence of desired m usic files and  conducted all phases of the transfer 
w ithout the involvement of servers controlled by the service provider. 
Searching millions of com puters for each request consum ed enorm ous 
resources and severely slowed down com puter processes.
This problem was solved by Grokster and M orpheus who designed 
their networks as self- organizing system s. The more powerful com puters 
running  the software, and based on instructions in the code, emerged as 
supernodes. These powerful com puters performed the indexing function 
and facilitated fast searching and downloading routines. The lack of 
ability of Grokster and  M orpheus to exercise any control over the 
activities of their software, although not the only factor, was non the less 
determinative in the Ninth Circuit decision affirming the California U.S. 
Court sum m ary dism issal of the MGM law suit against Grokster and 
S tream cast (Grokster, 2004).
Institution Impact
Soon after the enactm ent of DMCA, in 1999, and  the creation of 
Napster by Shawn Fanning in the sam e year, the num ber of u sers  of the 
Napster p2p file sharing software increased phenomenally (Strahilevitz, 
2003), and  national CD sales dropped (Zentner, n.d.). The im pact on 
universities was rem arkable.
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From the early 2000, colleges and universities reported abnorm al 
bandw idth usage on their cam pus networks (McCollum, 2000a). 
Adm inistrators soon traced th is phenom enon to increasing use  of 
Napster, an  Internet tool for finding and downloading MP3 audio files 
online. For colleges and universities, the initial concern was, according to 
McCollum, not because of its potential for copyright infringement, bu t 
because when studen ts use  it en m asse they can clog even high- 
bandw idth cam pus Internet connections (Id.).
As universities experienced high bandw idth utilization on their 
networks and traced the problem to file sharing operations, the potential 
of high economic losses drew the attention of artists like Metallica and 
Dr. Dre (Foster, 2000). Represented by the Motion Picture Association of 
America, MPAA and the Recording Industries Association of America, 
RIAA, a rtists claimed th a t p2p file sharing through the N apster Network 
was cutting into their earnings. The MPAA and RIAA used  a dual 
approach of cooperation and intim idation (RIAA, 2006) to get 
universities, first, to exercise tighter control on networks and  sh u t down 
file sharing capabilities, or alternatively, face copyright infringem ent law 
suits. Universities responded and reacted in various ways (Hennessey & 
Spanier, 2004). Eventually a  Ninth Circuit Court decision sh u t down the 
centralized Napster Network while software developers engineered de­
centralized networks to accomplish essentially the sam e ultim ate file 
sharing capabilities.
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While universities and  colleges worried about the increasing 
bandw idth consum ption in their networks, for a rtists and  recording 
companies, the prim ary concern was copyright infringement (McCollum, 
2000; McBride, 2005). In 2000, several recording com panies initiated a 
lawsuit against the m akers of N apster for actively encouraging direct 
copyright infringement (A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. Supp. 2d 
896, N.D. Cal. 2000), while the Recording Industry of America 
Association (RIAA) regularly dem anded th a t colleges sh u t down online 
archives of illegal MPS's on cam pus networks. (Madigan, 2002; RIAA, 
2006; Terdiman, 2006).
Judge Beezer rendered opinion in the A&M case against Napster 
(A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F. 3d 1004, 9 th  Cir. 2001). 
Essentially, th is decision required the lower court to order Napster to 
remove from its system  all offending tracks identified by copyright 
owners. With the exception of m usic company BMG, all major labels with 
outstanding copyright infringement su its against Napster were required 
to provide lists of the m aterial th a t they w anted removed from the 
system. Exclusion of BMG followed the withdrawal of paren t company 
Bertelsm ann from the Napster lawsuit. In a  joint agreem ent with 
Napster, Bertelsm ann agreed to fund the development of the file-sharing 
company. The company would establish  a m em bership based service 
tha t would pay royalties to a rtists whose works its m em bers accessed 
(Smith, 2000).
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As Napster was taking steps to comply with the court order to 
modify its system  in a  way th a t identifies copyrighted m aterial and 
restrict access to these works, the company also settled the law su it with 
Metallica and Dr. Dre. Napster agreed to identify and block access to files 
tha t the artists  did not w ant to share while they agreed to share some of 
the a rtis ts ’ songs through a new version of Napster which complied with 
the court rulings and ensured  com pensation to a rtists and  publishers 
(CNN, 2001). The law su it with Metallica was the first p2p copyright 
infringement case in which universities were nam ed as co-defendants.
In April 2003, two U.S. District Court decisions restructu red  the 
balance of power in the conflict between the m usic industry  and m usic 
fans. In RIAA v. Verizon (2003), a  W ashington D.C. court ruled th a t 
copyright holders could compel Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to 
release information on users identified as direct copyright infringers, and 
ordered Verizon to comply with RIAA subpoena to disclose the identity of 
an  alleged anonym ous copyright infringer on the ISP’s network. 
Universities and  colleges routinely provide Internet access to m em bers of 
their internal constituency, faculty, studen ts and staff th u s qualifying 
their organizations as ISPs.
In Los Angeles in MCM et al v. Crokster Ltd. 259 F. Supp. 2d 
1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), the court granted sum m ary judgm ent to 
defendants C rokster and Stream cast, ruling th a t they could not be held 
liable for the activity of their users. The court held, based on its reading
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of the landm ark Sony “Betamax” case, Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), th a t while some users 
might engage in illegal copyright infringement, other u sers of the file 
sharing services were legitimately sharing public docum ents or 
authorized m edia content.
Thus while the Los Angeles ruling m eant tha t the record industry  
could no longer sh u t down p2p networks as it had done with Napster, 
the W ashington ruling m ade it procedurally feasible for copyright owners 
to target for prosecution, direct prim ary infringers, m any of whom were 
university and  college studen ts on cam pus networks.
The demise of Napster, and the expanding in terest of m usic fans in 
accessing and sharing free Internet m usic was exploited by software 
developers who developed distributed system s which were not 
susceptible to the sam e legal vulnerabilities which ultim ately destroyed 
Napster's operation. Notably, Kaazar, Grokster and Stream  Cast 
Networks designed and deployed distributed p2p network system s 
w ithout any central control servers.
Alluding to copyright enforcem ent through targeting specialized 
interm ediaries like Napster which ran  central indexing servers, Wu, in 
“When code isn ’t law” (p. 683) has declared th a t peer networks exploit 
tha t enforcem ent struc tu re  by “creating a  distribution network th a t 
elim inates interm ediaries”.
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At institu tions of higher education, students developed the 12Hub 
system which ran  on an  advanced university network system , Abiline. 
This system  enabled studen ts in the 200 colleges and universities 
participating in the Internet2 network to swap movies and songs a t great 
speeds (Internet2, 2005).
Thus, the generation of p2p file sharing software th a t emerged 
after the demise of Napster raised to higher levels the concern of the 
motion picture industry  as well as th a t of universities. While the Napster 
system  shared m usic files, the new generation of system s typified by 
Grokster and  12 Hub represented “the m ost am bitious effort to underm ine 
an  existing [copyright] legal system  using com puter code (Wu, Supra, a t 
683)”. These networks had added the capability of sharing entire movies 
with consequent increase in bandw idth usage and therefore posed a  
significant th rea t to university and college networks as well as to 
copyright interests.
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the RIAA 
monitored and targeted users of the 12Hub, bringing pressure  on 
university adm inistrators to sh u t down the extraneous file-sharing use  of 
Internet2. The MPAA also announced intention to directly sue a  num ber 
of active users of the 12Hub (Gross, 2005). The inefficiencies inherent in 
this distributed a ttack  on individual u sers  stim ulated the resolve of 
copyright owners to increase legal p ressure on the relatively fewer
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targeted distributors of p2p software while concurrently filing law suits 
against the m ost serious direct infringers.
Although copyright, and  not academ ic freedom, was the apparen t 
and central issue in MGM v. Grokster, a  deeper understand ing  of the 
im pact of this case on higher education requires a consideration of the 
broader socio-educational implications of academic freedom.
Academic freedom, unlike copyright, has no specific constitutional 
imperatives bu t has evolved out of the "... changing relationship between 
faculty and their disciplines, studen ts, university adm inistrators, 
com m unities and  governmental bodies (Aby and Kuhn IV).” Aby and 
Kuhn sta te  th a t according to Rorty (1994), the socio-political grounds of 
academic freedom should be strengthened over commonly held 
epistemological presuppositions. Wright (1949) advances a  global 
perspective which identifies the kind of universities which spring from 
academic freedom as the only category of institu tions in society which 
can grapple with the problem s of a world faced with war and poverty, 
problems th a t th rea ten  civilization, if not m ankind itself. Tight (1985) has 
concluded th a t academ ic freedom can only be m aintained and  protected 
by force of law. (as cited in Aby and Kuhn IV, 2000, p. 17).
Indeed several Court decisions have effectively established the 
rational for protecting academic freedom. In Sweezy v. New Ham pshire, 
354 U.S 234 (1957), Chief Justice  W arren declares the “areas of 
academic freedom and political expression ...” as areas in which
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government should be “extremely reticent to tread .” Justice  B rennan 
stated  th a t “Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academ ic 
freedom ...” for its “... transcendent value ... (Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents)”. Opinion in “The Michigan Case”, G rutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003) repeats the C ourt’s tradition of “... giving a degree of 
deference to a  university’s academ ic decisions ....” The decision in 
Urofsky v. Gilmore, cert denied, 121 U.S. 759 (2001) noted w ithout 
endorsem ent as a  legal or Constitutional right, the AAUP report defining 
academic freedom as a  right claimed by “ ...teacher and  investigator ...” 
as well as the 1940 statem ent th a t established the concept of academ ic 
freedom for professors. The Urofsky opinion declared th a t the Suprem e 
Court has given no latitude in considering academic freedom beyond 
recognition of an  institutional right of self-governance in academ ic 
affairs.
Moodie in On Justifying the different claims to academ ic freedom 
(1996) addresses three different claims to academic freedom beyond civil 
liberties th a t the Constitution guarantees all persons. These three claims 
are scholarly academic freedom of the scholar’s right of unconstrained  
decision making, typically in the p u rsu it of research in terests and  in 
classroom  pedagogy; institutional freedom th a t prom otes university 
autonom y and shields institu tions in higher education from externally 
imposed restraints; and lastly, academ ic rule tha t protects the privilege
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of departm ental groups to m ake decisions on academic disciplinary 
issues.
From 2000 when higher education institu tions first experienced 
the chocking effect of p2p file sharing practices on their networks 
(McCullum, 2000), up  to the Suprem e Court decision in the MGM v. 
Grokster in May 2005 (Grokster, 2005), the exploding p2p file sharing 
phenom enon posed m ulti faceted challenges on the higher education 
complex.
Excessive dem and on bandw idth reduced network availability for 
academic and research endeavors for studen ts and faculty and for 
routine adm inistrative applications. Institutions, urged by external 
interests, devised various approaches to term inate p2p operations and 
avoid in terruptions of their own academic and research functions. At the 
same time, a surge in research in terest produced scholarship in network 
theory, design and optimization (lamnitchi, 2004) as well as in behavioral 
incentives for participants in p2p networks (Ranganathan, 2004) .
Somewhat less frontally, the p2p file sharing explosion and its 
progression up  to the Suprem e Court left discursive traces in several 
domains. One such  dom ain is academ ic freedom with widely recognized 
taxonomy of internal and  external categories of threats.
Historically, internal th rea ts arose from differences in the 
rhetorical construction of m eaning by diverse internal constituencies 
(Guttman, 1983; Ambrose, 1990; Hamilton, 1995), internal display of
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power (Gottfredson, 1996) and ambivalence (Capen, 1948) on the part of 
university adm inistrators, ethics of responsibilities (Held, 1983; Gouran, 
1990) and skepticism  of relevance (Dworkin, 1996).
Peer to peer file sharing by internal constituents substantially  
degraded network availability for established academic and 
adm inistrative functions. This phenom enon needs to be contextualized to 
determ ine if it posed any th rea t to any of Moodie’s three categories of 
academic freedom, namely scholarly freedom, institu tional autonom y 
and departm ental rule (Moodie, 1996).
Categories of external th rea ts arose from exercise of power of state 
apparatus (Urofsky, 2001) business in terests (Appel, 1993) and trustees 
(Berquist, 1972), collaborative research accomm odations and  business 
association with government agencies (Kreiser, 1993), and industry  
(Altbach, 1999).
During the peer to peer file sharing phenom enon. Read (2006) has 
reported th a t universities received unsolicited directions and injunctions 
from external in terests on how to configure and  m anage cam pus 
networks. These directions were frequently followed with th rea ts  of 
law suits if the recipient institution failed to comply (Id.). Again, 
contextualization of such  action by external interests may shed light to 
w hat degree, if any, such tactics threatened institutional autonom y.
Tension between copyright protection of au thors of works of art, on 
the one hand, and  the public in terest of access to these works, on the
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other, has been fundam ental to the ease with which higher education 
has pursued  its own societal derived m andate to produce and 
dissem inate knowledge and scholarship.
Colleges and universities reacted initially to excessive consum ption 
of bandw idth by its internal constituency of studen ts by imposing 
adm inistrative ban  on file swapping and also by introducing new policy 
statem ents to regulate the practice (Hennesey & Spanier, 2004). Some 
developed their own monitoring program s and other counter m easures 
following coercive dialogue with m edia organizations (McCollum, 2000).
Little consideration was given to the effects of u n u su a l interference 
in institutional governance and the implications of such  interference on 
categories of academ ic freedom, nor to the long term  prospects of success 
of the suppressive enforcem ents strategies against alleged p2p file 
sharing activity; strategies th a t appealed to some adm inistrators and 
th a t they employed to seek immediate relief to network congestion and 
sim ultaneously pacify m edia executives. An immediate effect of the 
som ewhat coerced collaborative environm ent th a t had  been forged 
between m edia executives and  university leaders was a  reprieve from the 
th reat of law suits (Mangan, 2002) and a halt to the degradation of college 
networks.
From pursuing  universities in their role as ISPs and  their studen ts 
as prim ary copyright offenders, entertainm ent m edia organizations, 
chiefly the RIAA and MPAA focused attention on law suits against p2p file
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sharing services. At every stage of th is legal encounter, they repeatedly 
argued th a t Grokster be assigned secondary liability for not designing or 
re-designing their p2p file sharing software in a  way th a t m akes them  
incapable of use  for infringement.
At the Suprem e Court, of all the in terests th a t had  substan tia l 
stakes in the outcome of Crokster, higher education leaders were 
conspicuously absen t and silent. This dissertation has focused on and 
analyzed the complete absence and silence of university presidents at 
this crucial stage of the Crokster conflict.
Petitioners essentially asked the Court to remove the protective veil 
which the Sony Suprem e Court decision (1984) had established to shield 
researchers and product developers from secondary liability arising from 
infringing third party  use, provided th a t their products were also capable 
of noninfringing uses. As several scholars pointed out in various am icus 
curiae briefs, acquiescence to petitioner’s request would am ount to an 
outright chill on innovation and  creativity.
Universities have been major centers for research, innovation and 
scholarship in alm ost every conceivable field of hum an endeavor. These 
institu tions own and operate extensive Internet networks with high 
capacity com puters and system s; their faculty and studen ts use  and  
produce massive quantities of copyrighted m aterial and from the early 
file-sharing N apster operation, universities have been the focus of 
external pressure and th rea t from entertainm ent industry  executives.
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Absence and silence of university leaders at the determinative 
moment a t the Grokster Court was unusua l. This symbolic action has 
been further probed and analyzed using methodologies of rhetorical 
criticism and legal research.
Research Problem 
As movie and m usic industry  executives pressured  some colleges, 
collaborated with others, and initiated law suits against individual 
studen ts, colleges and p2p software developers, software developers 
created new program s and system s designed to avoid vulnerabilities to 
legal attack. The public increased its consum ption of art, and 
participation in its distribution. Meanwhile, colleges struggled with the 
effect of bandw idth utilization on their technology budgets and  network 
availability for routine academic, research and adm inistrative functions.
File sharing assum ed colossal cultural dim ensions in sheer volume 
and participation and generated conflicting perspectives of ethics and 
morality (Logan, 2006; Read 2006a; Vaidhyanathan, 2004, p. 2). 
Legislative attem pts to end the conflict proved ineffective. Ideological 
argum ents raged regarding the role of a  free m arket in a democratic 
society and  attem pts to distort the free m arket structure . Philosophical 
questions on creativity and on the creation and distribution of 
knowledge, enabling software technology, a rt and culture raged (Carr, 
2005) as executives in the entertainm ent industries moved with
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determ ination and resolve in the legal arena to end the im pact of p2p 
networks on m usic and copyright infringement.
P2p file sharing operations im pacted higher education institu tions 
in several conflicting ways. First, the core functions of teaching, research 
and institu tional adm inistration relied heavily on network availability 
and integrity. P2p file sharing activity threatened m aintenance of these 
core institu tional functions and if unchecked would a tta in  disruptive 
dim ensions and cripple the day to day operation of institu tions (Carlson, 
2001b).
At the sam e time, as reported by Read (2005), p2p file sharing 
rem ained a  powerful and extensively used  tool for collaboration in 
research activities of faculty and  students. Institutions th a t could not 
sh u t down all p2p functionality w ithout also disrupting the research 
effort of their faculty and studen ts faced the challenge of filtering out 
unw anted p2p file sharing while m aintaining a  network in which desired 
p2p activity could proceed w ithout undue impediment.
Plaintiffs dem anded removal of the protective shield th a t the Sony 
decision provided for researchers, designers and developers of products 
and system s against secondary copyright liability on the condition th a t 
such products were capable of substan tia l noninfringing uses (Cohn et 
al. 2005).
While m em bers from the constituency of university faculty spoke 
through over a  dozen am icus curiae briefs in support of one side or the
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other, or spoke in support of neither side, a t the Suprem e Court, the 
constituency of higher education leaders, presidents of universities and 
colleges responded by complete absence and silence a t the Court.
This response of absence and silence by higher education leaders 
has invoked the need for a  critical review of th is performance in an 
attem pt to examine both its reasonableness as well as its 
appropriateness in the rhetorical situation surrounding a Suprem e Court 
determ ination of a  dispute in which fundam ental assum ptions of higher 
education autonom y and scholarly freedom faced possibilities of 
substan tia l modification. The situation a t the Grokster Court has 
necessitated a  probe of the following questions for fitting answ ers.
Research Questions
1. Did Grokster th reaten  academic freedom or institutional 
autonom y?
2. Utilizing rhetorical criticism, w hat were the implications of the 
absence and silence of higher education leaders a t the Grokster Court?
3. W hat was the im pact of the United States Suprem e Court 
decision in Grokster on higher education?
4. Have new issues been generated?
Definition and Explanation of Terms
Amicus curiae: Latin for "friend of the court," a  party  or an  
organization interested in an  issue which files a  brief or participates in
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the argum ent in a  case in which th a t party  or organization is not one of 
the litigants, (law.com Law Dictionary)
Appellate court: A court having jurisdiction to hear appeals and 
review a trial court’s procedure.
Artifact: An object of rhetorical criticism.
Bandwidth: Amount of d a ta  th a t can be transm itted  in a  fixed 
am ount of time.
Certiorari: A writ of review issued by a  higher court to a  lower
court.
Critical theo iy -1 : Defined by Max Horkheimer as social theory 
oriented toward critiquing and changing society as a  whole, in con trast to 
traditional theory oriented only to understand ing  or explaining it. 
(Wikipedia, h t tp : / /en .w ikipedia.org/w iki/Critical theorvL
Critical theory-2: “theory which can provide the analytical and 
ethical foundation needed to uncover the structure  of underlying social 
practices and to reveal the possible distortion of social life embodied in 
them .” h ttp ://w w w .answ ers.com /topic/critical-theory
Dialectics: A m ethod of reasoning which aims to understand  things 
concretely in all their movement, change and interconnection, with their 
opposite and  contradictory sides in unity.
Differance: The notion th a t words and  signs can never fully 
sum m on forth w hat they m ean, b u t can only be defined through 
synonymy, through the appeal to additional words. Thus, m eaning is
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forever "deferred" or postponed through an  endless chain of signifiers. (In
Jacques D errida’s Differance as sited in Wikipedia;
http : / / en .Wikipedia, ore/ wiki / Differance : Derrida quoted in Biesecker,
1989).
Ethical economy: A concept (coined in th is work) th a t indicates 
how efficiently com m unication within a sphere works to enhance the 
attainm ent of objectives th a t participants in the sphere articulate.
File sharing: Access of files on a  com puter from other com puters.
ISP: In ternet service provider.
Interpellation: An involuntary recruitm ent into a  subject position 
which bonds an individual to both the subject position and also to the 
underlying ideology.
MP3: A popular digital audio encoding format designed to greatly 
reduce the am ount of d a ta  required to represent audio with minimal 
quality loss.
Network: A system  linking com puters.
P2P: Peer-to-peer; com puters existing with equal privileges in a  
network.
PC: Personal computer.
Problematic: A definite theoretical struc tu re  characterized by a 
dialectical interplay of structuring  concepts th a t serve to raise some 
questions while suppressing others. (Giroux, 1981).
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Rhetorical criticism: The description, analysis, interpretation, and  
evaluation of persuasive uses of language. (In K. K. Campbell’s Critiques 
of contem porary rhetoric, as sited in German, 1985, p. 87)
Rhetorical situation: A complex of persons, events, objects, and  
relations presenting an  actual or potential exigence which can be 
completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the 
situation, can so constrain  hum an  decision or action as to bring about 
the significant modification of the exigence. (Bitzer, 1968).
Rhetor: The speaker in a  rhetorical situation.
Sphere: A space of hum an  discourse.
Sum m ary judgm ent: A court order ruling th a t no factual issues 
rem ain to be tried and therefore a  cause of action in a  com plaint can be 
decided upon certain facts w ithout trial.
Suprem e Court: The highest court in the United States, which has 
the ultim ate power to decide constitutional questions and other appeals 
based on the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution, including cases 
based on federal s ta tu tes, between citizens of different states, and  when 
the federal government is a  party, (law.com Law Dictionary).
U.S. Courts of Appeal : The 94 U.S. judicial districts are organized 
into 12 regional circuits, each of which has a  United States court of 
appeals. A court of appeals hears appeals from the district courts located 
within its circuit (U.S. Courts : 
http: /  /  W W W .uscourts.gov/courtsofappeals.h tm l)
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U.S. District Court: The United States district courts are the trial 
courts of the federal court system. Within limits set by Congress and the 
Constitution, the district courts have jurisdiction to hear nearly all 
categories of federal cases, including both civil and crim inal m atters.
Methodology
Legal Research
Legal research will be relied upon  to establish the issues at 
Grokster and  the role of questions which litigants presented for 
resolution a t the Grokster Court in creating an  exigency. Also legal 
research will be used  to uncover salient ju risprudentia l principles th a t 
bear on the questions presented by petitioners and respondents in briefs 
and also by Suprem e Court Ju stices in oral argum ents as well as by 
amici through am icus curiae briefs.
The role of legal research is crucial to th is d issertation in th a t the 
phenomenological absence and silence of university presidents need to 
be clearly established before rhetorical criticism can be attem pted on this 
phenom enon. Fortunately, th is is a  relatively uncom plicated task. 
Rhetorical Criticism
In the search for a  methodology th a t would yield the clearest 
understanding  of this curious absence and silence, consideration has 
been given to possibilities offered by various methodologies in the area  of 
rhetorical criticism which has been described as a qualitative research
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method th a t is designed for the system atic investigation of symbolic acts 
and artifacts for the purpose of understanding  rhetorical processes.
One major obstacle was th a t virtually all categories of 
methodologies of rhetorical criticism conveyed a privileged s ta tu s  on 
artifacts th a t exhibit a  physical or m etaphysical identity such  as text, 
speech, fantasy, ideology, and generally situations with effects th a t are 
capable of com m anding dram atic attention. For example. Traditional 
Rhetorical Criticism developed in 1925 through the work of Herbert 
Wichelns, worked quite well with oratorical artifacts such  as State of the 
Union addresses. Sermon on the Mount, Daniel W ebster’s defense in the 
1819 Suprem e Court D artm outh case and other oratorical works for 
which this methodology was designed.
Traditional rhetorical criticism being squarely incompatible with 
speechless perform ances of absence and silence m erits no further 
consideration. O ther methodologies such  as Fantasy Theme Analysis or 
Ideographic Criticism developed m uch later still tended to trea t absence 
and silence as mere incidental devices in contexts dom inated by the 
more privileged artifacts of speech and  text.
Two methodologies, namely Situational Criticism and Generative 
Criticism, offer possibilities for the study of the curious absence and 
silence which was the rhetorical response of university presidents in the 
situation th a t existed in the Grokster Court. Although generative 
criticism sta rts  with the encounter of a  curious artifact (Foss, 2004), the
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methodology relies on extensive coding of the artifact, a  procedure not 
readily applied to absence and silence in which lim itations imposed by a 
lack of concrete features th a t are am enable to a coding process would 
render coding im practical or a t best speculative.
S ituational criticism is based on the seminal work of Lloyd Bitzer 
(Bitzer, 1968) and  a  num ber of other works (Vatz, 1973; Consigny, 1974; 
Jam ieson, 1975; Biesecker, 1989; Edbauer, 2005) on “Rhetorical 
Situation”, the bedrock of situational criticism. A central concept in 
Bitzer's rhetorical situation is th a t exigencies within the rhetorical 
situation invite a  fitting response (Bitzer, 2000, p. 66) which may come 
forth as speech or fail to come forth in the case of absence and silence or 
speech th a t is not fitting.
Laura Beth Carroll’s doctoral dissertation. The Rhetoric of Silence: 
U nderstanding Absence as Presence. (Carroll, 2002) has specifically 
employed Bitzer’s rhetorical situation to study absence. Several other 
works (Kurzon, 1995; Thiesmeyer, 2003; Glenn, 2004) have also 
highlighted absence and  silence, sometimes in grave and horrific 
situations such  as the holocaust (Lang, 1996; Jones, 1999). The value of 
expanding th is class of works in rhetorical criticism in which absence 
and silence feature with innate salience, undim inished by the 
hierarchically privileged s ta tu s  frequently accorded presence and speech 
m akes situational criticism, based on Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, 
particularly attractive.
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Accordingly, the absence and silence of university leaders in 
Grokster has been analyzed through the methodology of situational 
criticism based on the works of Bitzer (1968) and others on rhetorical 
situation. The choice of situational criticism is informed by a  five 
question inquiry proposed by German regarding the isolation and 
exam ination of the rhetorical artifact in “Finding a methodology for 
rhetorical criticism ” (German, 1985). As Kuypers (2005, p. 18) has 
indicated, “Because a  rhetorical artifact is a  m ultidim ensional, complex 
and nuanced  event, there is no one best way of viewing it”. As such, the 
purpose of th is exam ination is to find “... a  special union of methodology 
and artifact to yield the best understanding  of both."(German, Id. a t p. 
87).
This d issertation seeks to describe, analyze, in terpret and  evaluate 
the deliberate or unintentional absence and silence by higher education 
leaders, a t the Suprem e Court phase of Grokster, a t which petitioners for 
certiorari sought to persuade the Court to reverse the 9 th  Circuit 
decision th a t upheld a  lower California court decision to dism iss the 
plaintiffs case against defendants Grokster and  Stream Cast on charges 
of secondary copyright liability for the alleged file sharing activities of 
u sers of In ternet p2p file sharing services provided by the 
defendants/ respondents (Grokster, 2005).
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Limitations
The unavoidable operation of the conscious and  subconscious bias 
of the critic is a  major lim itation in the generalizability of the conclusions 
th a t rhetorical criticism produces. Although a critic is encouraged to be 
objective all the time, Kuypers (2005 a t p. 30) has cautioned tha t 
“Indeed, excessive objectivity is a  failure th a t occurs with unfortunate 
frequency in criticism .” Hopefully, scrutiny by others will help to 
minimize the operation of bias. In m any ways, the conclusions of the 
critic is always provisional and  leaves m uch room for exploration of other 
perspectives which m ay be more or less as valid as the perspectives on 
which the critic has anchored his or her conclusions.
Meanings are susceptible to the operation of differance in a  general 
philosophic sense which m eans they can theoretically never be construed 
as absolute realities; ra ther they evolve through revelations of emergent 
traces of discourse.
As in all inquiries, assum ptions do influence the direction of the 
critic’s perspectives. The assum ption is m ade in the entire work th a t 
education is not ju s t  another grand narrative, bu t th a t both society and 
persons who seek education do benefit. Belfield has sum m arized the 
results of several studies with the conclusion th a t personal rates of 
re tu rn  to investm ent in higher education is “higher th an  the yield on 
other economic activities” even w ithout incorporating “the stream  of 
social or consum ption benefits from education” (Belfield, 2000, p. 29).
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Belfîeld has also presented results of estim ates of even larger percentages 
of “aggregate” societal economic growth due to education (Id. a t p. 193).
Sustenance of higher education and its institu tions has ontology 
far broader th an  th a t dictated by purely economic considerations. The 
range of narratives from Reading’s notion of symbiotic connections 
between early universities and national culture (Readings, 1996) to 
Altbach’s prescription of constructive reform (Altbach, 2001); from 
Jeffersonian role of education in protecting democracy through 
citizenship capable of “wardfing] off the potentially corrupting influence 
of power (Carpenter, 2001)” to Dewey’s education’s role in “supporting 
democracy (Dewey, 1984)”; these views and narratives propel the 
assum ption th a t universities constitute an  enterprise th a t society needs 
and th a t leaders of universities have moral responsibilities to uphold 
critical values th a t have served and are likely to continue serving the 
enterprise directly and by extension, the society in which the higher 
education enterprise lives.
Nothing is compromised by the assum ption th a t higher education 
institu tions represented by public universities and large private research 
universities have an  enduring epistemological responsibility and 
relevance to society, even though this assum ption becomes problem atic 
in the cosmopolitan public sphere where more educated nations can take 
advantage of less educated ones.
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Significance of the Study 
Grokster directly presented significant challenges in the areas of 
law, culture and technology. This study shows that, perhaps less 
obviously, th is case carried implications for higher education 
institutions. At the final onslaught, a t the Suprem e Court, Petitioners 
urged the Court to essentially lift the protection which, by Sony (1984), 
allowed researchers to develop system s which were im m une from 
secondary liability actions provided th a t the products based on these 
system s were capable of substan tia l noninfringing uses.
As argued by university professors in law, culture, and  technology, 
such a determ ination would have a  chilling effect on research activity, 
particularly a t research universities which as noted by Crews in (Crews, 
1993, a t p. 10) "... are distinguished by their param ount com m itm ent to 
original research ...”
Although ultim ately, the Suprem e Court opinion (545 U.S. 913, 
2005) did not shake the principles which supported the Sony decision, it 
is noteworthy th a t leaders in higher education adm inistration were 
completely absen t and silent a t the Court during the entire period in 
which the Court processed inputs and conducted its deliberations.
The political and  ethical implications of this absence and  silence 
need to be explored for the public who support higher education and  for 
studen ts of higher education culture, ethics and politics. Through the 
analysis of absence and silence as the rhetorical response of higher
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education leaders a t the Suprem e Court phase of Crokster, a  deeper 
appreciation could be gained of ways in which speech of university 
presidents may be constrained.
Readings has highlighted the symbiotic connection between early 
universities and  national culture and has pointed to a  shift in the role of 
the University due to “the decline of the national cultural m ission th a t 
has up  to now provided its raison d ’etre ...” (Readings, 1996, p. 3). 
Although Readings has suggested th a t “the University is a  ruined 
institution (Id. a t p. 169)” th a t “is losing its need to m ake transcendental 
claims for its function ... (Id a t p. 168)” the scholar has warned against 
“abandonm ent of [real] social responsibility”, namely, “ethical probity” 
which “is simply not com m ensurate with the grand narrative of 
nationalism  th a t up  to now underpinned accounts of the social action of 
University research and teaching (Id a t p. 192).”
Study so far has failed to uncover any calls for wholesale 
abandonm ent of the University, b u t ra ther prescriptions on how to “dwell 
in those ru in s” (Readings, p. 169) or on the criticality of “constructive 
reform” (Altbach, 2001, p. 290).
Perspectives represented by the ideas of Readings and those of 
Altbach increase the significance of th is investigation which directly 
probes the behavior of leaders of universities particularly the response of 
university presidents a t the Suprem e Court phase of Crokster. W hether 
the University’s need is to rise from “the ru in s” (Readings), undergo
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“constructive reform” (Altbach), or undergo some other form of 
transform ation, the issue of ethical probity for its leadership is critical. 
The rhetorical analysis of the symbolic action of absence and  silence of 
university leaders a t Grokster offers another perspective th a t could 
bridge the divergent perspectives represented by Readings and Altbach.
Sum m ary
In th is chapter, “Introduction”, a  brief account of copyright has 
been presented including its significance in the higher education 
enterprise. This has been followed by a sum m ary of succeeding stages in 
the copyright-based case of MOM v. Grokster up  to the Suprem e Court a t 
which the absence and silence of higher education leaders was glaring. 
The dem ands of petitioners a t the Court were poised to reverse or 
substantially  modify the import of the Sony principle.
The im pact of Grokster through copyright implications and the 
im pact on university function have been highlighted under the section on 
Institutional Im pact resulting in identification of a  curious rhetorical 
event, th a t is the absence and silence of higher education leaders a t the 
Suprem e Court in Grokster where petitioners’ dem ands had the potential 
of affecting universities through questions th a t petitioners urged 
Suprem e Court Justices to decide. This scenario has been described 
briefly under the section titled Research Problem. Four interrelated 
Research Questions have been stated  as a  m eans of analyzing this 
research problem.
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Due to the extensive use  of terminology and language from the 
special disciplines of legal research and rhetorical criticism, a  section on 
Definition and Explanation of Terms has been included.
Methodologies in rhetorical criticism and legal research are 
im portant tools and provide the framework for this investigation. German 
(1985) has provided a strategy for m atching rhetorical artifacts with an 
appropriate methodology from the discipline of rhetorical criticism.
Under the section on Methodology, portions of G erm an’s strategy have 
been sum m arized and the methodology of situational criticism has been 
selected to provide the unique combination of rhetorical artifact and 
methodology th a t prom ises to reveal new light on, and  increase our 
understanding  of the symbolic action of absence and silence.
The following section on Limitations adm its the theoretically biased 
posture of a  critic, and highlights certain exclusions, namely th a t of 
higher education from the categoiy of grand narratives. The latter would 
overshadow the rhetorical symbolic action and perhaps raise different 
and more urgen t questions. However by narrowing the sphere to the 
national public sphere, higher education in th is restricted sphere 
escapes the certainty of the m eta-narrative possibility. This allows the 
rhetorical criticism of the curious behavior of its leaders to rem ain a  
significant endeavor.
The next section. Significance of Study, has claimed th a t analysis 
of the absence and silence of higher education leaders in final phase of
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Grokster would add to the understanding  of the operation of forces th a t 
could compel such  a  response as well as contribute to the already 
highlighted concerns over challenges th a t exist in higher education 
leadership.
The entire chapter, C hapter I, is wrapped up  in th is Sum m ary 
section.
In C hapter II, “Review of L iterature”, review covers cases as well as 
two congressional bills, S. 167 and H.R. 4077 tha t are of proximate 
relevance to the issues in Grokster. The cases are Sony, Napster and 
Aimster. This chapter also reviews literature in the areas of the rhetoric 
of absence and silence, academic freedom as well as in the area  of public 
spheres in which university constituents are active participants. Some 
literature on decision making, judgm ent, ethics and morality is reviewed 
because of possible usefulness in the critical exam ination of the symbolic 
action of absence and silence.
C hapter III, “Methodology”, discusses the methodological 
framework through which the symbolic action of absence and silence of 
university presidents in Grokster is examined. The framework includes 
two com ponents, namely legal research and rhetorical criticism.
In C hapter IV, "Findings of the Study”, research questions are 
answered following findings th a t emerge from application of methodology 
to the rhetorical situation a t the Grokster Court with a  focus on the 
symbolic action of absence and  silence of university presidents.
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C hapter V, “Sum m aiy, Conclusions & Recom mendations”, 
provides sum m ary, conclusions and recom m endations. Concerns over 
leadership in higher education are revived. Ideas for further research 
conclude th is chapter and the substance of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction
Literature relevant to th is work falls into three categories. First, is 
the category of copyright cases and legislation tha t relate directly to p2p 
networks and cases through which principles of the doctrines of 
secondary copyright liability have been developed. Higher education 
institu tions have played and  continue to play central roles in the 
development and utilization of high speed networks as well as continuing 
to provide services as Internet service providers (ISPs) in a  unique 
environm ent in which the only users of their networks are also 
constituents of the institu tions themselves. The constituency of 
university studen ts with access to college networks, a t the height of the 
p2p file swapping phenom enon, played central roles in the crises which 
threatened to choke university networks and which alarm ed copyright 
owners into legal responses th a t culm inated in the Suprem e Court 
decision in Grokster.
The second category of literature is from the area  of rhetorical 
criticism th a t includes works on rhetorical situation, essential to the 
methodology of situational criticism as well as studies of absence and 
silence and  the way in which these phenom ena have been studied. 
Bitzer’s sem inal work on rhetorical situation is a  logical starting  point in
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this review. Highlights of imperfections uncovered in subsequent works 
ranging from compl
ete negation (Vatz, 1973), elaboration (Jamieson, 1975; Edbauer, 2005), 
alternative perspectives (Biesecker, 1983), and  comprehensive rhetorical 
theoiy (Consigny, 1974) have been selected for review because of their 
fundam ental relevance to situational criticism.
These first two categories of literature drawn from the areas of law 
and rhetorical criticism are of direct im portance to the legal and  critical 
methodologies. The scope of the third category of literature is informed 
by a theoretical dilemma in an exigency inquiry and illustrated in the 
following example in which a  child is drowning in an  isolated pool of 
water. In one case, the only subjects or agents present are other m inor 
children who have no swimming skills while in another case, adult 
swimmers surround  the pool.
One approach is to consider the child in the pool together with the 
surrounding environm ent of agents as a  single space of inquiry. The 
alternative approach is to separate the child’s immediate space from the 
space of other subjects in the immediate vicinity of the pool.
In th is alternative approach, questions of capacity, qualifications, 
values, ethics and morality could be probed w ithout any clash with 
Bitzer’s alleged assum ption of an  independently and publicly established 
exigence. Merging the situation in the pool with surrounding subject
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agents into a  single space of inquiry unnecessarily  problem atizes Bitzer’s 
notion of publicity of exigence.
For th is reason, the th ird  category of literature m ust be capable of 
dealing with the ecological environm ent which provide “a  network of lived 
practical consciousness ....” w ithin which rhetorical situation operates 
(Edbauer, 2005 a t p. 5).
Included in this collection are studies on the role of universities in 
society, principles of academic freedom, a  vibrant rhetorical site in which 
various constituencies in and out of higher education have established 
widely divergent discursive positions. This is also an  area in which 
Suprem e Court decisions have actively shaped the contours of rights and 
privileges which arise from various perspectives of academ ic freedom. 
Copyright, a  constitutional issue is a t the heart of the university function 
in society with strong relationships to academ ic freedom, the th rea t to 
which is a  principal concern of th is work.
Also included are works on concepts and constraints, both 
personal and external, on decision making, as well as considerations of 
ethics and  morality in special instances such  as in leadership positions 
of complex university environm ents. The in ten t is to expand the 
boundaries of spatialized and historialized ecology as broadly as it is 
reasonable to capture an  exhaustive inclusion of elements in the 
“network of lived practical experiences....” (Edbbaur, 2005) in which the 
rhetorical situation is embeded.
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Also, Farrel and  Young (2004) have recom mended for the 
methodology of situational criticism th a t "... the critic m ust take into 
account the totality of the situation and m ust consider the role played by 
each elem ent”. They further emphasize th a t although elem ents can be 
omitted later, initially, the list of elem ents “should be inclusive, even 
exhaustive” (Id. a t p. 35).
Legal Setting
Pre-Grokster Precedent
Developments in technology leading to peer to peer file sharing 
system s are central to the underlining argum ents in all the cases 
considered. Highlights of these developments deserve mention.
In 1969, an  RFC (Request for Comments) by a  m em ber of the 
three-person Network Working Croup, Steve Crocker of UCLA described 
details of a  peer-to-peer architecture. In the RFC he stated  one of the 
group’s goals as the need to stim ulate immediate and easy use  of the 
network by a  wide class of u sers and th a t “We m ust look for some 
m ethod which allows u s to use  our m ost sophisticated equipm ent as 
m uch as possible as if we were connected directly to the remote 
com puter” (Crocker, 1969; Wikipedia, 2005).
ARPANET, the basis of the Internet, went online in the sam e year 
as the RFC of the Network Working Croup. Funded by the Federal 
Government, it was eventually tu rned  over to an  agency of the 
D epartm ent of Defense with highly restricted connections to military
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sites, and  a  handful of universities involved in defense-related research. 
In the 1980’s, connection extended to more institu tions and  com panies 
involved in sponsored DOD research. Subsequently, DOD ended its 
development of ARPANET, clearing the way for the National Science 
Foundation, NSF, to continue funding the growth of the Internet until 
1995, when NSF privatized access (Kristula, 2001).
By 1998, Microsoft had  built-in peer-to-peer file-sharing 
capabilities into the Windows 98 platform (Stevens, 2007). According to 
Windows History (2007), a  superset of Windows 3.1, Windows for 
W orkgroups 3.11, added peer-to-peer workgroup and dom ain networking 
support and for the first time, W indows-based PCs were network-aware 
and became an  integral part of the emerging clien t/server com puting 
evolution (Windows History, 2007) and able to “share files, program s or 
your desktop, anytime, anywhere” (Microsoft, 2007). This feature of the 
Windows operating system  enjoyed quiet and limited popularity until 
1999 when a college student, Shawn Fanning, developed the Napster 
software th a t enabled users to download m usic files from other PCs 
connected to the Internet (Lewis 2005).
Fanning’s revolutionary application of peer-to-peer networking 
awakened copyright owners to the potential economic consequences of 
massive copyright infringement, and precipitated concerted public 
campaign and legal m aneuvers which sh u t down the N apster operation. 
The defunct Napster system  was based on one of three broad classes of
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peer-to-peer network design. Analysis of the MGM v. G rokster litigation is 
closely related to the peculiar characteristics of these three classes of 
peer-to-peer network architecture.
One end of the spectrum , typified by Napster, involves a  central 
indexing server controlled by Napster. All search traffic depended on th is 
centralized and dynamic repository of file nam es. At the other end of the 
spectrum , the “tru e” peer-to-peer system, each com puter m aintains 
shared files in its own hard  drive. A searching com puter m ust search 
each connected com puter until it locates a  desired file. Between the 
centralized and distributed extremes, an  interm ediate architecture exists. 
In this system, the software enables a com puter, depending on the traffic 
dem ands and  the com puter’s own processing capabilities, to shift into 
operation as a “supernode”. Supernodes m aintain indexes of files 
available for sharing and facilitate the connection between requesting 
and sharing com puters. Grokster and  Stream  Cast based the 
development of their software on the FastTrack technology developed by 
Niklas Zennstrom  and Ja n u s  Friis. Details in licensing relationships, as 
well as in the operation of the resulting networks substantially  
influenced analysis of liability for copyright infringement in Napster 
(2001), Aimster (2003), and  Grokster (2004).
Although p2p Internet activity was not an  issue in the Sony 
Betamax case, the significance of Sony is underscored by the claims of 
virtually all parties in Napster, Aimster, and Grokster th a t the Sony
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decision supported their positions. It is therefore useful to examine the 
landm ark Sony case.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios (1984)
Statem ent of the case
Petitioners, Sony Corp., m anufactured and sold, through third 
party retail establishm ents, a  home video tape recorder, Betamax, 
capable of recording television program s for later viewing. Respondents, 
Universal Studios, owned copyrights on some of the television program s 
broadcast. Respondents brought action in Federal District Court alleging 
tha t VTR users violated copyright protection by recording the publicly 
aired program s and further th a t Sony was liable for th a t infringement 
because they m arketed the VTR m achines used  to record television 
program s for later viewing. (Universal Studios v. Sony Corp. ,480 F. 
Supp. 429, 1979) . They sought money damages, an  equitable 
accounting of profits, and  an  injunction against the m anufacture and 
sale of Sony’s VTRs.
The District Court denied all relief sought by respondents holding 
tha t noncommercial home recording of public broadcasts was a  fair use 
of copyrighted material; also th a t petitioners could not be held liable as 
contributory infringers even if home use of VTRs was considered an 
infringing use. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding petitioners liable 
for contributory infringement and  ordered the District Court to fashion 
appropriate relief. (659 F.2d 963, 1981). The Suprem e Court granted
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certiorari, (457 U.S. 1116, 1982) and reversed the 9 th  Circuit appellate 
decision. (464 U.S. 417, 1984).
Principles and issues
In the Court opinion, the Constitutional in tent in U.S.C. Art.I, sect. 
8. provided monopoly privileges to au thors and inventors as a  m eans 
towards the im portant public purpose, th a t of public access to creative 
products. Copyright and paten t s ta tu tes m ake reward to the owner a  
secondary consideration. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127. 
Such rew ards are incentives to induce release of creative products for 
public access. United S tates v. Param ount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 
158 (1948).
The opinion used the “staple article of commerce” doctrine from 
patent law to conclude th a t Betamax was capable of substan tia l non 
infringing uses because of its capability to record program s which are 
authorized by certain copyright holders, as well as unauthorized 
recording of works of other copyright holders under the “fair u se” 
doctrine of Copyright Law. The decision emphasized th a t indeed the 
product need merely be capable of substan tia l noninfringing uses (Sony, 
442). In the latter case of Aimster, the 7th  Circuit decision placed the 
burden on Aimster of dem onstrating the probability of actual 
noninfringing uses of its system.
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The role of Congress
The Court em phasized the C onstitutional charge to Congress in 
balancing the scope of the purely sta tu tory  monopoly granted by 
copyright laws to copyright holders in their works, on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, the availability and use  of such works by the general 
public. It indicated th a t Congress has been discharging its duties from 
time to time “fashioning the new rules th a t technology m ade necessary”, 
(Sony, 1984 under “The Court of Appeals Decision”), as the realities of 
new technologies introduce am biguities in defining assum ptions. The 
Court consistently defers to Congress when major technological 
innovations alter the m arket for copyrighted m aterials. “Congress has the 
constitutional authority  and the institu tional ability to accommodate 
fully the varied perm utations of competing in terests th a t are inevitably 
implicated by such new technology (Id.)”
However, in the case th a t Congress has not plainly m arked the 
balance of competing interests, the Court is guided by the principle, 
credited to Justice  Stewart in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975), th a t although creative work is to be 
encouraged and rewarded within the limited monopolistic and  durational 
scope of copyright holders’ privileges, the ultim ate objective was the 
promotion of broad public availability of literature, m usic and  the other 
arts.
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Authorized use  of staple article of commerce
In contrast to the Patent Act, the Copyright Act does not expressly 
render anyone liable for infringem ent committed by another. Secondary 
liability under the “doctrines of direct infringement and  vicarious 
liability” were not involved in the Sony case. Rather, petitioners asked 
the Court to hold Sony liable for contributory infringement. The Court 
found th a t Sony does not supply Betamax consum ers with copyrighted 
works, a  critical difference in the N apster case. Rather, it sells a  device 
th a t consum ers, independently and subsequently may use to copy 
program s th a t are copyrighted, those th a t are not copyrighted, those th a t 
are copyrighted b u t may be copied w ithout objection from the copyright 
holder, and  those th a t the copyright holder would prefer not to have 
copied. Sony’s advertisem ents did not also encourage infringing uses of 
its m achine, in contrast to Aim ster’s active promotion of unauthorized 
downloads of copyrighted m usic and movie files. Unlike Aimster, Sony, in 
its advertisem ents, warned th a t some television program s which 
Betamax was capable of recording may be protected by copyright. Ample 
evidence had  been presented th a t some producers sanctioned the use  of 
Betamax in time-shifting which afforded viewers the convenience of 
recording television program s for viewing a t a  later time.
Contributory liability
The staple article of commerce doctrine m ust strike a  balance 
between a  copyright holder’s legitimate dem and for effective protection of
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the sta tu tory  monopoly, and  the rights of others freely to engage in 
substantially  unrelated areas of commerce. Since the potential u se  of 
Betamax is m uch broader th an  its use  for recording unauthorized works, 
Sony could not be held liable under contributory infringement.
Such a rule would “block the wheels of commerce” as in Henry v. A. B. 
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912).
The record showed th a t there were m any producers of television 
program s who did not object to the “enlargem ent in the size of the 
television viewers th a t resulted from the practice of time-shifting for 
private home u se”. The seller of the equipm ent th a t m akes th is time- 
shifting process possible “has had no direct involvement with any 
infringing activity”.
W hereas Sony had  no direct involvement with any infringing use  of 
Betamax, N apster’s involvement was central in the file swapping 
operations th a t the Napster system  supported. In Aim ster’s case, though 
Aimster avoided direct involvement in the actual exchange of files, it 
nonetheless played an  essential role in enabling two peer com puters to 
actually exchange files. In contrast, Grokster and Stream  Cast have no 
role in the file swapping transactions between peer com puters th a t run  
the Grokster or M orpheus software program s.
Vicarious liability
Although petitioners did not charge vicarious liability, the Court 
observed th a t if vicarious liability was to be imposed, it m ust rest on the
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fact th a t Sony sold equipm ent with constructive knowledge of the fact 
tha t its custom ers may use  th a t equipm ent for unauthorized recording of 
copyrighted material. The Court concluded th a t there was no precedent 
in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability on such  a 
theoiy.
U nauthorized “fair u se”
The Court observed th a t even unauthorized uses of a  copyrighted 
work were not necessarily infringing. To constitute an  infringement, the 
unlicensed use of copyrighted m aterial m ust be in conflict with one of the 
five exclusive rights conferred by the copyright statu te. These rights were 
subject to exemptions created in section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976 
for a “fair u se” of copyrighted works which does not require any 
authorization from the copyright owner. The determ ination of a  fair use 
qualification required application of an  “equitable rule of reason” in the 
analysis of each particu lar claim of infringement.
Section 107 provides four factors to be considered in a  fair use 
analysis. These are the purpose and character of the use, the na tu re  of 
the copyrighted work, the am ount and substantiality  of the portion used, 
and the potential m arket effect on the work. An adverse potential m arket 
effect may be presum ed if the intended use  of copied works was for 
commercial gain. However, if the copied work was for a  non commercial 
purpose, the likelihood of harm  m ust be dem onstrated by a
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preponderance of evidence th a t some meaningful likelihood of future 
harm  existed.
Conclusion
The Court concluded th a t “The direction of Art. I is th a t Congress 
shall have the power to promote the progress of science and  the useful 
arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far 
Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress”. Deepsouth 
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972). The Seventh 
Circuit applied the Suprem e Court ruling in the Sony-Betamax case in 
Aimster. It is useful to d iscuss the principles underlining copyright 
infringement and how these im pacted the Napster system  since new 
capabilities in subsequent p2p file swapping system s exhibit different 
vulnerabilities when scrutinized under each principle. “Fair Use” was 
critical in Napster since this was the essence of N apster’s affirmative 
defense on behalf of its users. Direct infringement is pre requisite to any 
consideration of a  secondary infringement. A successful fair use 
affirmative defense would have been necessarily fatal to the petitioner’s 
charges against Napster for contributory and  vicarious liability. The 
Ninth Circuit decision in Napster addressed notable differences between 
the conduct of Napster and th a t of Sony in Betamax.
A & M Records v. Napster (2001)
Napster operated a  system  which enabled a potential u se r to first 
access N apster’s Internet website, register, download, and  install the free
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Napster M usicShare software on his or her com puter after creating a  
u se r nam e and passw ord as part of the registration process. A registered 
u se r who w ants to share files is required to create a  directory on the 
computer, load files intended for sharing and uses capabilities in 
M usicShare to verify and upload to N apster’s severs, the nam es of well 
form atted MP3 files. The record did not show th a t creation of th is file 
share directory was required. The nam es of files in the u se r’s share 
directory were uploaded and  organized under u se r nam es within a  global 
“collective directory” of all files available for transfer. Within the collective 
directory on N apster’s servers, the nam es of files on com puters which 
were online a t the m om ent were available for in stan t access by other 
com puters running  the Napster software.
Software on Napster servers m aintain and update a  search index 
which an  individual u ser can search by artists or song titles. Napster 
servers handle the search requests and  m atch these with d a ta  from their 
collective directory returning and re tu rn  a  list of all the m atching file 
nam es to the com puter which initiated the search. To effect an  actual 
transfer from one com puter to a  requesting com puter, N apster servers 
extract the IP addresses of both com puters, use the IP address of the 
com puter with the song files to inform th a t com puter of the IP address of 
the requesting com puter. Subsequently, both com puters, using  each 
others IP address, transfer the requested files. The file transfer initiates 
an  infringement inquiry. Two conditions are required to establish  a  prim a
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facie case of direct infringement. Firstly, the plaintiff m ust dem onstrate 
ownership of the subject m aterial which in th is case, is the contents of a  
specific m usic m edia file. Secondly plaintiff m ust dem onstrate th a t the 
alleged infringers violated a t least one exclusive right of the copyright 
holder under 17 U.S.C § 106.
The court established th a t file transfer through the Internet 
involves reproduction and distribution. This finding establishes the 
Internet based process as a valid copying m echanism  for which the 
Copyright Act grants exclusive reproduction and distribution rights to 
the copyright owner, subject only to a  fair use determ ination. In 
Betamax, copying was localized exclusively in the actions of the user. 
D istribution was not an  issue. In Napster, a  fair use inquiry is 
complicated by the fact th a t the acts of copying and distribution are 
coupled and involve two parties. A fair use analysis is based on factors 
enum erated in 17 U.S.C. § 107. The factors are (1) the purpose and 
character of the use; (2) the na tu re  of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
am ount and substantiality  of the portion used  in relation to the work as 
a  whole; and (4) the effect of the use  upon the potential m arket for the 
work or the value of the work.
The first factor examines w hether the resulting work adds a further 
purpose or different character to the original work. The court’s analysis 
asserts th a t courts have been reluctan t to find fair use  when an  original 
work is merely retransm itted  in a  different medium. This factor also
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examines w hether the alleged infringement is commercial or non 
commercial. While direct economic benefit is not required to dem onstrate 
a  commercial use, copying a  work to avoid the expense of purchasing  the 
original could potentially create an  indirect economic benefit to the 
recipient of the copied work. In Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia 
Church of God, 227 F. 3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit opinion 
observed th a t the mere fact th a t a  use  is educational and not for profit 
does not insulate it from a  finding of infringement. Also the Philadelphia 
Church use  of “The Mystery of Ages” indirectly profited it through 
increased m em bership (Worldwide C hurch v. Philadelphia Church,
2000). The Napster court also noted th a t the No Electronic Theft Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-147, 18 U.S.C. § 101, in its definition of financial gain 
includes trading infringing copies of a  work for other sim ilar works. It 
m ust be noted however th a t a  file transfer in the Napster system , as in 
the subsequently  developed file swapping system s of Aimster and 
Grokster, does not involve any reciprocal undertakings or exchanges.
The na tu re  of use is the focus of the second factor. The court 
asserted  th a t the plaintiffs’ copyrighted m usical compositions and sound 
recordings are creative in natu re  and therefore militate against a  finding 
of fair use. However, how the recipient uses the work would seam  to be 
more determ inistic of fair use  th an  the natu re  of the work itself which 
the court was apparently describing. The th ird  factor considers the 
portion used. As the court observed, wholesale copying does not
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necessarily preclude fair use  although copying an  entire work m ilitates 
against a fair use  finding. Here the court referred to the Betam ax in Sony 
where the Court concluded fair use even when the protected work is 
copied in its entirety for time-shifting purposes (Sony, 1984, p. 449-50).
If indeed the requester- recipient of a protected Internet file had  a 
legitimate fair use for parts of a  protected work, it is doubtful th a t 
lim itations in the enabling technology would perm it fractional copying.
The fourth and last factor exam ines the effect of use  on the 
m arket. The court stated  th a t if the intended use  is for commercial gain, 
the likelihood of m arket harm  may be presum ed, bu t m ust be 
dem onstrated in the case of a non commercial purpose. The N apster case 
did not clarify the threshold of harm  th a t can be associated with a  one 
time download of a  single protected m usic file although it recognized th a t 
the im portance of th is factor would vary, not only with the am ount of 
harm , b u t also with the relative strength  of the other factors. Significant 
portions of the consideration of fair use  in Napster and  subsequent cases 
are based on an aggregation of the presum ed effect of the actions of 
several independent alleged infringers. Direct infringement is an 
individual act. The validity of aggregating these individual acts in 
analyzing fair use  factors is yet to be established. In any case, the 
Napster court did exactly that.
In considering present and  future harm , the court relied on the 
opinion of plaintiffs’ experts whose studies were statistical in na tu re  as
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the inferences related to the present and  probabilistic as to the future 
im pact on the m arket for the copyrighted works. In Sony, it was observed 
tha t the technology th a t Sony developed for the copying of m usic files 
with the Betamax m achine eventually benefited copyright owners. 
Betamax limitation to one hour program s was overcome when another 
company developed the VHS which extended the one hour limit 
sufficiently to allow the copying of entire movies thereby generating a 
gigantic m arket for movie and m usical CDs for copyrighted ow ners’ 
works. The Napster court also established th a t lack of harm  to an 
established m arket could not deprive the copyright holder of the right to 
develop alternative m arkets for their works. This concept was highlighted 
in Grokster where artists  encouraged copying of their works to stim ulate 
concert a ttendance sales. After Napster was sh u t down, it quickly 
restructured  its system  for the use of copyright owners in effecting 
controlled m ass sales and distribution of their protected works.
The court also examined some established principles of fair use 
and concluded th a t time shifting use  of Betamax and space shifting in 
Diamond, m anufacturers of the portable MP3 player, ‘Rio’, served the 
convenience of the individual u sers of these devices (RIAA v Diamond, 
1999). On the contrary, the Napster system  enabled a u se r to expose to 
millions of potential infringers, a  m usic file even if it had  been copied for 
space shifting use  by an  original CD owner. Some lower courts had 
already ruled th a t space shifting of MP3 files through a  com puter disc
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was not a  fair use  even when previous ownership is dem onstrated 
regardless of w hether the files are used  exclusively by the owner or 
offered to others for downloading. In the absence of a fair use 
determ ination, operators of p2p file sharing system s necessarily 
succum b to the fundam ental condition for secondary copyright liability, 
namely the existence of the prim ary direct infringer. It has long been 
established th a t there can be no contributory infringement by a  
defendant w ithout direct infringement by another party. (Religious Tech 
Center V. Netcom, 1995).
Secondary liability
Contributory liability requires th a t the secondary infringer knows 
of direct infringement. The court concluded th a t Napster had both actual 
and constructive knowledge. This conclusion in the case of actual 
knowledge was derived in part from N apster’s own internal 
communication. In the case of constructive knowledge, the Napster 
court, like Sony, would not im pute the requisite level of constructive 
knowledge to Napster merely because peer to peer file sharing technology 
may be applied to infringing purposes.
The Napster court relied on the Sony opinion th a t selling 
equipm ent capable of both infringing and substan tia l non infringing uses 
was sufficient to relieve the seller of such  equipm ent from being judged 
to posses the requisite level of constructive knowledge required for 
contributory liability. Actual knowledge then  becomes critical to
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satisfying the knowledge condition for contributory liability. The court 
judged Napster to have actual knowledge because copyright holders 
directly informed Napster of specific infringing files on its system.
Napster failure to remove the nam es of such files contributed to 
infringement. The success of the Napster system  depended on an 
architectural design th a t m aintained searchable indexes of file nam es. 
Aimster’s design attem pted to overcome this feature by not m aintaining 
any indexes on its servers. Rather its servers searched the folders of its 
users in an  attem pt to locate a  specific requested file.
The second and final condition to establish contributory liability 
involves m aterial contribution. The court found th a t Napster m aterially 
contributed to the infringing activity through its operation of an  
integrated service designed to facilitate the location and  downloading of 
copyrighted m usic files. “The site and  facilities” of Napster were involved 
in direct infringement as in Fonovisa (Napster II, Sect IVB, para. 58). The 
9th  Circuit decision agreed with the lower court determ ination tha t 
Napster had the ability to locate infringing m aterial listed on its search 
indices and the right to term inate u se rs ’ access to the system  and failure 
to exercise th is right am ounted to a  contribution to infringement. 
Vicarious liability
Vicarious liability arises in copyright law when a  party with a 
financial in terest in infringing activity and also with the right and  ability 
to supervise th a t activity fails to exercise supervision to term inate
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infringement. The N apster court noted th a t Sony’s “staple article of 
commerce” analysis did not apply in considering N apster’s liability for 
vicarious copyright infringement since th a t doctrine had  application as a 
defense to contributory infringement and not to vicarious infringement. 
However, the financial benefit factor was easily established. The court 
found th a t N apster’s future revenue was directly dependent upon 
increases in the use  of its system. Increasing access of u sers to the 
N apster website and search indexes to conduct searches for copyrighted 
works, m aterially benefited Napster by creating revenue stream s from 
Internet advertisem ent.
The court reasoned th a t N apster’s website notices, and  ability to 
block infringers’ access to its services “for any reason” dem onstrated the 
“right and  ability to supervise”.. N apster’s own expression of rights to 
refuse service and term inate accounts at its own discretion confirmed its 
ability to supervise u se rs ’ conduct. This right to police m ust be exercised 
to its fullest extent to avoid vicarious liability (Id. sect. VIII, para. 85).
The court however noted th a t N apster’s ability to supervise could 
be impaired since file nam es are supplied by users and could be spelt 
incorrectly to an  extent which m ade it difficult or sometimes impossible 
to determine if a  file nam e was associated with infringing m aterial. 
N apster’s system  did not examine file contents. For N apster to function 
as intended, file nam es m ust reasonably predict file contents which they 
represent. The court endorsed the conclusion th a t N apster’s failure to
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police the system ’s “prem ises,” combined with financial benefits from the 
continuing availability of infringing files on its system, rendered Napster 
vicariously liable for copyright infringement. (Id. sect. VIII) Although all of 
N apster’s defenses failed to avert the lower court’s decision to impose a 
preliminary injunction, each of them  has a t least one significant 
relationship to specific circum stances in the subsequent Aimster and 
Groks ter cases.
Napster asserted  th a t its users were engaging in actions protected 
by § 1008 of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 
(Napster II, sect. VI, para. 70) and also th a t its liability for contributory 
and vicarious infringement was limited by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512. The Audio Home Recording Act sta tu te  
forbids actions alleging infringement of copyright based on the 
m anufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording 
device, a  digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device or 
an  analog recording medium, or based on the non commercial use  by a 
consum er of such  a  device or m edium  for m aking digital m usical 
recordings or analog m usical recordings. Contrary to N apster’s claim, the 
court excluded com puters from the definition of digital audio recording 
devices under the assum ption th a t their prim ary purpose was not to 
make digital audio recordings.
Napster also used  the defense of copyright m isuse by a  copyright 
holder to expand the scope of the limited monopoly granted by the
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Copyright Act and  asserted  th a t online distribution was not w ithin the 
copyright monopoly accorded in 17 U.S.C. § 106, as exclusive rights for 
copyrighted works. The court stated  th a t the format of transm ission, 
MP3 ra ther th an  audio CD was irrelevant. Also the burden  of identifying 
the presence of copyrighted m aterial was placed on the copyright owner 
after which Napster would have the duty to disable access to the 
offending content.
Napster also asserted  th a t under the First Am endment it had  a 
right to publish a  “directory” and its u se rs ’ had  a  right to exchange 
information. The court would consider the significance of the First 
Am endment principles if u sers of Napster were engaged in “fair u se”. 
Prior restrain t, contrary to the First Am endment requires a  further 
examination. Is it admissible for the court to allow copyright owners to 
create a  resu lt which destroys the ability of a potential u se r to engage in 
lawful noninfringing activities sanctioned by the First Amendment? The 
Copyright Act provides for various sanctions against infringers. One of 
this is injunctive relief, 17 U.S.C § 502. The court affirmed th is lower 
court sanction which in effect sh u t down the Napster operation.
In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation (2003)
In the Aimster case, cert denied, the Seventh Circuit considered 
several principles from the Sony “Betam ax” case. Jo h n  Deep, the owner 
of “Aimster” appealed the decision of a Northern District of Illinois court 
in a consolidated law suit filed by several owners of copyrighted popular
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
m usic to, in effect, sh u t down the Aimster service which facilitated the 
swapping of digital copies of popular music. In Aimster, as in the other 
related copyright cases, direct infringement by users was undisputed  and 
factual. Though Aimster’s com puters do not store any m usic files and  are 
not directly involved in the file downloading process, its server scouts for 
a connected u se r’s com puter on which a  requested file is available for 
sharing and instructs th a t com puter to download the requested file to 
the com puter th a t initiated the search.
Statem ent of the case
Aimster provided proprietary software th a t can be downloaded free 
of charge from Aim ster’s Web site after a  prospective u ser enters login 
data  and information th a t they use  to access Aim sters’ services. 
Computerized tutorials on the web site explained how to use the software 
to swap com puter files.' For a  fee, users could join “Club Aimster”, also 
owned by Deep. From this club, u sers could more easily download 
popular m usic files labeled as “top40”. First time users enter a  u ser 
name and passw ord to register. Thereafter the u ser can designate 
another u se r as a  “buddy” and can com m unicate directly with all 
buddies who are online a t the sam e time. The mode of com m unication is 
encrypted email to which files may be attached. Encryption software may 
be downloaded, w ithout charge, from the Aimster web site. Users 
typically place files they wish to share in a  folder which is searchable by 
Aimster’s server when another u se r m akes a  request for a particu lar file.
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If a  requested file is available in the shareable folder, the Aimster server 
instructs the com puter on which the shareable folder exists to download 
the file to the requesting computer. Both com puters ru n  the Aimster 
software which facilitates these transactions.
Contributory liability
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit enum erates three possible 
uses of the recording m achine Betam ax in the Sony case. The first is 
time-shifting, the second, “library building”, the th ird  was skipping 
commercials, in effect producing a  “derivative work”. Judge Posner 
concludes th a t the Sony copying m achine was used  for both infringing 
and non infringing purposes. The Sony Court construed time shifting as 
“fair u se” since the Court believed th a t th is use was not hurting  the 
copyright owner. Rather, it enlarged the audience for their program s. 
Posner asserts th a t the other two uses of the Betamax m achine, libraiy 
building and avoiding commercials are infringing uses. Mere constructive 
knowledge of infringement is insufficient to establish contributory 
liability. Also, lack of constructive knowledge of infringing activity does 
not necessarily insulate a  person from contributoiy liability. Posner 
considers Deep’s claim tha t he lacked constructive knowledge of the 
contents of files being swapped as “willful b lindness”. Deep cannot 
escape liability by the use of encryption to m ask the identity of files 
shared by users of Aimster. “Our point is th a t a  service provider th a t 
would otherwise be a contributory infringer does not obtain im m unity by
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using encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful 
purposes for which the service is being used”.
The Aimster opinion asserts th a t the Sony Court did not absolve 
Sony from contributory liability merely because Betamax had substan tia l 
non infringing uses. The opinion suggested th a t other factors considered 
in Sony are revealed by the notice the Court gave to the fact th a t Sony’s 
advertisem ent did not promote infringing uses; the observation th a t 
Betamax was used  “principally” for time shifting; and the sta tem ent tha t 
the opposing party, Universal Studios, owned only a  small percentage of 
copyrighted television program m ing while it was unclear how m any more 
copyright owners objected to home taping. They see no conflict with Sony 
in imposing contributory liability on a product or service which though 
capable of non infringing uses is, in reality, used only for infringement. 
Unlike Sony’s advertisem ent, Aimster actively promoted infringement 
through its web based tutorials and through Club Aimster whose 
m em bership provided download access to the forty m ost popular m usic 
hits. However, these apparent roles which involve Aimster in significant 
aspects of file swapping “does not exclude the possibility of substan tia l 
non infringing uses of the Aimster system .” The court considered the 
evidence highlighting Aim ster’s role sufficient, “especially in a 
prelim inaiy injunction proceeding, which is sum m ary in character”, to 
shift the burden to Aimster, of dem onstrating tha t the service has non 
infringing uses.
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While several non infringing uses rem ain as possibilities, the 
“question is how probable they are .” Posner’s opinion asserts  th a t “it is 
not enough...that a  product or service be physically capable ... of a  non 
infringing u se”. The court observes th a t Aimster has failed to produce 
any evidence of non infringing uses “let alone evidence concerning the 
frequency of such u se s”. The Aimster court apparently a ttaches 
im portance to dem onstration of the probability of using the service for 
non infringing purposes and possibly more weight to the frequency of 
such uses. The encryption used  by Aimster with the expectation of 
avoiding a finding of constructive knowledge, which might be used  to 
assign contributory liability, also m ad-e it impossible for Aimster to 
observe non infringing uses of its system, which might have enabled it to 
avoid sum m ary judgm ent.
The court attached so m uch im portance to the failure of Aimster to 
produce evidence of non infringing uses, th a t it considered irrelevant, 
further inquiry into the possible effects on the m arket for copyrighted 
works of the defendant. This insistence by the Seventh Court th a t the 
defendant produces evidence of non infringing uses as a condition for 
avoiding a  contributory liability finding is one of the m ajor differences 
between the 7th  and  9 th  Circuits reading of Sony.
Judge Posner also addressed issues related to the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) with the conclusion th a t although 
Aimster fits the definition of an  Internet service provider (ISP), its actions
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precluded it from seeking refuge in any of the “safe harbors” th a t the 
DMCA provides for service providers. One such  refuge is th a t the service 
provider, to avoid contributory liability, m ust “do w hat it can be 
reasonably asked to do” to prevent the use  of its services by “repeat 
infringers.” On the contrary, Aimster “invited them  to do so, showed 
them  how to do so with ease using its system  and by teaching its u sers 
how to encrypt their unlawful distribution of copyrighted m aterials, 
disabled itself from doing anything to prevent infringement”. Thus the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court decision to sh u t down the 
operation of the Aimster service.
Evolving Interpretations of Copyright Law Interests
In the United States, copyright laws derive from Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, “the Congress shall have power ... to 
promote the progress of science and  useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to au thors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries”. Congress exercised its constitutional m andate 
to promote the progress of science by enacting patent laws to protect 
inventors while to promote useful arts, it enacted copyright laws.
While Congress has progressively increased the duration of 
copyright protection from an  absolute 14 years in 1790, to, 
retrospectively, 70 years beyond the au th o r’s life in 1998. Remarkable 
also are the persisten t a ttem pts by copyright holders to seek expansion 
in the scope of statu tory  protection afforded them  through a  two pronged
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strategy of litigation and  legislative maneuvering. While according to 
ARL, “for alm ost three hundred  years... U.S. law has been revised [by 
Congress] to broaden the scope of copyright, to change the term  of 
copyright protection, and  to address new technologies”; the Courts have 
been cautious in resisting attem pts of copyright holders to expand, not 
only the scope of sta tu tory  protection granted by Congress, b u t to extend 
control over products which are not the subject of copyright laws (Sony, 
1984, sect. I).
The first Congress implemented the copyright provision of the U.S. 
Constitution in 1790 through “An Act for the Encouragem ent of 
Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and  Books to the 
Authors and Proprietors of Such Copies”. ARL, 2005. “Exclusive rights” 
included the right to print, re-print, or publish their works for a  period of 
14 years with an option to renew for the same duration. The Act 
embodied the two pronged constitutional in ten t of providing incentives to 
encourage artists and writers to create artistic works while it ensured  
th a t “science and the useful a rts” are advanced through wide public 
access to these artistic creations which, upon the expiration of a  limited 
period of monopoly, pass into the public domain. A revision in 1831 
doubled the term  of protection to 28 years, with an option to extend by 
an  additional 14 year period. Successive revisions in 1909 extended the 
additional period to 28 years thereby providing protection for 56 years 
and then  to the life of the au thor plus 50 years and in the case of works
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for hire, 75 years beyond the life of the author. C urrent protected term  of 
70 years beyond the au th o r’s life came into effect in 1998. (Notable dates 
in United States Copyright, 2005; Timeline, 2005)
Throughout the Groks ter case, attorneys representing defendants 
Grokster and Stream  Cast, like the lower State of California courts have 
insisted th a t the plaintiffs’ dem ands am ount to a  plea for judicial 
expansion of the sta tu tory  scope th a t successive am endm ents of the 
Copyright Act have already established for protected works and  th a t such  
action is reserved for Congress. (Sony, sect. 11).
Congress m ade major revisions of the U.S. Copyright Act in 1909 
to include “all works of au thorsh ip”. Lawmakers expressed the concern 
tha t “it has been a  serious and difficult task  to combine the protection of 
the composer with the protection of the public”. For th is congressional 
session, the challenge was “securing to the composer an  adequate re tu rn  
... and a t the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies”. 
Id, HR 2222. Another major revision in 1976 codified “fair u se” for 
purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship 
and research. This represented a  bold attem pt to serve the common good 
especially as the sam e revision also extended the duration of protection 
beyond th a t which ordinary m ortals could lay in wait. Education received 
generous concessions in the House report accompanying the 1976 act.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 dealt a  debilitating 
blow to “fair u se” by criminalizing “unauthorized access to a work by
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circumventing a  technological protection m easure” to frustrate  copying, 
except by libraries and  state  agencies, for any purpose, including 
purposes which had  been established under the fair use  doctrine. A year 
later, in the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages 
Improvement Act of 1999, Congress significantly raised the m inim um  
statu tory  dam ages for infringements from $500 to $750. The maxim um  
for willful infringement increased from $100,000 to $150,000. As a 
strategy to deter casual infringers, copyright owners have sued over 8000 
“major infringers”, m any of whom are studen ts a t university networks 
(Niccolai, 2006).
Congressional Bills S. 167 and H.R. 4077
Another attem pt by Congress to fulfill its constitutional role of 
balancing reward to creators of a rt and preservation of public good is 
embodied in two Bills H.R.4077 and S. 167.
The House of Representatives bill H.R.4077 sponsored by Rep. 
Lamar Smith of Texas, with seven cosponsors, titled “Piracy Deterrence 
and Education Act of 2004” sought “To enhance criminal enforcem ent of 
the copyright laws, to educate the public about the application of 
copyright law to the Internet, and  for other purposes.” In H.R. 4077, law 
m akers frontally tackled the peer-to-peer phenom enon stating th a t over 2 
billion digital-media files were transferred among up millions of u sers 
who simply believed th a t they will not be caught or prosecuted for their 
conduct. (H.R. 4077, Sec. 2 . 3,4). Congress was concerned over the
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security and privacy th rea ts of “software th a t could allow an  independent 
company to take over portions of u se rs ’ com puters and Internet 
connections and has the capacity to keep track  of u se rs ’ online hab its” 
were addressed in (Sec. 2.5. Id.) in apparen t reference to “supem odes” in 
the Grokster “G nutella” system. The act provided for the D epartm ent of 
Justice  to urge ISPs to w arn identified infringers of the penalties for [p2p] 
copyright infringement and train  Com puter Hacking and Intellectual 
Property (CHIP) agents to investigate and  enforce “intellectual property 
crim es”.
The bill prescribed penalties for persons who record movies in “a 
motion picture exhibition facility” bu t m ade no reference to fair uses by 
users of home m edia recording equipm ent. In Sec. 9, development and 
legal use of peer to peer technology was commended and encouraged 
while decrying economic and crim inal consequences of massive illegal 
activity th a t includes “the distribution of child pornography, viruses, and 
confidential personal information, and  copyright infringem ent.” Sec. 10 
targets p2p file sharing users who exceed a  distribution threshold with a 
m inim um  penalty of $10,000 per infringement. The threshold is 
comparable to th a t used  by RIAA in selecting users th a t it targets for 
legal prosecution.
The bill implies a  clear distinction between users who simply 
download files which are offered by others and users who m ake available 
to others to download, substan tia l num ber of files. Procedures are
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detailed for ISPs to participate voluntarily in transm itting  warning 
notices to offenders which government CHIP agents have identified. 
Virtually all institu tions of higher education provide Internet and 
network access to their faculty, staff and studen ts and  therefore, under 
H.R. 4077, have the same responsibilities as other ISPs to control 
unauthorized file sharing activity on their networks.
Senate bill S. 167 sponsored by Sen. Orin Hatch of U tah and  four 
cosponsors and introduced under the title “A bill to provide for the 
protection of intellectual property rights, and for other purposes” has 
been enacted into Public Law No: 109-9 as the “Family E ntertainm ent 
and Copyright Act of 2005” or “A rtists’ Rights and  Theft Prevention Act of 
2005”. Also cited as the ‘ART Act’, th is enactm ent prescribes penalties for 
distribution of works ‘being prepared for commercial d istribution’ bu t not 
yet released as well as commercially available works such  as ‘a  com puter 
program ... sound recording ... and  motion picture’
The Grokster Lower Court Decisions
MGM V. Grokster (S.D. Gal. 2003), affd. (9th Cir. 2004)
Plaintiffs brought actions against Grokster, Ltd and Stream  Cast, 
Networks, Inc. (“D efendants”) under 17 U.S.C §§ 501 for secondary 
copyright infringement based on uncontested direct infringem ent of 
u sers of their software. Defendants filed cross-m otions for sum m ary 
judgm ent arguing th a t they have no control of users of their software.
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Details of architecture and licensing relationships are critical in the 
analysis.
Software distributed by Grokster, Stream  Cast and Kazaa BV, were 
initially based on the FastTrack networking technology developed by 
Niklas Zennstrom  and Ja n u s  Friis, owners of Kazaa BV. (Wu, supra, p. 
734; Grokster, 2003, sect. IIA) FastTrack was licensed to the three 
organizations; however. Stream  Cast now employs the non proprietary 
Gnutella technology in its software, M orpheus. Groks te r’s software is 
based on the FastTrack technology, under license from Sharm an who 
acquired ownership of Kazaa. Users of both software packages ultim ately 
connect to other u sers and download copyrighted m edia files and  by their 
actions, raising genuine questions of contributoiy and vicarious liability 
for Grokster and  Stream  Cast who supply the software.
Contributory infringement
The two factors which determ ine liability for contributory 
infringement are knowledge of the direct infringing conduct and  m aterial 
contribution in the infringement process. The standard  for the knowledge 
condition, established in Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 
if the product is capable of substan tia l noninfringing uses, is actual 
knowledge of specific instances of infringing uses a t a  time during which 
infringement is in progress. Constructive knowledge is not sufficient to 
impose contributory infringement, nor is actual knowledge, if the
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knowledge arrives when the alleged contributory infringer can do nothing 
to stop the infringing conduct.
In Religious Tech v. Netcom (N.D. Cal. 1995), alleged infringing 
m essages resided on servers controlled by Netcom a t tim es when 
plaintiffs asserted, Netcom could have deleted them  and suspended 
users accounts to m ake distribution of the m essages impossible. Netcom 
is the classic landlord -  tenan t case where knowledge of infringement 
acquired after the tenan t is in control of the leased prem ises is 
insufficient to establish contributory infringement.
Material contribution
Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction (9th Cir. 1996) gave guidance on the 
extent of involvement required to establish m aterial contribution. 
Fonovisa provided “the site and  facilities” which included non only rental 
space, like the landlord, bu t also utilities, parking and advertisem ent to 
lure buyers of counterfeit goods from his swap meet tenants. N apster’s 
provision of a  central site essential to u sers searches for locations with 
downloadable files, satisfied the site and  facilities standard  to establish 
liability (Napster 239 F.3d a t 1022). Grokster and  Stream  Cast, unlike 
Napster, do not m aintain central sites under their control th a t are 
essential to the successful use  of their software by users to download 
files from other users.
G rokster’s system  is based on the FastTrack technology which 
dynamically establishes supernodes within the network of connected
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com puters. The Grokster system  is configured with a list of “root 
supernodes” which direct u sers to active supernodes. G rokster does not 
have the ability to alter the proprietary software licensed from Sharm an. 
Grokster has since disabled the root supernodes feature ensuring th a t 
users connect to other u sers w ithout any support from Grokster. W ithout 
the supernode feature, and  any control of the source code, G rokster was 
not contributing to infringement. Stream  Cast, unlike Grokster, designed 
its software “M orpheus” on the open source Gnutella technology in which 
there is no hierarchical struc tu re  of nodes and supernodes th a t 
characterized the Grokster network. But while Stream  Cast could alter 
the open source software, it probably does not need to since as it is, 
M orpheus users find and download files completely independently of 
Stream  Cast.
In spite of plaintiffs assertion th a t defendants’ system s enabled 
and provided an in frastructure for infringement, the court found tha t 
neither defendant provided the site and  facilities to support direct 
infringers who searched for, and  established connections and 
downloaded files completely independently of Grokster and  Stream  Cast 
and concluded th a t these com panies are no different from companies 
th a t sell home video recorders or copy m achines.
Vicarious liability
The two elements required for vicarious liability are financial 
benefit or in terest in and the ability to supervise the infringing conduct.
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Financial benefit can be direct as in Napster, 239 F. 3d a t 1023 or 
indirect in Fonovisa, 76 F.3d a t 263. Collection of advertising revenues 
th a t accrued from the draw of custom ers to the defendants’ website and 
the fact th a t most, bu t not all, u sers accessed these websites to 
download software for infringing uses, indicated th a t a  financial benefit 
flowed to the defendants. The second condition, “the right and  ability to 
supervise” then  becomes the determ ining factor in a  vicarious liability 
finding. Napster, with its centralized file indexing and  u se r registration 
requirem ent, had  not only the ability bu t also the obligation to exercise 
its right to police to the fullest extent. In Aimster, the 7th Circuit also 
concluded th a t Aimster had the ability to term inate u sers and control 
access to its centrally controlled system.
Grokster and  Stream  Cast have no control over u sers  of their 
software and could not be construed to have any exercisable ability to 
police the network th a t users of their software establish for infringing 
and possibly noninfringing activity. The court once again deferred to 
Congress for guidance in containing the insistence of plaintiffs who 
would expand the protections afforded them  by Copyright laws. “When 
major technological innovations alter the m arket for copyrighted 
m aterials. Congress has the constitutional authority  and the institu tional 
ability to accommodate fully the raised perm utations of competing 
in terests”.
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MGM V. Grokster (9th Cir. 2004)
The Ninth Circuit court added two salient points to the lower court 
ruling in Grokster. First it highlighted its disagreem ent with the 7th 
Circuit reading of Sony. The 7th  Circuit in Re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation., 334 F.3d 643 apparently introduced a novel probability 
condition on noninfringing uses w hereas for the 9th Circuit, a  system  
used for infringement, only needs to have the capability of noninfringing 
uses to raise the knowledge standard  for secondary liability from 
constructive to factual and timely knowledge in regard to specific 
infringing content.
The court also raised a question as to the nature  and extent of 
continuing involvement with the infringing u se r tha t would precipitate 
secondary liability. They note th a t Stream  Cast m aintained an  XML file 
from which u se r software periodically retrieves param eters such  as the 
addresses of websites where lists of active users are m aintained. Also, 
the owner of FastTrack, (Sharm an and not Grokster) m aintained root 
nodes containing lists of currently active supernodes. For the 9 th  Circuit, 
these and occasional com m unication with users, “are too incidental” to 
any direct copyright infringement to constitute m aterial contribution.
The insistence by plaintiffs th a t defendants can alter their system s 
to prevent infringement assum es th a t defendants have already been 
found liable for infringement after which like in Napster, they would have 
the obligation of policing their system  to the fullest extent. N apster was
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forced to implement filtering software on its own centrally controlled 
system  where it had the right and ability to police and which was 
essential to the success of infringing file swapping activity . However 
since Grokster and Stream  Cast had  not been found guilty of secondary 
infringement, they had no duty to modify their system s. The 9 th  Circuit 
observed th a t in the rapidly changing technological environm ent, with 
initially adverse economic effects to copyright owners, m arket forces 
“often provide equilibrium in balancing in terests”.
Grokster a t The Suprem e Court
MGM V. Grokster: Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (2004)
Petitioners presented the following question to the Suprem e Court: 
W hether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to long- 
established principles of secondary liability in copyright law (and 
in acknowledged conflict with the Seventh Circuit), th a t the 
Internet-based “file-sharing” services Grokster and  Stream  Cast 
should be immunized from copyright liability for the millions of 
daily acts of copyright infringement th a t occur on their services 
and th a t constitute a t least 90% of the total use of the services. 
(MGM V. Grokster, October 8, 2004).
Arguing their question, petitioners state  the rational for urgent 
review to resolve the conflict between the 9 th  and 7th  Circuits and to 
clarify the standards for secondary liability applicable to Internet-based 
services th a t facilitate copyright infringement. According to petitioners.
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the 9 th  Circuit believed th a t Sony-Betamax imposed lim itations on the 
factors th a t establish contributoiy liability if the infringing product is 
merely capable of substan tia l or commercially viable noninfringing uses 
even when infringement is the principal use. Knowledge, one of the 
necessary factors, in the above circum stances m ust occur a t a  timely 
moment when infringement is in progress and the defendant can  act to 
curtail the infringing conduct. The court deemed the notices th a t 
copyright owners provide to Grokster and  Stream  Cast irrelevant since 
the alleged infringing conduct occurs when defendants had  no m eans of 
stopping the alleged infringement.
The 9 th  Circuit also assum ed th a t the defendants have no legal 
duty to alter the design of their system  to avoid infringement, even if they 
could, because the system as designed was capable of non-infringing 
uses and prior liability had  not been established. N apster’s order to 
redesign followed a  finding of liability after which Napster had  a  legal 
duty to redesign its system  to eliminate the possibility of infringement. 
Petitioners state  th a t the 7th  Circuit, when applying Sony in Aimster, 
considered the prevailing conditions under which infringem ent occurs “in 
determining how best to accomm odate both the in terests of copyright 
holders in preventing infringement and the public’s access to the 
noninfringing uses of the service” The Aimster court was concerned 
about relative proportions of infringing and noninfringing uses as well as 
the defendant’s ability to implement m easures which interdict infringing
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users while leaving the capability for noninfringing uses intact. While the 
7 th  Circuit did not allow Aimster the luxury of curtailing its ability “to 
police its operation” by using encryption to m ask the nam es and  m edia 
titles in lists m aintained on its servers, the 9 th  Circuit would not hold 
Grokster and  Stream  Cast liable even when the acknowledged th a t 
defenders may have redesigned their system  to “tie their own h an d s” with 
the expectation of avoiding a  finding of vicarious liability.
Petitioners argued th a t lack of Suprem e Court intervention, would 
cause several undesirable consequences; leave copyright owners with 
only the im practical and “manifestly inadequate option” of bringing 
individual suits against each direct infringer; stifle development of 
innovative noninfringing system s such  as Apple’s ITunes; and  subject 
copyright owners to economic ruin, contrary to Constitutional and 
legislative intent. Out of millions of alleged infringing u sers of m edia file 
sharing system s, copyright owners have brought suits against 
approximately 8000 identified as “the m ost conspicuous infringers”. 
Petitioners allege th a t inaction poses a grave th rea t to the foundations of 
the copyright law’s incentive for promoting the progress of science and 
the arts.
MGM V. Grokster (2004): Brief for Respondent Grokster in opposition 
Respondents presented the following question:
W hether the district court and Ninth Circuit correctly concluded 
th a t Congress, ra ther th an  the courts, should decide w hether
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and how to expand the scope of the statu tory  copyright 
monopoly to reach new technologies th a t have substan tia l 
noninfringing uses (MGM v. Grokster, November 8, 2004). 
Respondents urged the Court to deny certiorari on the grounds 
tha t the task  of finding the proper accommodation between new 
technologies such  as p2p file sharing and copyright is reserved for 
Congress and th a t no urgency justified Suprem e Court intervention in a 
task  th a t the Constitution has commited to Congress. They point out 
num erous instances since Sony th a t Congress has exercised this 
constitutional right (p. 5).
Further the lower courts correctly rejected petitioners’ effort to 
overturn the Sony precedent embodied in the “substan tia l noninfringing 
u se” test. The p2p technology has substan tia l noninfringing uses and the 
prospect of “massive and unpredictable” liability for innovators would 
“cast a  pall over the nation’s technology sector (p. 2).”
MGM V. Grokster (2004): Reply Brief of petitioners
In their reply (filed November 22, 2004) to respondents’ brief 
against certiorari, petitioners charged th a t Grokster and Stream C ast set 
out to capture infringing users of the defunct Napster and  have disabled 
m echanism s th a t could limit infringement thereby maximizing financial 
harm  against copyright holders.
They assert th a t urgen t review was needed to settle the question of 
w hether a  defendant th a t created and operated a  worldwide network for
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distributing infringing works could escape liability merely by disabling or 
avoiding available m echanism s th a t block infringement (p. 5). They urged 
th a t the petition for writ of certiorari should be granted (p. 10).
On December 10, 2004, The Court granted petition for certiorari 
and set for argum ent on March 29, 2005. Before argum ent, petitioners 
presented two briefs followed by brief presented by respondents and two 
reply briefs. Highlights of these briefs follow.
MGM V. Grokster (2005): Brief o f Motion Picture Studio et al.
In their “Brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company 
Petitioners, (MGM v. Grokster, Jan u a ry  24, 2005)”, petitioners presented 
the following question:
W hether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to long- 
established principles of secondary liability in copyright law (and 
in acknowledged conflict with the Seventh Circuit), th a t the 
Internet-based “file-sharing” services Grokster and  Stream  Cast 
should be immunized from copyright liability for the millions of 
daily acts of copyright infringement th a t occur on their services 
and th a t constitute a t least 90% of the total use  of the services. 
(MGM V. Grokster, Jan u ary  24, 2005).
Petitioners asserted  th a t respondents Grokster and  Stream Cast 
operated services th a t contributed to copyright infringement on a “mind- 
boggling scale” enabling their u sers to commit millions of acts of
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infringement each day; respondents exploit th is massive infringement for 
profit while petitioners suffer extreme harm s as a  consequence (Id., p. 1).
Grokster and  Stream Cast took steps to create “plausible 
deniability” by disabling log in, disengaging themselves from N apster type 
central control (p. 9) and foisting the task  of indexing on conscripted high 
performance com puters of users (p. 10).
R espondents’ sevices “inflict massive and irreparable harm ” by 
facilitating production of infinite num ber of perfect copies (p. 12), and 
breeding a  culture of contem pt for intellectual property ... in cyberspace 
(p. 13).
Respondents are liable as contributory infringers because they 
have “knowledge of the infringing activity”, and they induce, cause, or 
materially contribute to th a t infringing activity in “myriad ways” (p. 17); 
liable under vicarious liability principles through direct advertising 
profits and cannot claim the protection of Sony because they 
intentionally facilitated and actively encouraged and assisted 
infringement (p. 27).
They urged the Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit judgm ent (p. 50). 
MGM V. Grokster (2005): Brief of Songwriter and Music Publisher
In their “Brief for Songwriter and  Music Publisher Petitioners 
(MGM V. Grokster, Jan u ary  24, 2005)” petitioners presented the following 
question:
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W hether secondary copyright liability extends to com panies 
whose Internet-based “file sharing” services facilitate copyright 
infringem ent and exploit it through advertising, when such 
liability provides the only practical remedy for w idespread 
infrigements of copyrights, will not thw art legitimate uses of file- 
sharing technology, and  will spu r dem and for legitimate online 
distribution of m usic [MGM v. Grokster, Jan u ary  24, 2005]. 
Petitioners representing over 27,000 songwriters and m usic 
publishers assert th a t songwriters, m ost of whom are struggling in a 
“difficult economic scenario” suffer the added impact of staggering 
Internet distribution of copyrighted music. Grokster and Stream Cast 
intentionally exploit copyright infringement and have removed protective 
features from their services to exploit loopholes in the Ninth Circuit 
Napster opinion (p. 16).
They w arn th a t imposing liability “is the only effective way to 
enforce ... [copyright] p. 14.” ; and urge reversal of the judgm ent of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
MGM V. Grokster (2005): Brief for Respondents
Respondents presented (March 1, 2005)the following question: 
W hether the court of appeals correctly ruled, on the only issue 
before it, th a t respondents’ distribution of the curren t versions 
of their file-sharing software does not render respondents 
secondarily liable for eveiy direct infringement of petitioners’
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copyrights committed by users of the software (MGM v.
Grokster, November 8, 2004).
Software distribution by the respondents satisfies the requirem ent 
in Sony, th a t the product or service be capable of noninfringing uses. Not 
only are the services of Grokster and Stream  Cast capable of 
noninfringing uses, respondents have provided ample evidence of such 
uses. In Sony, the Court rejected the attem pt to impose copyright liability 
on Betamax and thereby extend control of copyright holders over “an 
article of commerce th a t is not the subject of copyright protection”. 464 
U.S. a t 441. Such extension of sta tu tory  copyright privilege is reserved 
for Congress, not courts, and  congress has from time to time, m ade 
adjustm ents when new technological developments would clearly upse t 
the balance between entitlem ents of copyright owners and the rights of 
the public to use products of these developments in noninfringing ways. 
Id a t 430, n l  1,12.
Respondents present counter argum ents to several issues raised in 
petitioners’ brief to assign secondary copyright liability to Grokster and 
Stream  Cast; a  proportionality inquiry as to the predom inance of 
infringing compared to noninfringing uses; supposed aggravating 
consequences of a  profit motive in distribution by Grokster and Stream  
Cast of file-sharing software; and the proposal th a t failure to redesign 
their services to police infringing uses is tan tam ount to “turning a  blind 
eye” towards conduct of direct infringers. They point out th a t these
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objections are flawed under Sony. The predom inance theory is foreign to 
Sony which merely required th a t a  product be capable of noninfringing 
uses. Regarding redesign, the Sony Court reached its decision based on 
the product, Betamax, as designed, despite the fact th a t possible 
modifications to Sony’s Betamax recorder were “repeatedly called to the 
C ourt’s a ttention”. Quoting from the U.S. Br. 19-20, “Vicarious liability 
does not apply ju s t because a  change in an  existing product could give 
defendant control over direct infringem ents”.
Respondents urged th a t the Court adhere to stare decisis and 
reject expansion of secondary liability w ithout specific direction of 
Congress adding th a t Sony stated  a  “clear rule of law, not a case-specific 
result limited to the circum stances presented”. The effects of changing 
circum stances are best left for Congress which has the capability of 
conducting “wide-ranging inquiry, assessm ent, and experim entation... as 
in the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act ... and ... [as] 
Congressional consideration of their current argum ents is actively under 
way”. Respondents Brief a t sect. HID (Grokster, 2005).
MGM u. Grokster (2005): Reply of Motion Picture Studio et al.
In “Reply brief for Motion Picture Studio and Recording Company 
Petitioners (March 18, 2005)” petitioners state tha t Grokster and 
Stream Cast cannot escape the reality th a t copyright infringem ent is the 
entire basis of their business and cannot escape liability by claiming 
hypothetical noninfringing uses for their services, even if actual uses are
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overwhelmingly infringing (p. 1). Unlike Sony whose relationship with 
Betamax users was limited to a  one-time sale, respondents are actively 
involved in the m aintenance and  expansion of their networks (p. 7).
In their reply, petitioners draw significant distinction between 
paten t law from which the Sony Court constructed its “noninfringing 
u ses” test. Petitioners point out th a t in the paten t context, a  product or 
device used  in contributory infringement typically affects only one patent, 
whereas a  copying product or service can be used  to infringe all 
copyrights in the relevant m edium  (p. 9). Consequently, higher 
proportions of noninfringing uses should be required to consider 
imm unization of a service capable of both infringing and  noninfringing 
uses from secondary liability.
MGM V. Grokster (2005): Reply o f Songwriter et al.
In “Reply brief for Songwriter and Music Publisher Petitioners 
(March 18, 2005)” petitioners charge th a t Grokster and  Stream C ast are 
not innocent innovators and therefore have no genuine claim to concerns 
about broader policy reamifications of a  decision in the case. Professed 
concerns about innovation and deference to Congress would be more 
credible except th a t respondents’ own conduct was clearly tied to 
infringement (p. 1).
Petitioners undo two principal policy argum ents m ade by Grokster 
and Stream Cast namely, th a t holding them  liable would “condem n” the 
use and development of p2p technology for legitimate purposes and th a t
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Congress and not courts should decide the issue of secondary liability 
presented to the Court..
They charge respondents as p2p abusers who lure users by 
distributing free content and  profiting from advertisem ents and point out 
that, by contrast, legitimate services such  as iMesh use p2p technology 
to distribute m usic online while ensuring th a t content owners are paid 
appropriately. A decision against respondents would benefit developers of 
legitimate p2p m usic distribution system s and would not “condem n” p2p 
technology or chill innovation (p. 9).
Petitioners argued th a t the Court should decide the case ra ther 
than  waiting for belated congressional action due to the immediate, 
substan tia l and ongoing harm  caused by illegitimate distribution of tens 
of millions of perfect digital copies of copyrighted works (p. 10). They 
lam ent the inefficacy of m easures available to copyright owners to target 
and prosecute millions of direct infringers and  underscore the need for 
urgent relief (p. 12).
Petitioners conclude th a t it is the intention of Congress, as 
dem onstrated by its rejection of requests to articulate precise boundaries 
of secondary liability in the DMCA sta tu te  th a t the courts should 
continue to evaluate secondary liability for those providing services on 
the Internet (p. 15). Petitioners urged the Court to reverse the Ninth 
Circuit setting the stage for oral argum ents and subsequent judgm ent
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MGM V. Grokster (2005): Oral Arguments
Interest peaked as the date for oral argum ents approached. (Squeo, 
2005a; Squeo, 2005b; Zeller, 2005). At the oral argum ents, Donald 
Verrilli, and Richard Taranto appeared on behalf of petitioners and 
respondents respectively. Acting Solicitor General , Paul Clement 
represented the U.S. D epartm ent of Justice  as am icus curiae, supporting 
the petitioners. Verrilli's opening charge th a t the “only commercially 
significant use  of Grokster and  Stream  Cast services” was copyright 
infringement was questioned by Justice  Stevens, drawing attention to 
“some 2.6 billion legitimate u ses” in a  foot note in [petitioners] brief. 
Justice  Stevens inquired if any proportion of noninfringing uses would 
affect Verilli’s continuing criticism of respondents claim of substan tia l 
noninfringing uses of their system s as merely a  device to a  “a  perpetual 
free p a ss” to continue distribution of their copyright infringing software.
On Verilli’s contributory theory which incorporated a substantiality  
test component. Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Scalia, and Souter wondered 
how such  a  “Damoclean sword” approach, “going in”, would have affected 
the development of several products such  as the VCR and the iPod. 
Following Verilli, Clement focused on the “active inducem ent” theory for 
contributoiy liability bu t could not defend its efficacy in the hypothetical 
case, raised by Justice  Scalia, th a t successors of Grokster announce the 
very sam e system  bu t avoid any appearances of active inducem ent.
Scalia. Clement agreed th a t for new products, som ething in the line of
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Justice  Souter’s suggestion of a “flexible rightness doctrine” could form a 
basis for responding to suits.
Taranto attem pted to separate respondents past “active 
inducem ents” from the current operation which is inducem ent free, 
although Justice  Souter conjectured th a t past inducem ent could have 
fueled the current financial success of the file sharing system s. In 
addition (Id. a t p. 30), Justice  G insburg opined tha t sta tem ents in the 
Sony opinion to the effect th a t a product merely be “capable of 
substan tia l noninfringing u se” could not be described as a  “clear ru le” in 
disregard of the rest of the docum ent, parts of which acknowledged th a t 
authorized or fair noninfringing tim e-shifting was the predom inant use  of 
Sony. Despite the survival of industry  in light of the Sony [mere 
capability for significant noninfringing] rule. Justice  Breyer wondered 
why a different substantiality  rule would not have served equally well. In 
response to the impropriety of using “unlawfully expropriated property” 
as sta rtup  capital, Taranto suggested th a t resolution of the dilemma 
should be left for Congress. Oral argum ents concluded with Verilli 
stressing the point th a t the “staple article of commerce” doctrine required 
striking “a real balance th a t provides effective protection of copyright, as 
well as protecting unrelated  lines of commerce” and th a t instead of 
balance, respondents are using selected portions of the Sony opinion to 
seek im m unity (Id. a t p. 52). As indicated by Greenhouse (2005), the 
Grokster case which pitched “old-fashioned entertainm ent and new-
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fangled technology found the justices surprisingly responsive”. Such 
responsiveness may support the theory th a t argum ent does in fact 
influence the calculation, and ultim ately the propensity of Ju stices 
towards fundam ental fairness.
As Cardozo has observed (supra, a t p. 30), “The directive force of a 
principle may be exerted along the line of logical progression ...” Grokster 
stretched principles from the Sony case, upon which litigants on both 
sides drew strength  to argue their positions. Many other concepts and 
issues in Sony may not have served the direct th ru st of litigants’ 
argum ents, bu t th is is not to say th a t others would gain no grounds in 
pointing to those concepts and  issues from the landm ark Sony decision 
tha t would serve in terests beyond those of the litigants of record.
MGM V Grokster (2005): Amicus Curiae Briefs
A total of 55 am icus curiae briefs were subm itted to the Grokster 
Court. 19 supporting petitioners, 27 supporting respondents and 9 
supporting neither party. Fourteen briefs were subm itted by professors 
in their private capacities as scholars and  educators, 3 supporting 
petitioners, 10 supporting respondents, and 1 supporting neither party. 
No briefs were subm itted by Institutions, University and College 
Presidents or Higher Education Associations.
Amici urging reversal argued the 9 th  Circuit decision would upse t 
the balance between private incentive and  public benefit (Gibson, 2005), 
resu lt in economic inefficiency and prohibitive costs of action against
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direct infringers (Strauss et al., 2005). Gibson et al. enum erate negative 
effects of the lower court decision to include “negatively affect existing 
technologies, underm ine the copyright system, destroy the economic 
viability of legitimate file-sharing services, and retard  future innovation 
in both the technological and authorial com m unities”. Menell et al.
(2005) question the appropriateness of incorporating the sta tu tory  paten t 
law defense for dual-use technology into copyright law with the argum ent 
tha t an  infringing “staple article of commerce” would affect only a  limited 
num ber of paten ts whereas the distribution of dual-use technologies 
would th rea ten  entire industries and expose the copyright system  to 
“grave risks”. The amici point out th a t the Audio Home Recording Act of 
1992 bans audio recording devices th a t do not incorporate technology to 
block second-generation digital copies.
Professor Hollaar’s brief in support of neither party  favored 
retention of the Sony “capable of substan tia l noninfringing u se s” 
standard  and sim ultaneously recognizing secondary contributory liability 
based on two theories, namely direct contribution and  inducem ent, the 
severity of which will be determ ined by in a  trial. (Hollaar, 2005). Hollaar 
asked the Suprem e Court to vacate the decision of the 9 th  Circuit 
appellate court which affirmed a sum m ary judgm ent of the lower 
California court and  rem and for further proceedings for a determ ination 
of secondary liability based on the inducem ent theory.
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Scholars in support of respondents suggested affirmance of the 
appellate court judgm ent on several grounds th a t include adequacy of 
the “capable of substan tia l noninfringing u se s” standard  of Sony 
(Abelson, 2005; Fisher III, 2005; Lunney, 2005; Mulligan, 2005), 
exclusive purview of Congress over issues involving balancing of in terests 
th a t are skewed by new technology (Lessig, 2005; Pulgram, 2005), First 
Amendment protection of speech (Lee, 2005), lack of “clear” statu tory  
authority  to create common law in an  area  "... where Congress has 
enacted detailed sta tu tes (Pollack, 2005), petitioner’s flawed claims of 
economic loss ascribed to p2p activity (Oberholzer-Gee, 2005), fair use 
principles (Lunney, 2005), and the need to avoid generation of another 
layer of doubt, anxiety, and  m isunderstanding among educators 
(Liebman, 2005).
They argue th a t reversal could be interpreted as an  injunction to 
redesign networks with filtering a t the network level. Such networks are 
less useful and less efficient and  rem ain vulnerable to defeat. Petitioners 
seek a  remedy th a t will ’’hobble advances in technology“(Abelson, 2005). 
P2p networks, th a t rem ain unburdened  by design restrictions tha t 
petitioners dem and, are essential in m aintaining classes of 
constitutionally protected speech typified by creators who use  these 
networks to freely d istribute their works. (Lessig, 2005). Oberhozer-Gee 
et al (2005) argue th a t in the ’’first and  only detailed study of which files 
individuals actually downloaded via file sharing netw orks”, there is no
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support for petitioner’s contention th a t reduction in sales was caused  by 
p2p activity. Lunney (2005) warned th a t the assum ption th a t all 
unauthorized private copying was not fair use  was problem atic since the 
Sony Court was addressing only the fair use  s ta tu s  of tim e-shifting and 
not th a t of “other types of home taping”, allowing Chief Judge Posner of 
the 7th  Circuit to assum e by the C ourt’s silence th a t “other types of 
home taping” were condemned. Liebman (2005) stated th a t w ithin the 
educational context, introducing “another level of doubt, anxiety, and 
m isunderstanding ...” would chill development of creative uses of p2p 
“within the academ y”. Anxiety already exists with the limits of “fair u se” 
in classroom  production.
MGM V. Grokster (2005): Supreme Court Decision, 545 U. S. 913
The Court opinion, delivered by Justice  Souter, accepted the theory 
th a t it was impractical to enforce rights in protected works effectively 
against all direct infringers leaving an attack  against the d istributor of 
the copying device as the only practical alternative. Contributoiy 
infringement involves intentional inducem ent or encouragem ent of direct 
infringement (Gershwin Pub. Corp v. Columbia Artist M anagement, 443 
F. 2d 1159). Vicarious infringement involves profiting from direct 
infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it,
(Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F. 2d 304). Both forms 
of secondary liability, contributoiy and vicarious, are well established 
principles of common law.
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The Court considered and dism issed the allegation of contributoiy 
liability in Sony based on the opinion th a t the principal use  of the VCR 
was for “time shifting” which the Court found to be noninfringing and for 
which a  fair use  determ ination was appropriate. There was also no 
evidence th a t Sony intended to promote infringing use  of its VCR, even 
though it possessed constructive knowledge of the likelihood th a t some 
would use  it for infringement. Under these circum stances, the Sony 
Court held th a t the VCR was “capable of commercially significant 
noninfringing u ses” and  th a t its m anufacturer could not be faulted 
“solely” for distributing the product.
With evidence beyond a product’s characteristics and  constructive 
knowledge of infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude 
liability. The Court decided th a t distribution of a device with the object of 
promoting its use  to infringe copyright, as shown by “clear expression or 
other affirmative steps to foster infringem ent” is liable for th ird  party  acts 
of infringement. The Court was satisfied th a t petitioners showed 
sufficient evidence from statem ents and actions of respondents 
indicating “a  patently illegal objective”. Hence the Court vacated the 
judgm ent of the 9th  Circuit Court of Appeals and  rem anded the case for 
“further proceedings consistent with th is opinion”.
Positions taken in Sony, in re Aimster and in Grokster were 
affected by assum ptions th a t litigants as well as subsequent courts m ade 
on issues on which various courts rem ained silent. “Nothing in Sony
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requires courts to ignore evidence of in tent ... and the case was never 
m eant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from common 
law”. This indicates th a t silence and  absence are certainly not 
inconsequential.
Rhetorical Setting 
Considerable literature exists on the rhetoric of silence and 
absence. Following is a  review of literature on rhetorical situation 
followed by a  review of literature focused on the exam ination of absence 
and silence in various situations. Although the focus is ultim ately on 
situations th a t are rhetorical, a  few works on absence and silence in non 
rhetorical situations have been included for completeness.
Rhetorical Situation
Bitzer has stated  th a t rhetorical situation focuses on the 
interaction of rhetors, audience, and  exigencies th a t create opportunities 
for rhetorical responses (Bitzer, 1968; Bitzer, 2000). Bitzer’s formally 
defines a  rhetorical situation as:
a complex of persons, events, objects and relations presenting 
an  actual or potential exigence which can be completely or 
partially removed if discourse introduced into the situation, can 
so constrain  hum an decision or action so as to bring about 
significant modification of the exigence. (Id. a t p. 63).
Bitzer’s sem inal work contains im portant concepts. Rhetoric is a 
mode of altering reality by creating discourse which changes reality and
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a  particular discourse comes into existence because of some specific 
condition or situation which invites response (Id. a t p. 62).
To say th a t rhetoric is situational m eans th a t the rhetorical 
discourse comes into existence as a  response to situation. However m any 
rhetorical situations “m ature and decay” w ithout giving b irth  to a 
rhetorical u tterance which theoretically is required to alter reality in the 
situation and influence the inclination of an audience.
Bitzer has examined the constituents of rhetorical situation 
namely, exigence, audience, and  constraints. Because an  exigence m ust 
be capable of being modified or removed through discourse to count as 
rhetorical, not all exigencies are rhetorical. Examples of exigencies such 
as death, winter, and some na tu ra l d isasters are not rhetorical since they 
cannot be modified by any m eans and even less so through discourse (Id. 
at p. 63).
Another im portant concept is th a t in any rhetorical situation, there 
will be at least one controlling exigence which “functions as the 
organizing principle”, although the exigence may or may not be perceived 
by the rhetor or other persons in the situation (Id. a t p. 64). Also the 
exigence may appear to be strong or weak depending upon the “clarity of 
their [author’s] perception and the degree of their [author’s] in terest in 
it.” Furtherm ore, the exigence may be real or unreal depending on the 
facts of the case and may be im portant or trivial, familiar or totally new 
and unique.
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Right after exigence, the second constituent of rhetorical situation 
is audience. An audience in rhetorical situation is not necessarily the 
same as a  body of mere listeners. A rhetorical audience consists only of 
those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of 
being m ediators of the change which the discourse functions to produce.
The th ird  constituent of rhetorical situation is a  set of constrain ts 
made up  of “persons, events, objects, and  relations which are parts of the 
situation” because they have power to constrain decision and action 
needed to modify the exigence. Bitzer provides a  list, by no m eans 
exhaustive, of standard  sources of constraint th a t include beliefs, 
attitudes, docum ents, facts, traditions, images, interests, and  motives. 
Further, Bitzer has elaborated on the rationale of grouping constraints 
into two m ain classes, those originated or m anaged by the rhetor and 
other constrain ts in the situation which “may be operative”. This is “to 
separate those constraints th a t are proper from those th a t are im proper.”
Although rhetorical situation invites response, th is is not ju s t  any 
response, bu t a  fitting one if it is not to am ount to poetry or declam ation 
“w ithout rhetorical significance.” Even though the rhetor may or may not 
read the prescription accurately, every situation prescribes the contours 
of its fitting response whose existence can be readily certified by a  critical 
exam ination of the “objective, publicly observable and  historic” 
circum stances of the situation.
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Bitzer explains salient differences in structurally  simple and 
complex situations. A situation such  as the u su a l courtroom  consisting 
of well screened jury, knowledgeable counsels and prepared judges, is 
highly structu red  and complex. Situations may become weakened by 
causes such  as the involvement of num erous or incompatible exigencies 
in a single situation, a  scattered rhetorical audience, uneducated  
regarding its duties and powers and m any other possible factors which 
may weaken the structu re  of situations.
Another im portant characteristic of rhetorical situations is tha t 
they come into existence, then  either m ature or decay or m ature and 
persist, maybe indefinitely (Id. a t p. 67).
Finally, Bitzer suggests th a t rhetoric as a  discipline, and  analogous 
to scientific inquiry, is philosophically justified insofar as it provides 
“principles, concepts and procedures by which we effect valuable 
changes in reality (Id. a t p. 68).” This quality distinguishes rhetoric from 
the mere craft of persuasion which “although it is a  legitimate object of 
scientific investigation, lacks philosophical w arrant as a practical 
discipline.” A num ber of studies have raised im portant questions ranging 
from the validity of rhetorical situation as constructed by Bitzer (Vatz, 
1973) to potential conflicts th a t may be avoided by a  reconsideration of 
the basis of Bitzer’s fundam ental assum ptions (Biesecker, 1989). O ther 
studies have served to m ake Bitzer’s framework more extensible 
(Consigny, 1974; Jam ieson, 1975; Edbauer, 2005).
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According to Vatz, Bitzer has assum ed th a t “There is an  intrinsic 
nature  in events from which rhetoric inexorably follows, or should 
follow.” Vatz sta ted  a  contrary position th a t “No situation can have a 
nature  independent of the perception of its in terpreter or independent of 
the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it.” Relationship 
between situations and rhetoric is dependent upon the “initial depiction 
of the situation (Vatz, 1973 a t p. 157).” Such depictions are initiated 
through rhetoric by rhetors who “choose or do not choose to m ake salient 
[:] situations, facts, events, etc. (Id. a t p. 160); choices th a t have crucial 
ethical implications (Id. a t p. 158).
Vatz’s critique would place rhetoric a t the top of a  disciplinary 
hierarchy on the prem ise of a rhetorical basis for all m eaning, w ithout 
which “rhetorical study becomes parasitic to philosophy ... or whatever 
discipline can inform u s as to w hat the [real] situation is.” Vatz’s 
perspective has not specifically ruled out the role of philosophy through 
legal research ra ther th an  rhetoric, of validly establishing more or less 
invariant properties of situations from which rhetoric may be applied in 
the a rt of salience creation.
The major oppositional perspectives of Bitzer and  Vatz on 
rhetorical situation in which orders of rhetors, audience, constraints, 
situations, exigencies and  symbolic action inter relate to define, generate, 
exude, a ttenuate  or extinguish exigencies are both phenomenological. 
However in Bitzer’s view, rhetorical situation merely discloses clearly
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constituted and intrinsically p resent exigences th a t invite a  fitting 
rhetorical response; whereas for Vatz, situational exigencies are 
fabricated a t will through pure rhetorical arbitration. Biesecker’s 
dialectical resolution of the im passe is noteworthy.
One of Biesecker’s outstanding contributions to rhetorical theory is 
the treatm ent of rhetorical situation on a  fundam entally elemental level; 
analysis capable of dissolving the im passe precipitated by existential 
presuppositions endemic in virtually all expositions of rhetorical theory. 
In Rethinking rhetorical situation from within the them atic of differance 
(Biesecker, 1989), Biesecker has applied D errida’s deconstruction and 
the elemental concepts of differance and  articulation in the reproduction 
of m ateriality and discursivity in a radically productive way.
Differance was coined by Derrida to explain how signifiers are 
trapped in an  infinite precessional quest for veritable signification. Any 
transcendental claims for an  elemental signifier is instantly  dism issed by 
the realization th a t a  more fundam ental element is already ubiquitously 
in effect, separating every element from th a t which it is not, while 
sim ultaneously and unheirarchically dividing the present element in 
itself (Id. a t p. 16).
The result, quoting Derrida is that:
Nothing, neither among the elem ents nor within the system  is 
anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, 
eveiywhere, differences and traces of traces ... no element can
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function as a  sign w ithout referring to another element which 
itself is not simply present ... Only to the extent th a t we are able 
to differ, as in spatial distinction or relation to another, and  to 
defer, as in temporalizing or delay, are we able to produce 
anything (Id. a t p. 117).
By deconstructing the hierarchy between situation and  rhetors as 
respectively assum ed in Bitzer’s framework and in Vatz’s critique, 
“questions of origin” are replaced by questions of process th a t “frees 
rhetorical theorists and critics from reading rhetorical discourses ... as 
either the determ ined outcome of an  objectively identifiable and  discrete 
situation or an  interpreting and  intending subject” Neither the tex t’s 
immediate rhetorical situation nor its au tho r can be taken as simple 
origin or generative agent since both are underw ritten by a  series of 
historically produced displacem ents (Id. a t p. 121) through the operation 
of differance.
Articulation is a som ewhat intuitive concept th a t plays a  critical 
role in the historicity of dynamic identity production. Articulation is 
about connectivity and is capable of operating on simple as well as in 
complex system s capable of constraining as well as liberating 
functionality in multiple dimensions. Microsoft E ncarta  College 
Dictionary (2001) defines articulation in speech, com m unication and  in 
jointing as follows; speech, the pronouncing of words, or m anner in 
which they are produced; comm unication, the coherent expression of
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thoughts, ideas, or feelings; and  jointing, the connection of different 
parts of som ething by joints, or the way the parts fit together.
Storm er (2004) has fleshed out considerable scope for articulation 
which m akes it useful to visit several exerpts from this work before 
returning to the role of articulation in Biesecker’s rethinking of rhetorical 
situation. Storm er (2004) has used  taxis, the Greek term  for textual 
articulation th a t describes the linkage of elements w ithin a  text to create 
certain effects in the audience in a project of "... retheorization of the 
historiography of rhetoric as it is relevant to understanding  the 
emergence of different rhetorics.”
Storm er in applying articulation to orders of m aterial and 
discursive elements has explained th a t “articulation is transform ational 
and emergent, creating new possibilities through the m utual interaction 
of elements . . . ” and th a t “articulation modifies through a m utual capture 
of powers among elem ents ...” in a  network of elements in which no 
single element has complete control over the interaction (Id. a t p. 264).
Returning to Biesecker, the scholar’s conclusion is th a t 
deconstruction enables a  reading “of the rhetorical situation as an  event 
struc tu red  not by the logic of influence bu t by a logic of articulation . . . ” 
Since the subject or audience, as constituted by the play of differance, is 
shifting and unstable, the rhetorical event may be seen as an  incident 
tha t produces and reproduces the identities of subjects and  constructs 
and reconstructs linkages between them  enabling elem ents in a
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rhetorical situation to affect each other. Deconstruction enables the 
opening of a space “wherein it becomes possible ... to discern the 
considerable heterogeneity of the social sphere and the formidable role 
th a t rhetoric plays in articulating th is heterogeneity (Id. a t p. 126).”
Deconstruction of rhetorical situation and its constituent elements, 
rhetors, audience, and constrain ts, enables a  rethinking of rhetoric as 
articulation and  opens rhetorical situation and  embedded symbolic 
appearances to endless radical possibility and critique. Works by other 
scholars continue to expand the boundaries of Bitzer’s rhetorical 
situation.
Regarding constraints, one of Bitzer’s constituent elem ents of 
rhetorical situation, Jam ieson (1975) has further extended Bitzer’s 
horizons. Bitzer has stated  th a t a  rhetorical work may obtain its 
character from the circum stances of the [proximate] historical context, to 
which Jam ieson has added, through an  analysis of constrain ts in certain 
genres, namely, the papal encyclical, the early state of the union 
addresses and  their congressional replies, th a t past historical contexts 
ra ther th an  proximate ecology may indeed prove more determinative in 
constraining forms of ensuing discourse.
Jam ieson has illustrated the similarity of contem porary papal 
encyclicals and historical apostolic epistles as evidence of “genre 
calcification” and to essential correspondence in rhetorical function of
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pope, in contem porary times, and  apostles in more ancient history (Id. a t 
p. 407).
In a  different example, faced with “an  unprecedented rhetorical 
situation”, namely, th a t of responding to the new Constitutional 
enjoinder to report to Congress on the state  of the union, W ashington, 
president of the new democratic republic, delivered a  speech rooted in 
form in the m onarch’s speech from the throne. Response by Congress to 
this first attem pt a t the sta te  of the union address was equally mimetic 
in form and substance to the response of parliam ent to the m onarch’s 
speech from the throne; an  obvious contradiction in a  republican 
constitution in which executive and legislative arm s of government are 
equal. Hardly fortuitously, subsequent Congresses quickly readdressed 
the tone and format of congressional responses to presidential sta te  of 
union addresses.
To include cases in which response is controlled by an  
inappropriate antecedent genre, Jam ieson has concluded that: 
perception of the proper response to an  unprecedented 
rhetorical situation grows not merely from the situation bu t also 
from antecedent rhetorical forms .. .Antecedent genres are 
capable of imposing powerful constraints. Furtherm ore, the 
m anacles of an  inappropriate genre may be broken with varying 
degrees of difficulty (Jamieson, 1975).
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Edbauer (2005) has further expanded the scope of possibilities 
afforded by the “elemental framework” consisting of tem porally and 
spatially constituted elements of rhetors, audience and constraint, by 
relocating each individual element within a  wider ecological context of 
historical fluxes in which they progress. E dbauer has stated  th a t “the 
exigence is more like a  complex of various audience - speaker 
perceptions and  institu tional or m aterial constraints (Id. a t p. 8).”
Similar to Biesecker’s use  of Derridian deconstruction and 
differance, (Biesecker, 1989), E dbauer’s ecologically conditioned notion of 
exigence informs a  dialectical reconciliation of Bitzer’s suggestion th a t 
rhetors discover exigencies th a t already exist and  Vatz’s assertion th a t 
exigencies are created for audiences through the work of rhetors 
(Edbauer a t p. 6). By shifting the focus from rhetorical situation to 
“rhetorical ecology”, Edbauer has proposed “a  revised strategy for 
theorizing public rhetorics and  rhetoric’s publicness as a circulating 
ecology of effects, enactm ents, and  events (Id. a t p. 9)”
Perhaps the closest approach to the emergence of “a coherent 
theory of rhetoric” may be read in the work of Consigny (1974) in which 
the au thor seeks to unify the apparently diametrically contentious 
perspectives of Bitzer and Vatz. As observed by Consigny (Id. a t p. 176) 
for Bitzer the situation controls the response of the author; for Vatz the 
rhetor is free to create a  situation a t will (Id.).
114
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Consigny has indicated th a t rhetors face an indeterm inate 
existential situation in which the best m ust be m ade of “facticities” 
encountered through the use of strategies for “shaping the 
indeterm iacies, thereby form ulating concrete problems which can be 
potentially solved (Id. a t p. 177)” Further, Consigny has argued th a t the 
rhetorical situation is an  indeterm inate context m arked by troublesom e 
disorder which the rhetor m ust struc tu re  so as to disclose and form ulate 
problems.
Hence, according to Consigny:
Bitzer errs in construing the situation as determ inate and 
predeterm ining a fitting response. [From another perspective, 
the rhetorical situation is not one created solely through the 
imagination and discourse of the rhetors.] It [rhetorical 
situation] involves particularities of persons, actions, and 
agencies in a  certain place and time ... hence Vatz errs in 
construing [rhetors] as completely free to create ... exigences at 
will and  select ... subject matter[s] in a  m anner of pure 
arbitration (Id. a t p. 178).
Rhetors thrown into a rhetorical situation m ust transform  the 
indeterm inacies into a determ inate and coherent structure; and  “in this 
activity, he is constrained by the recalcitrant particularities of the 
situation which bear on his disclosure and resolution of the issue (Id.)” 
with the conclusion th a t rhetors who fail to take these contraints into
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account m ay never get in touch with events or the audience and may 
“rightly be dism issed as ineffective and irrelevant.”
According to Consigny, the rhetorical act is one in which rhetors 
become engaged in a  novel and indeterm inate situation and are able to 
disclose and m anage exigences therein (Id. a t p. 179). Rhetors require a 
capacity which perm its receptivity and responsiveness to particularities 
of novel contexts. Consigny has argued th a t “the art of rhetoric” is both a  
heuristic art, allowing the rhetor to discover real issues in indeterm inate 
situations and also a  m anagerial art, providing the rhetor with m eans for 
controlling real situations and bringing them  to a  successful resolution 
or closure (Id. a t p. 180).
Consigny’s a rt of rhetoric requires two conditions, namely, integrity 
and receptivity, to provide rhetors an  effective m eans of engagem ent in 
particular situations. Integrity dem ands th a t rhetoric as an  a rt provide 
the rhetor with a  “universal” capacity such  th a t the rhetor can discover 
and m anage issues in all kinds of indeterm inate and particular 
situations as these change dynamically, w ithout “his action being 
predeterm ined.” Rather th an  being forced to respond in a  fitting m anner 
“... as Bitzer claims, the rhetor will have a  repertoire of options and the 
freedom to select ways of m aking sense anew in each case, disclosing the 
problems and finding m eans of attain ing their solutions (Id. a t p. 181)” 
Contrary to Vatz’s view, the rhetor cannot be “merely a universal 
a rtist with complete freedom to create problems arbitrarily.” Rather th an
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create problems a t will with complete disregard to situational 
param eters, the rhetor m ust rem ain receptive to particularities of the 
individual situation in a  way th a t facilitates discovery of relevant issues, 
if the rhetorical act is to be heuristic or m anagerial (Id.).
Consigny has asserted  th a t the a rt of “Topics” m eets the two 
conditions of integrity and receptivity and  th a t m asteiy of th is a rt 
perm its the rhetor to enter into and function in a  wide variety of 
indeterm inate fields irrespective of subject m atter. Referring to views 
expressed by legendary persons in the field of rhetoric; Aristotle, Cicero 
and Vico, Consigny has argued th a t “topic” is construed as an  “essential 
instrum ent for discovery or invention.” It is also the “realm ” or field 
m arked by the “particularities of persons, acts, and agencies” in which 
the rhetor th inks, acts, discloses and establishes meaningful 
relationships. Consigny has concluded th a t “the topic” functions both as 
instrum ent with which the rhetor th inks and the situation in and about 
which he th inks (Id. a t p. 182).”
To function as a  central device of a  rhetoric which m eets the two 
conditions of integrity and receptivity, the topic m ust m aintain  a 
dynamic interplay between instrum ent and realm. Consigny has noted 
tha t topics are universal, formal devices th a t may be applied in a  variety 
of novel situations. The au th o r’s choice of topic is not predeterm ined by 
the m aterial or the context, ra ther the rhetor is “engaged in an  interplay
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of devices and m aterial which direct the indeterm inate situation to 
resolution (Id. a t p. 184).”
A com petent rhetor is able to select the m ost fruitful topic from 
among a  wide repertoire of topics a t his com m and for the exploration, 
selection, arrangem ent and effective m anagem ent of the heteronom ous 
m atter in any given situation, with an engagement in a  novel situation 
and “thereby find and shape issues w ithout predeterm ining w hat he will 
find (Id.)”.
Rhetoric of Absence and Silence
The rhetorically expansive categories of symbolic action and 
language embrace all perm utations of presence, absence, speech and 
silence with ontologies and effects in psychological, social, cultural, legal 
and purely rhetorical and artistic arenas and  which m ay be m apped from 
non rigid moral and  ethical reference positions into a  spectrum  of 
laudableness and desirableness on one side of the spectrum , 
undesirableness and disdain on the other side.
In assim ilating the instan taneous, dynamic, proximate or 
ecological characteristics (Edbauer, 2005) of rhetorical situation for 
oneself or framing these for others (Vats, 1973), articulated exchanges 
map traces of signification on elem ents of rhetorical situation including 
elem ents of audience and rhetors. “Fittingness” (Bitzer, 2000) resu lts 
from exchanges with a  high probability of attenuating, extinguishing or
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otherwise affecting or controlling the exigencies in the rhetorical 
situation.
Subject intentionality factor into the exchanges th a t contribute to 
the composition and flow of ensuing discourse which m akes the 
consideration of ethics, morality, competence and dispositions of rhetors 
im portant, w hether rhetors are engaged in legitimate exercises to grapple 
with complexities of situational indeterm inacies (Consigny, 1974) or 
possibly engaged in arbitration of deliberate creation as suggested by 
Vatz.
Works on situations in which ethics and morality relate to 
categories of absence and silence as well as to how judgm ent is exercised 
in decision m aking would be useful in evaluating the resulting 
performance and  effects of certain subject elements in a rhetorical 
situation. All these considerations need to be filtered and tunneled into 
the assessm ent of “fittingness”.
Jones (1999) has presented in “Theory of moral responsibility” a 
basis for analyzing problematic situations which involve moral and 
ethical judgm ents, such  as arose in the holocaust. This theory is 
sufficiently general and may be applied in a  broad scope to situations of 
far less horrific circum stances such  as in cases of the absen t parent 
(Mathys, 1996). Jo n e s’s theory has three m ajor components.
The first is the concept of “liability to judgm ental blam e”, the 
elem ents of which are constructive knowledge of a  wrongful act which a
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
person, from “morally bad motives”, voluntarily and intentionally 
executes (Id. p. 16). The second com ponent of Jo n es’s theory is “virtue 
ethics” which recognizes relatively stable personal character traits in a 
virtuous and vicious m atrix, with a  note th a t “sometimes people act out 
of character” The th ird  com ponent are “justified moral excuses” which 
are patently exculpatory. Examples of these are ignorance or the lack of 
relevant knowledge, m istakes, and coercion.
O ther features of Jo n e s’s theory include imposition and or 
acceptance of “informal moral sanctions” such  as withdrawal of approval, 
social ostracism , and “formal legal sanctions” such as crim inal 
punishm ent. Another feature is “self-deception”, a psychologically 
attractive alternative to the pains and distress of feelings of guilt, sham e, 
and rem orse which, depending on circum stances may be considered 
desirable or undesirable. An analysis of conduct involves considerations 
of several responsibilities: moral responsibility, or “liability to moral 
sanctions”, role responsibility, or “duties of office”, expressed or implicit, 
capacity responsibility or “possession of powers of agency” (Id. p. 26).
Perhaps the m ost innocuous use of absence and silence may be 
found in the arts, where “structu red  absence” is used as a  deliberate 
literary device to involve the spectator or reader in the process of 
m eaning construction and co-authorship. W alsh (1998) sta tes th a t the 
perception th a t som ething th a t could or should be present is not there 
becomes vaguely threatenening, requiring some sort of resolution or
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closure. This “disquieting m ultivalence” m akes “rational analysis 
infinitely more complex and difficult” and  possibly more engaging (Id. p. 
170). Walsh sta tes th a t “through a wide variety of s truc tu red  absences, 
readers are m ade to feel w hat words cannot touch and to experience 
sym pathetically w hat our logical and  discursive abilities cannot 
approach”. W alsh describes the use  of struc tu red  absences as “negative 
techniques” “... a  heuristic process of unnam ing, whereby the 
scaffolding of words and sentences is seemingly dism antled in favor of 
some less m aterial bu t immensely more powerful form of aw areness ”.
In Hollywood’s White House, Alkana, (2003) in reference to the 
films Mr. Sm ith goes to W ashington, The Candidate, and  Bulworth, 
states that, “his [The American President’s] lack of presence in these 
films allows the  American leader to rem ain above the corruption, the 
pettiness, and the partisanship  of American party politics while, 
consequently, symbolizing continuity and strength  in face of the 
challenges to the political system  raised by the films”. In the arts, 
constructing absences is the artistic and dram atic challenge.
In real life, circum stances create absences out of physically 
present persons through the category of Bystanders who, by their 
inaction or an  unacceptable level of reaction, frustrate an expectation to 
m ake an  “acceptable sta tem ent”. Grayling (2003) describes bystanders as 
people on the sidelines, unaffected by m ajor events of war, terrorism , 
global capitalism  and technological change (Id. p. 152) and adds th a t
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“Even inaction is action ... there is a  choice about one’s m anner of 
involvement ...” Voluntarily or otherwise one can become w itness, victim, 
fighter for peace, or “as the kind who does physical battle, which is 
justified when it opposes greater evils ...”, or as helper of the victims 
(Jones, 1999; Grayling, 2003). The only certainty is th a t there will always 
be victims and a  good probability th a t in one way or another, every one 
will indeed be one.
S taub (2003) reports th a t “the perpetrators of m any school 
shootings have been described as victims of bullies, with others passively 
w itnessing their suffering (p.489).” S taub places bystanders in two 
classes. Type 1 or internal bystanders, according to Staub, w itness the 
m istreatm ent of m em bers of a  group of their own society bu t rem ain 
passive. Type II bystanders rem ain passive in the face of societal issues 
and chose to a ttend  to tasks they consider urgent and  ignore the 
distraction of im pulses to take action toward fulfilling long-term group 
goals.
Carroll (2002) has examined silence as a rhetorical tool tha t 
“reinforces or works to underm ine power struc tu res” and cites examples 
of elected rhetorical silences th a t “are chosen for specific discursive and 
rhetorical purposes (Id. a t 4).” A taxonomy limited to these classes of 
elective silences nam es them  as “affirmation, consent, acknowledgement, 
negation, and  refusal”. Silences th a t affirm and acknowledge, “w ithout
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critique”, are collaborative silences, while silences th a t “consciously 
negate and  refuse” are resistan t silences.
Carroll d iscusses two models of interpretation. According to 
Carroll, Kurzon (1998) ignores contexts and  postulates th a t society 
constructs answ ers th a t are negative to the silent rheto r’s position as is 
the case in m any legal system s. Lang’s model, in Heidegger’s Silence, 
establishes the am biguous na tu re  of silence and confronts the problem 
of interpretation (Lang, 1996).
Actually, the m ethods of in terpretation of silence developed by 
Kurzon and Lang are not m utually inconsistent. Kurzon (Id. a t p. 4) 
declared th a t “The central problem of silence in discourse is to discover 
the m eaning”, and has presented a “basic model” of interpretation (Id. a t 
p. 45). In th is model, the intentional silence leads to “modal 
in terpretations” and as Kurzon has indicated (at p. 50), 
“Contextualization of the silence is the best aid in interpreting it and 
answering the ultim ate question [meaning]”.
Chbib (2004) points to the effect of “m om ent of silence” a t Ground 
Zero, televised worldwide, “unites a  seemingly subjugated disembodied 
comm unity of nations against the globalism defined by the B ush 
adm inistration” as an  example of another perspective of “how 
contem porary democracies appropriate illusion and phantasm agoria  ... 
“... to essentially interpellate popular sym pathies while pushing  a 
political agenda. Also, m om ents of silence are skillfully used  by television
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to m ask political bias as they evoke em pathies of viewers (Id., p. 69) and 
in memorial events in popular culture such  as funerals.
Contem porary views of silence have successfully deconstructed 
this rhetorical object to allow for a  wider range of interpretations of 
silence as passive concealm ent (Gardner, 2001), a form of 
com m unication th a t challenges the logo centric tendency th a t privileges 
assertion and speech over silence (Farrell, 1999), a  force in Judicial 
Opinions (Conway 1996): “A study of persuasion based on voices -  
w hether those voices have been quoted, contrived, or silenced — seem s 
especially suited to Suprem e Court majority opinions, where intensely 
politicized issues often have their final official hearings”.
The effects of absence as a  resu lt of politically motivated exclusion 
abound in several areas. In An American Dilemma: The Negro problem 
and m odern democracy, Myrdal (1944) found th a t “the only im portant 
difference between Negroes and whites is th a t practically all the 
economic, social and  political power is held by whites”.
Absence is not always caused by power imposed exclusion. Various 
strategies and tactics in politics use  absence to gain political grounds 
such as legislative absences precipitated by “walk ou ts” and boycotts 
(CBS News, 2007); economic influence on political issues as in the 
Johnson  & Yeager (2006) article reporting th a t “... to underscore their 
im portance to the [U.S.] economy and to protest against legislation th a t 
would target illegal m igrants, hundreds of thousands of im m igrants
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staged coordinated walk-outs th a t h it several businesses”. This is an  
example of a  deliberately and precisely calculated and executed absence. 
The purposes, m eanings, and  effects of the absence of university 
presidents and  higher education institu tional associations in Grokster 
may not be as clearly delineated as in the “walk out”. Nevertheless, the 
implications for values such  as academ ic freedom and implications on 
the role of universities in the national public sphere cannot be ignored. 
Academic Freedom and Copyright
Unlike copyright, the intensely fertile rhetorical site of academic 
freedom is devoid of an  explicit constitutional basis. Standler (2000) 
argues th a t academic freedom cases fall under government suppression 
of political speech by professors as in Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563 (1968), or governm ent’s interference with freedom of 
association as in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967) and th a t such cases relate to First Am endment rights which the 
Constitution guarantees w ithout preference to all citizens. Although Tight 
(1985) has concluded th a t academic freedom can only be m aintained and 
protected by force of law (as cited in Aby and Kuhn IV, 2000, p .17), 
discursive engagement has certainly m aintained academic freedom as 
one of the m ost vibrant rhetorical sites in societies’ institu tions of higher 
education.
Although is clear th a t the First Amendment protection of free 
speech th a t the Constitution guarantees all citizens extends.
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undim inished, to scholars, the original motivation for the First 
Am endment was to foment democracy. Publicly, citizens can criticize 
leaders in powerful positions and  hopefully limit abuse of power and 
rationalize the conduct of public policy.
However, production of tru th  and knowledge in all dim ensions do 
not necessarily materialize m ost efficiently from the type of freedom of 
expression th a t the Constitution protects. The ethics of public policy, 
dictated by the need for efficient processing of a broad range of issues in 
the national public sphere dem ands a  search for more efficient 
conditions for the production of all tru th  forms and knowledge 
categories. Indeed ethical economy of the national public sphere 
coincides with the protection of national sovereignty against subsum ing 
and subversive experiences.
The special privilege of academic freedom and the invention of 
spheres in which this freedom can function, is a  necessary condition for 
the p u rsu it of this economy. Throughout Grokster, significant 
disruptions of functionality and in trusion by external in terests into 
internal governance of universities raise substan tia l questions of the 
effects of such  events on academic freedom as well as their potential 
im pact on the role of institu tions of higher education in the broader 
sphere of national ethics.
Being itself a culturally established category of constitutionally 
protected free speech, it is not surprising th a t academic freedom
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continues to generate endless traces and bifurcations of m eaning and  
contention among the chief constituents of universities, namely, faculty, 
adm inistration, and  students. Kaplan in “Regulating the intellectuals”, 
states th a t academic freedom is “not an  abstraction” and m ust be placed 
within a  system  of higher education th a t serves definite social, cultural 
and political functions. (Kaplan and  Schrecker, 1983, p. 15). W hat these 
functions are or should be, in Kaplan’s view, determ ine the actual 
m eaning of academ ic freedom and its value to the university and to 
society. Gewirth (1990, p. 21) argues th a t the existence of a  [universal] 
hum an right to education necessitates criteria for intellectual excellence. 
These criteria provide the justification for and limits of academic 
freedom.
Although few scholars question th a t universities have a  legitimate 
function in society, a  question th a t would cause leaders such  as 
Jefferson and Dewey to tu rn  in their resting places, the natu re  and scope 
of functions are differently construed as are the th rea ts to universities 
and academic freedom. Thomson (1983) has stated th a t society needs 
institu tions for the advancem ent of knowledge, provision of higher 
education for studen ts, and  the training of specialists in the various 
professions and tha t such  institu tions “require free search for tru th  and 
its free exposition”. For Sykes (1988), universities have virtually 
abandoned the teaching function to assistan ts . Sykes in Profscam (1988)
127
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
calls for abolishm ent of tenure to “free the vast untapped  energies of the 
academ y ... locked in the petrified grip of a  tenured professoriate.”
Altbach (2001, p. 290) has suggested th a t American universities 
require “a critical eye for constructive reform ... if [American] higher 
education is to continue to thrive”. A wide array of described th rea ts  and 
challenges include enum erated “new variants of intolerance and 
ideological orthodoxy . . . ” (Dickman, 1993, p. vii), degree of university 
leadership com m itm ent to academic values operating to dim inish 
academic freedom and consequently discourage beneficial research, 
“given the external political and  corporate forces th a t influence (or 
control) the university’s adm inistration”( Fischer, 1994), tendency to 
sacrifice professional m erit for political ambition or personal security and 
a  weakening of respect for intellectual objectivity by “attractions of power 
and political ideology” (Chapman, 1983, p. 22).
Aby and Kuhn IV’s (2000) comprehensive guide indicates th a t 
academic freedom is a  vibrant rhetorical site a t which politics, ideology, 
economics and culture intersect. A major part of the complexity a t this 
site arises from the presence of a  multiplicity of issues which generate 
rigid discursive positions. As a  special privilege beyond First Amendment 
rights (Standler, 2000), scholars have defined three categories of 
academic freedom which have gained enorm ous validity from Suprem e 
Court opinions (Grutter v. Bollinger; Sweezy v. New Hampshire;
Keyishian v. Board of Regents ) and  from teacher organizations such  as
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the American Association of University Professors (AAUP, 1940).
Scholarly freedom allows scholars enorm ous opportunities to pursue  
research with few constraints; institu tional autonom y allows universities 
and colleges to essentially govern them selves w ithout external 
interference, while academic rule conveys decision-making rights to 
groups such  as academic departm ents (Moodie, 1996).
The three categories, particularly scholarly freedom, generate 
radically divergent discursive positions among scholars inside and 
outside the academ y (Buckley, 1986; Sykes, 1988; Altbach, 2001). The 
doctrine th a t academic freedom is absolutely essential for the search for 
knowledge and for universities to function is countered with the caution 
tha t other values m erit consideration and th a t academic freedom 
attaches responsibilities which cannot be ignored. Questions about the 
need for academic freedom and its a ttachm ent to tenure th rea ten  both 
privileges as do m any other highly contested categories of concerns tha t 
arise from internal and external relationships.
Externally, government interference (Winks, 1983, p. 190), 
“[inevitable clash] of scientific freedom and national security", (Schwab , 
1990 p .29), business interests, and  apparen t reversals in legal opinion 
im pact scholarly freedom, academic autonom y (Urofsky, 2000), and  in 
varying degrees, institutional autonom y. Internally, research 
m isconduct, faculty squabbles, ideological biases in academic 
departm ent standards (Gottfredson, 1996) and weak support by
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adm inistrators (Capen, 1948) often resu lt in dissipative conflicts and 
frustration to faculty.
To highlight the rhetorical and  political nature  of academ ic 
freedom, dem ands for accuracy in academ ics by watch-dog groups are 
decried unconditionally by the AAUP (On Accuracy in academ ia and 
Academic Freedom, 1985) bolstering the criticism th a t the AAUP is more 
committed to the protection of faculty employment privileges and  less 
concerned about academic freedom, symbolically “placing security of 
appointm ent and  other related m atters ... on the first pa rt in it’s agenda”. 
(Shils, 1993 p. 13).
Another perspective seeks to emphasize nationalistic values in the 
socio political relevance of the university in supporting democracy 
(Dewey, 1984), m aintaining critical vigilance on key social issues 
(Wallerstein, 1971), and supporting strategic national defense research 
(Reagan, 1983). Epistemological perspectives explore academ ic freedom 
as a condition for the emergence of knowledge and tru th  (Trinity College 
1904; AAUP 1940; Dworkin 1996; Capen 1948).
Societies have learned th a t the privilege of unique knowledge has 
rem ained critical to the advancem ent of their civilization and to the 
expansion of their culture. The term s of dialogue and diplomacy in 
peaceful tim es as well as military superiority and dom inance in tim es of 
conflict are heavily dependent on the degree of control over specialized 
knowledge and information. Falk (2003 p. 19) has highlighted the
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relationship th a t exists between higher education and  war. “The 
exponential growth of the destructive power of war weapons coincided 
with the exponential growth of codified knowledge and  the 
unprecedented growth of every type of educational and  research 
institu tion”. According to Falk, th is relationship developed new forms of 
knowledge based in military research and enabled “large academic 
funding increases justified by appeals to military, social and  economic 
Cold War preparedness” (Id. p. 19).
Though unintended, some of these new forms of knowledge pass to 
antagonistic forces as evidenced in McBride’s recall of M urdock’s 
statem ent th a t the military establishm ents design their weapons system s 
to defeat their own artifacts and to fit their own pre conceived strategic 
and tactical conceptions (McBride, 1989, p. 84). Even if th is were 
unavoidable, time still operates to increase the advantages of superior 
knowledge and technology in tim es of conflict. Hughes (1999) has m ade 
reference to decisive roles of “Infowar” in conflicts in Iraq, peace 
negotiations on Bosnia and the Chiapas conflict. Throughout history, 
dom inance over certain categories of knowledge has played decisive roles 
in the outcome of notable conflicts (Palmer 1997).
Establishing a  framework in which these categories of knowledge 
can emerge was critical in the development and  legitimacy of higher 
education in society. The culture of higher learning has been nu rtu red  to 
provide the freedom of inquiry and  dialectics th a t are believed to promote
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the creation, critique and evolution of knowledge at least w ithin the 
restricted military or the open public spheres in which such  knowledge is 
desired.
The C onstitution identified two broad categories of knowledge, the 
sciences and the useful a rts  and  higher education has m aintained a  
central position in the p u rsu it and  evolution of both categories of 
knowledge. Although other constituencies such  as inventors, a rtists, and 
business interests, outside of institu tions of higher education, contribute 
routinely towards the development of useful products of scientific 
research, society has gradually deferred the right and  freedom to act in 
leadership of educational m atters and  issues to institu tions of higher 
education. The 1947 Report of the President’s Commission on Higher 
Education charged th a t the birth  of the atomic age “has deepened and 
broadened the responsibilities of higher education ...” in preparation for 
social and economic changes th a t were certain to follow the new age 
(Report of the President’s Commission on Higher education in Lester F. 
Goodchild and Harold S. Wechsler, Eds. The History of Higher 
Education, 2nd Ed. 1997).
Universities have acquired substan tia l privileges of autonom y and 
self governance to legitimize their s ta tu s  in the wider society. Societies 
have recognized th a t creation of knowledge and research are complex 
diachronic endeavors and  th a t although the results of present efforts 
may not be immediate, the environm ent of free inquiry th a t produced
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historically w hat is usefully applied in contem porary tim es, is likely to 
continue its operation in ways th a t increase benefits to society.
Consequently even though the Constitution did not create 
academic freedom nor universities bu t only protective rights for inventors 
and creators of arts, society by popular acquiescence and  political 
involvement, helped to legitimize the protection of academ ic freedom for 
higher education institutions. The Courts have reinforced the concepts of 
academic freedom through several decisions and institutionalized 
society’s assum ptions th a t th is freedom is essential to the continued 
production of useful knowledge (Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 1967; G rutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 2003).
The Constitution, desirous of promoting the wide availability of 
products of invention and works of arts, m andated th a t Congress 
provides incentives to inventors and a rtists to encourage production of 
these works. For the products of science and arts to be available to 
society, society, through the Congress, grants exclusive rights to those 
who create these products.
The products of the arts, preserved on media, have rem ained a 
useful source of m aterial th a t higher education institu tions rely upon to 
further their ancillary m ission of providing education to m em bers of the 
society who seek knowledge through education. Providing education has 
grown to become a necessary pa rt of the basic public m andate which had 
been primarily the production and dissem ination of new knowledge and
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scholarship. S tudents of today become agents of application of learned 
knowledge in the production of newer scholarship and in the economic 
development and enhancem ent of culture.
This has created reliance on m aking copies of various works for 
classroom  use. Waves in technological development expanded the 
boundaries of the practice of reproducing copyrighted m aterial for u se  in 
the traditional classroom. Instructors copy portions of textbooks and  
research papers, librarians copy research papers for the benefit of other 
researchers directly from their collections or through interlibraiy loans, 
instructors tape television program s for reproduction in their classes.
Many of these activities are interpreted as expansive and intrusive 
on the constitutional rights of persons who created these works. The 
public benefits of the availability of these works and the incentive to 
create more works necessarily alarm  copyright owners who a t least w ant 
to protect their copyright privileges if not outright expand them  through 
conscious and  organized legal pursuits.
Sustenance of the culture of higher education relies on two basic 
foundations, namely public tru s t and judicial support. Through 
legislative and executive reflections of the public will, higher education is 
supported as a  m atter of public policy with the expectation th a t they 
operate to increase public welfare. Empowerment through judicial 
decisions has stabilized the environm ent in which higher education
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institu tions can  operate and su sta in  the public tru s t as generators of 
knowledge and scholarship th a t ultim ately benefit the public interest.
Judicial activity has supported theories of academic freedom both 
of the institu tion and  of their faculty with the clear view th a t the 
university rem ains the cradle from which by all of its integrated activities 
and individualized entities, the public good is served. This unique 
position of higher education, not being of constitutional creation, cannot 
be taken for granted in the inevitable presence of th rea ts from both 
external and internal sources.
Actors in the higher education enterprise m ust rem ain aware of 
factors which may contribute to the erosion of public tru s t keeping in 
mind th a t it is th is public tru s t which constructed and continues to 
susta in  the privileged environment. Privileged autonom y has w itnessed 
increasing challenges from rising and more complex expectations of 
accountability as elaborated by Berdahl and McConnell (1999). Maybe 
not as well recognized, a significant obstacle to the fulfillment of the 
m ission of higher education is the existence of adverse in terests which 
control m any of the principal tools th a t higher education relies upon.
Typified by copyright protection, these in terests derive their 
strength  from the Constitution. While higher education culture seeks to 
use copies of works of arts, traditional and contemporary, in the 
furtherance of their institutional mission, they have to navigate 
successfully in the arena of assertive copyright owners who rely on the
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sam e political and judicial institu tions, the legislature and  the Courts, to 
protect their more fundam ental and  constitutionally protected positions.
Constituencies in the higher education enterprise need to act with 
shared resolve and  understand ing  th a t progressive failure to protect the 
tools th a t facilitate their epistemic directions could ham per their 
operations, dim inish public tru st, and  ultim ately lead to considerable 
modification of its contem porary system s. The dilemma is complicated by 
differences in the perspectives of internal constituents of institu tions 
themselves; faculty, students, trustees, and adm inistrators (Crews, 1993 
a t p. 14) as well as the power configuration of the external environm ent 
in which these institu tions exist.
The three functions of higher education institu tions are teaching, 
research and service. All three require extensive use of historical as well 
as contem porary works of a rts  in the form of original writings, com puter 
program s and works fixed in digital and other media, works whose 
au thors have direct private in terests which conflict with the m ission of 
higher education and are protected by the Constitution. If by its failure to 
effectively bracket the inclination of copyright owners to expand the 
scope of sta tu tory  protection, higher education proportionally and 
perhaps unintentionally reduces its capabilities to susta in  its expected 
public m ission, th is inaction could steadily erode the rationale for public 
support and  alter the future evolution of higher education in 
unpredictable ways.
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Society has the right to expect th a t as the higher education 
enterprise grapples with their day to day operations, they rem ain vigilant 
against th rea ts th a t limit hard  won privileges of institu tional autonom y 
and scholarly freedom. Lapses in vigilance could accum ulate to erode 
public tru st. Crews in Copyright, Fair Use, and  the Challenge for 
Universities (1993, p. 116), alludes to the conformist tendencies of 
universities; concerned about litigation universities have gravitated 
towards acceptance of the Association of American Publishers (AAP) 
limiting “Classroom Guidelines” and avoided the more liberal American 
Library Association (ALA) model policy on photocopying, a  significant 
activity in m any academic and research functions in higher education.
From findings in the study by Crews it is apparen t th a t university 
leaders generally had  failed to fully exploit the advantages th a t “fair u se” 
was created to provide towards the expansion of research and 
scholarship. Towards the last years of the twentieth century and the 
early years of the twenty first, as technology expanded the capabilities 
and ease of the copying process, universities once again faced th rea ts of 
copyright law suits, th is time, from m em bers of the Recording Industry  
for American Artists (RIAA) and the Motion Pictures Association of 
America (MPAA).
Constraints
C onstraints, one of the categories in Bitzer’s rhetorical situation 
(Bitzer, 2000, p. 63) may be imposed by proximate and  historical factors
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in the ecological network within which rhetorical situation is embedded 
(Edbauer, 2005). These may relate to environmental, political, 
psychological or personal factors th a t act as constraints and  affect a  
rheto r’s response to exigencies (Janis, 1992; Foucault, 1972).
Constraints, effectively handled, increase the likelihood th a t a  fitting 
response results; ineffectively handled, the resulting response becomes 
less fitting and in extreme cases, may fail to materialize in any 
discursively notable form.
Decision m aking
At various times as the Grokster litigation progressed towards the 
Suprem e Court, university presidents were faced with decision m aking 
tasks and leadership challenges. A brief discussion of leadership and 
decision m aking theories should be useful in sorting out the applicability 
of portions of these theories in the understanding  of presidential roles in 
Grokster. These theories recognize three categories of constrain ts to the 
use of “high quality decision procedures”. These are cognitive, affiliative 
and egocentric constrain ts (Janis, 1992). Jan is  presents a  comprehensive 
array of pathw ays all of which s ta rt with some aw areness or perception 
of th rea t or opportunity. Integrated with research in three areas of 
inquiry, namely, effective leadership practices, organizational norm s and 
structure , and  personality characteristics of leaders, probabilities of 
avoidable errors are ranked (p. 30).
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Pettigrew (1973) highlights the role of power and  support 
generation as determ inants in a  decision process in a  study which 
identified known internal and  politically relevant details such  as the 
composition and sta tu s  of staff, organizational struc tu re  and  the objects 
for which decisions were required. Early phases of the file sharing crisis 
in universities bear similarities to Pettigrew’s political model. The ways in 
which leaders understand  and perceive the m eaning of leadership could 
help to illum inate the role of university leaders in several phases of 
Grokster and the file sharing crisis.
In Bensimon, Newman and B irnbaum  (Supra., p. 215), the au thors 
restated B irnhaum ’s findings th a t when asked to explain w hat 
leadership m eant to them , m ost of the presidents participating in an  
extensive study of institu tional leadership defined leadership as a  one­
way process, with the leader’s function depicted as getting others to 
follow or accept their directives. A small minority saw leadership as 
facilitating the emergence of leadership laten t within the organization. 
Infrequently definitions included elem ents of conceptual orientations 
from trait, contingency, and symbolic theories.
While transactional theories seek to understand  interactions 
between leaders and followers, transform ational theories (as Bensimon, 
Newman and B irnbaum  quoted from Kauffman, p. 217), stress the need 
for leaders dedicated enough to the purpose of higher education th a t 
they will expend themselves, if necessary, for th a t purpose. C onsensus is
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th a t high quality decisions produce rew ards th a t accrue to decision 
m akers and their organizations. On the other hand, poor quality 
decisions may not only fail to produce rew ards bu t could actually invite 
or resu lt in moral or legal sanctions. Valid critique of legitimacy is 
perhaps one of the milder forms of sanctions against leadership 
associated with poor decision m aking scenarios.
Legitimacy of leadership is affected by the degree of congruence of 
the actions of the leader with strong rhetorical curren ts th a t ru n  in the 
organization. According to Edm undson (1998), contradicting or failure to 
reverence firmly entrenched conventional moral views can be suicidal to 
legitimacy. Drawing from concepts in Mill’s “On Liberty”, Edm undson 
has nam ed as behaviors th a t are fit objects of moral reprobation, 
retribution and punishm ent, unfair or ungenerous use  of advantages 
over others and selfish abstinence from defending them  from injury (p. 
135).
Dill (2000) suggested th a t since hum ans need and seek meaning, 
an im portant part of academic adm inistration involves the creation and 
m aintenance of academ ic beliefs (p. 106). Participation or non 
participation of a  leader in a situation may ultim ately rest on the 
functioning of the completely personal sphere in which the subject, 
emotions and  decision m aking system s co-exist.
According to Arduini (1992) the m ost emotion-loaded elem ents are 
those centered on the self and the own good in a  broad sense and  th a t
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these influence the subject as additional weights to the weight of other 
rational elem ents and also operate as factors causing transform ation of 
the reference framework in which reasoning and behavior are developed 
and organized. Arduini argues th a t emotions could interfere with a  
sm ooth progression in eidetic operations as well as restruc tu re  the 
subject’s reference framework in a  way th a t affects the level of 
importance of factors th a t compete to dom inate the individual decision 
making process, (p. 128).
Public spheres
While the individual may be unique the public sphere is 
characterized by communicative interchanges among multiply 
constituted groups of persons. Although presum ed to operate w ithout 
preexisting influence of power, the public sphere has w itnessed 
num erous transform ations in communicative resources tha t 
continuously reshape its form. Hyland, Gomez and Greensides (2003, p. 
386) recounted the description of the early public sphere by H aberm as as 
a  sphere of public authority  in which private persons, on account of their 
s ta tu s  and position in society could not participate.
Eventually, as Haberm as has argued in his landm ark work “The 
S tructural Transform ation of the Public Sphere” (Habermas, 1962), 
public areas typified by coffee houses developed and preserved a  kind of 
social intercourse in which ideally, the relevance of hierarchical social 
sta tu s became less determ inant of the process through which ideas on
141
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
issues of public concern emerged. Assum ptions in cultural products of 
philosophy, literature and a rt became problematic in principle and 
subject to public discursive exam ination and interpretation. Stable 
groups of d iscussan ts rem ained part of the larger open public and 
sometimes actively sought to dissem inate their views and ideological 
perspectives to the wider public. Theoretically, public opinion emerged 
from public debate and grew in sta tu re  as legitimate basis for ethics and 
morality.
O ther works indicate th a t the public as envisioned by Haberm as is 
subject to certain distortive influences. King (1995) has pointed to the 
argum ent th a t the distinction between public and private hides the 
fundam ental dependency of the capitalist m arket on the struc tu re  of 
relations in the intim ate sphere of the conjugal family in which forms of 
gender biases are ingrained and  projected into public discourse.
Further the influence of the m edia gives the press enorm ous ability 
to shape the contours of a public sphere by influencing w hat information 
ultim ately becomes available and the param eters of discourse (King, p. 
196). These concerns would limit the abstrac t universality th a t 
Haberm as assum ed would allow individuals to achieve parity in their 
subjectivities and  ensure th a t critical public debate was based on 
common shared principles and  in accord with universal rules w ithout 
regard to all preexisting social and  political rank.
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While accepting th a t “som ething like H aberm as’s idea of the public 
sphere is indispensable to critical social theory and democratic political 
practice”, Fraser (1992) has problematized the Haberm as “public sphere” 
and argued th a t a  multiplicity of publics operates to better bracket the 
tendency of dom inant groups to “delegitimate some in terests, views, and 
topics and to valorize others (Id. a t p. 131)”. Fraser has referred to “weak 
publics”, “strong publics”, “institutional public spheres” , “internal public 
sphere”, “subaltern  counterpublics” in arguing for “a  widening of 
discursive contestation” in stratified society.
University studen ts and scholars have played significant roles at 
promoting critical discourses across public spheres th a t incorporate 
networks of other institutions. At tim es, these discourses have influenced 
public policy in dram atic and definitive ways as in term inating United 
States involvement in the Vietnam War. Ideally, for such  publics to 
function effectively, com m unication m ust be free of community-wide 
biases and free from serious interruptions.
Bohm an and Lutz-Bachm ann (1997) added th a t the cosm opolitan 
public organized in world civil society m ust understand  itself as 
m aintaining th is openness and inclusiveness in com m unication. Such 
openness, they m aintain, allowed new publics to emerge with new 
them es and  issues for the public agenda and fresh challenges to cu rren t 
understand ings.
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Bohm an and Lutz-Bachm ann asserted  th a t beyond criticism of 
existing law and authority  citizens in a  world public sphere m ust be able 
to debate, discuss and  deliberate in such  a way as to produce public 
agreem ents and  consensus consistent with the integrity of various 
political com m unities and cultures. Changing priorities and  concerns 
spawn new publics. They argued th a t political institu tions th a t do not 
rem ain responsive to new, increasingly pluralistic and cosmopolitan 
publics risk losing legitimacy and  th a t the source of m any extraordinary 
periods of democratic lawmaking was characterized by the reassertion of 
popular sovereignty against the resistance of rigid forms of 
institutionalization and entrenched relations of power (Id., p. 192).
Bohm an and Lutz-Bachm ann concluded th a t the force of the 
opinions of world citizens, like the opinions of republican citizens in the 
state, would be primarily responsible for limiting military power and 
ensuring world peace. Such far reaching effects require the formation of 
internationally connected publics with common global them es and issues 
such as world peace and  environm ental integrity. Across universities 
nationally and  internationally studen ts and faculty are active in publics 
with cosmopolitan and global in tents. University adm inistrators m ust 
factor these activities into the leadership challenges th a t they address, 
or, as implied by Edm unson (p. 135), ignore them  a t the risk of moral 
reprobation.
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The area  of public discourse appears to be grappling with a  variety 
of conceptual issues as suggested in W arner’s statem ent th a t tha t 
“publics have become an essential fact of the social landscape, yet it 
would tax our understand ing  to say exactly w hat they are (Warner, 2002. 
a t p. 413)”, and in Frazer’s critique of H aberm as’s conceptualization of 
the early bourgeois public sphere and its subsequent transform ation 
(Habermas, 1989; Frazer, 1992). The extensive role of universities in 
promoting, shaping and in the understand ing  of discourse in virtually all 
spheres of society adds to the complexity of challenges th a t face leaders 
of these institutions.
Sum m ary
In th is chapter, literature review has been conducted under two 
categories, namely, legal settings and rhetorical settings. The first 
com ponent of the legal setting consists of the pre-G rokster p2p file 
sharing cases, Napster, In Re Aimster, the landm ark Sony litigation, as 
well as a  discussion of evolving interpretations of copyright in terests and 
early congressional bills on p2p file sharing. The second and third 
com ponents cover the lower court decisions in Grokster and  the Suprem e 
Court phase of the Grokster litigation respectively.
Under the rhetorical setting, Bitzer’s rhetorical situation is 
reviewed along with modifications th a t add robustness to Bitzer’s basic 
concepts. Also, works on absence and silence are reviewed to illustrate 
the treatm ent of these phenom ena as discursive symbolic action in a
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variety of environm ents. Next the rhetorically fertile academ ic freedom 
site and its connection to copyright has been explored.
Finally works on certain elem ents of the ecology have been 
included in the review. These may be viewed as Bitzer’s category of 
constrain ts in rhetorical situation. Such constraints have varied 
ontology and are capable of affecting the fittingness of a  rhetorical 
response in rhetorical situation where exigencies exist.
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Cohen and Olson (1996) have w arned th a t legal sources differ in 
their relative authority  (p. 3) and  have identified three categories of legal 
literature required for thorough research. These are prim ary sources, 
finding tools and secondary m aterials.
Primary sources are found in constitutions, in decisions of 
appellate courts, in sta tu tes passed  by legislatures, in executive decrees, 
and in regulations and  rulings of adm inistrative agencies. A major 
category of prim ary sources is judicial decisions. In common law 
jurisdictions, such  as in the United States, law is expressed in an  
evolving body of doctrine based on cases. Established rules are tested 
and adapted for novel situations.
Another category for prim ary sources comprises sta tu tes  passed by 
legislatures. Cohen and Olsen have stated  th a t the ruling principles in 
some subject areas are determ ined wholly by case law while other areas 
are governed partly by case law and partly by statu te. The third 
im portant prim ary source is adm inistrative law, contained in the 
regulations and decisions of government agencies.
Due to the multiplicity of cases and sta tu tes generated and the 
concurrent need for stability, the researcher needs to consider the m ost
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recent legal sources as well as the doctrine of stare decisis which ensures 
the relevance of a  wide range of chronological enactm ents, decisions and 
rulings.
Finding tools facilitate discovery of existing decisions and  sta tu tes 
by subject or topic. In p rin t format, digests reprint headnotes 
sum m arizing points of law from court decisions classified by subject and 
citators list later sources th a t have relied upon or m entioned a particular 
precedent; annotations and legal encyclopedias provide narrative 
explanations of case law. WESTLAW and LEXIS are powerful and  
comprehensive com puter-based system s for legal research.
Secondary m aterials such  as treatises discuss and analyze legal 
doctrine. According to Cohen and Olsen, m uch of the m ost influential 
legal writing is found in the academ ic journals or law reviews. The 
au thors also distinguish between “authoritative treatises by great 
academic scholars”, and “superficial trac ts by hack w riters”. Relevant 
secondary sources are also available through law library catalogs and 
legal periodical indexes.
This d issertation focuses on the curious rhetorical behavior of 
absence and silence of higher education leaders in MGM v. G rokster at 
the Suprem e Court phase of th is notable copyright-based case. 
Consequently, it is useful to briefly describe the structure  of the United 
States Federal Court system  through which the litigation progressed;
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from U.S. District Court, through U.S. Court of Appeals and  finally U.S. 
Suprem e Court.
The Internet site (h ttp ://w w w .uscourts.gov /) has presented the 
following account of the U.S. Federal Court system. The United States 
district courts are the trial courts of the federal court system. Within 
limits set by Congress and the Constitution, the district courts have 
jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including both 
civil and  crim inal m atters. There are 94 federal judicial districts, 
including a t least one district in each state, the District of Columbia and 
Puerto Rico. Three territories of the United States, the Virgin Islands, 
Guam, and the Northern M ariana Islands have district courts th a t hear 
federal cases, including bankruptcy  cases.
The 94 U.S. judicial districts are organized into 12 regional 
circuits, each of which has a United States court of appeals. A court of 
appeals hears appeals from the district courts located within its circuit, 
as well as appeals from decisions of federal adm inistrative agencies.
The United States Suprem e Court consists of the Chief Justice  of 
the United States and eight associate justices. At its discretion, and 
within certain guidelines established by Congress, the Suprem e Court 
each year hears a  limited num ber of the cases it is asked to decide. 
Those cases may begin in the federal or state  courts, and  they usually  
involve im portant questions about the Constitution or federal law.
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Internet searches in FindLaw.com, WESTLAW and Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF) and THOMAS Library of Congress system  and 
The Chronicle of Higher Education produced in stan t references for the 
Grokster case as well as the preceding relevant cases, Napster, Aimster, 
and Sony. Published decisions in these cases have provided links to 
significant cases involving both secondary and  primary copyright liability 
and dating back beyond the previous century. The Grokster Docket at 
the Suprem e Court (Docket for 04-480) website provided details of 
docum ents and briefs filed a t the Court. EFF provided details and  links 
to briefs filed by all parties, including amici curiae briefs. I expect th a t 
the above tools as well as general and  law library aids and databases 
available a t m ost university libraries and collaborated m aterial obtained 
from Internet searches will provide adequate and accurate m aterial for 
this work.
The first task  using legal research was to establish the case th a t 
provides the site for rhetorical criticism. The case is the Grokster 
litigation a t the United S tates Suprem e Court: METRO-GOLDWYN- 
MAYER STUDIOS INC. V. GROKSTER, LTD. (04-480) 545 U.S. 913 
(2005), 380 F.3d 1154, vacated and rem anded. The com ponents of th is 
case are certiorari, briefs, oral argum ents and the Suprem e Court 
decision. Briefs discussed in th is project are Petition for certiorari 
subm itted by Petitioners MGM et al.. Brief of Respondents subm itted  by 
Grokster et al. and  briefs subm itted by amici. Although 55 amici briefs
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were submitted, representing the 3rd most significant case in United 
States contem porary history as m easured by num ber of briefs subm itted 
by amici with declared in terests, only the briefs subm itted by 
universities, their associations or their constituent faculty were 
considered of in terest to th is project. This follows the assum ption th a t 
these briefs, totaling 14 in num ber represent perspectives of higher 
education in Grokster.
A crucial finding for th is project is th a t the 14 briefs referred to 
above were subm itted by university professors in their individual 
capacities as scholars. Each declared in terest did not extend beyond 
individual roles as scholars. Direct reference to the case docket. Suprem e 
Court Docket 04-480 (MGM v. Grokster Ltd., Suprem e Court Docket 04- 
480) corroborated with a  list of briefs published by the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation ([EFF] (2007b) confirmed the finding th a t from 
universities, all briefs were subm itted by individual scholars.
No record was found th a t universities and university associations 
subm itted any briefs and  since the only participation perm itted a t the 
Suprem e Court by in terests who are not parties in the case, with the 
exception of the Solicitor General of the United States, perm itted to 
subm it briefs and participate in oral argum ents on behalf of the United 
States, is through subm ission of am icus curiae briefs, the finding is th a t 
universities did not participate a t the Grokster Court. The conclusion is
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th a t university presidents and  university associations were absen t and 
silent a t the Suprem e Court in Grokster.
Rhetorical Criticism
German (1985) has explained th a t it takes a special union of 
methodology and artifact to yield the best understanding  of both, and 
has recom mended exploration of five questions about the artifact. This 
process would serve to expose the utility of various alternative 
perspectives and direct the critic towards choice of a  perspective th a t 
m ost effectively illum inated the discourse over the m ost significant 
orientations of the artifact.
The first question is as follows: “Is there a  prom inent element or 
several elem ents in the artifact which dom inate it?” The prom inent 
elements can include the character of rhetors, the words themselves or a  
“... strong image in the artifact which dom inates the effect of the 
discourse”. (German, p. 88); also, the artifact may depend on the 
audience for its impact. German has explained th a t since any artifact 
has m any facets th a t include the ideas, pattern , rhetor, style, context 
and impact, a  thorough exam ination and understanding  of all facets 
should be acquired before form ulation of final im pressions. Germ an lists 
several examples th a t a  critic might choose to examine, such  as, an  
exam ination of the moral qualities of the public statem ents of figures like 
M ahatm a Ghandi or Mother Hale, the argum ents of atomic scientists on 
the nuclear energy question, motivational appeals in presidential
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cam paign commercials and the structu re  of the Gettysburg Address. 
Rhetorical artifacts can be examined “for their use of logic, speaker 
credibility, motivational appeals, ideas, structure , expression, and 
delivery”, (Id.). Emergence of dom inant elem ents can narrow  the range of 
choices for the critic’s method.
The second question: “Is the rhetoric an  expression of its cultural 
milieu?” German sta tes th a t the rhetoric may “reveal som ething about 
the we live, the way others live” or express a  point of view which enriches 
understandings of hum anity. According to German, the Olympic spirit 
exemplified by Mary Lou Retton and Edwin Moses reveal how we view 
sports; Slim Goodbody provides a  model for children in a health ­
conscious society while the 1984 presidential campaign teaches us 
som ething about our political expectations. Each of these examples is an 
expression or reflection of its culture and, as such is a  rhetorical 
m anifestation of culture.
The third question: “Is there an  interaction of elem ents in th is 
artifact which accounts for its unique character?” Germ an has stated 
tha t the na tu re  of com m unications depends upon com binations of 
audience, rhetor, and message (Id.), and th a t “the m anner in which th is 
occurs is of unending in terest to the critic, particularly because it may 
reveal som ething about the natu re  of com m unication” (Id). The “rainbow 
coalition” of the 1984 Democratic Convention, the “silent majority” of the 
Vietnam era, both feature an  interaction of values, ideas, personalities
153
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
captured in a  single expression. To understand  the power of rhetorical 
slogans, the critic can analyze the interaction of elements and how each 
element affects the process of m eaning creation. German sta tes th a t 
“countless rhetorical artifacts function in th is m anner including dram atic 
works” such  as the state  play “Uncle Tom’s Cabin”, m usic like the hym ns 
of Jo h n  Wesley, poetry such  as feminist writings of the m id-60’s and 
more traditional discourse. This orientation provides the critic with 
“salient dram as, fantasies, and m yths” , as they are expressed in popular 
rhetoric.
The fourth question: “When compared to other artifacts, does this 
rhetoric reveal unique characteristics it possesses or which characterize 
a  group of similar artifacts?”
Germ an (Id. a t p. 89) sta tes th a t rhetoric may have unique 
characteristics which are not seen until contrasted with other rhetorical 
artifacts and  th a t the striking features of categories may not be readily 
apparent un til they are seen together. As an example, the critic may 
explore the rhetorical characteristics of Jo an  Baez’s songs by discovering 
their common denom inators or by comparing them  with the m usic of 
other songwriters. German also indicated th a t critics may not find 
com parisons which best illustrate the function of the rhetorical artifact of 
in terest until the search outside of the realm  of strictly rhetorical 
com parisons for other ways of illum inating the rhetoric. As an  example, 
the organizational pa ttern /argum entative  structure  of a  speaker might
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resemble the repetition of the fugue in m usic or the cam paigner seeking 
a  party  office may resemble the courting ritual (In H erm ann G. Stelzner’s 
Hum phrey and Kennedy court West Virginia, as sited by German, Id. a t 
p. 89).
The fifth question: “Does the rhetorical theory of the historical 
period lend understanding  to the rhetorical artifact?”
G erm an has stated  (Id. a t p. 90) th a t a  rhetorical artifact may be 
examined by discovering the theory or practices which influenced the 
rhetorician because conventions of m essage or audience understand ing  
of rhetorical conventions th a t shape the message differ from our own 
with the conclusion th a t “one source for appropriate methodologies exists 
in the rhetorical theorists of the historical period ... (Id.). A critic should 
choose the perspective which gives the reader new insight into the forces 
of rhetoric.
In selecting a particular m ethod of rhetorical criticism to apply to 
the artifact, it is useful to rem em ber th a t rhetorical system s and 
methodologies have developed in response to the questions asked by 
critics. Many tentative system s are available from which the critic may 
examine potential candidates for selection. German (Id. a t p. 96) suggests 
tha t the final selection should be clear, efficient, and appropriate and 
should also answ er the “m ost im portant question”, namely “does the 
methodology reveal som ething new about the artifact” and increase our
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understanding  of the rhetorical artifact “since th a t is the purpose of 
rhetorical criticism ”.
German has presented some categories of methodology including 
traditional criticism, situational criticism, three subcategories of 
sociological criticism, genre, or analog criticism and historically relevant 
theory. However “because distortions of complex system s of thought are 
not acceptable”, it is im portant to apply a  methodology with the entirety 
of its essential tenets. The methodology of generative criticism (Foss, 
2004, p. 411) offers a  system  which is ideal when a  critic needs to 
analyze an  artifact w ithout following any formal m ethod of criticism. 
Such may arise if standard  codified methodological categories seam  
inadequate in any significant respects. Following are outlines of some 
system s of rhetorical criticism.
Traditional criticism is based on the theory th a t rhetoric functions 
as a m eans for discovering rational tru thfu l appeals to audiences. 
Several elem ents dom inate the rhetorical artifact and the critic focuses 
on logical, ethical, and motivational elem ents through which the rhetor 
operates to achieve persuasion. The focus is on internal subcategories 
such as speaker credibility, motivational appeals, u se  of language, 
organization and  delivery.
In situational criticism, the rhetorical artifact arises from the 
situation or the culture and suggests the use of Bitzer’s “rhetorical 
situation” as a  source of methodology. One approach in situational
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criticism focuses on the interaction of audience, exigencies, and, 
contingencies in creating the opportunity for an  appropriate and timely 
rhetorical response (Bitzer, 1968). Another approach focuses on an  
exam ination of the culture which produces external influences from a 
rhetorical situation. According to German (supra, a t p. 92), differences in 
cultural expectations or conventions can account for mis- 
com m unication, a  common occurrence in international com m unication.
Sociological criticism focuses on language as a  response to social 
situations in which com m unication is a m eans of action as well as a 
record of thoughts, a ttitudes and values. (Id. a t p. 92). Germ an has listed 
four approaches to sociological criticism. These are movement studies, or 
agitation criticsm, dram atism , reality construction, and  fantasy them e 
analysis.
In movement or agitation criticism, critics have been interested in 
the language and action which accompany social movements using these 
to account in varied ways for the rhetoric produced to create and 
susta in , as well as to dim inish and suppress the effects of social 
movements (Id.).
Dram atistic criticism, credited to Kenneth Burke, u ses the them e 
of dram atic interaction to capture the essence of rhetoric through 
rhetorical transactions influenced by ratios of the five factors of the 
“pen tad”, action, agent(s), agency, scene and  purpose.
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Reality construction focuses on rhetoric as the m eans th a t aids the 
creation and sustenance of the social reality necessary to form relatively 
enduring governm ents and  social institutions. Language is a  prim ary 
force calculated to reinforce the connection of individuals in relationships 
to the larger society, ultim ately assuring  and m aintaining a  stable social 
reality.
In Generative criticism, upon encountering a “curious artifact”, the 
critic generates un its  of analysis or an  explanation schem a from the 
artifact ra ther th an  from previously developed, formal m ethods of 
criticism (Id.). Foss provides a flexible tem plate th a t considers 
encountering the curious artifact, coding the artifact, searching for 
suitable explanatory theory and creating an  explanatory schema.
This d issertation has focused on the curious absence and  silence 
of higher education leaders a t the Suprem e Court phase of Grokster.
Most system s of rhetorical criticism are biased towards corporal identity 
of the rhetorical artifact; speech, texts, semiotic objects - occurrences in 
which silence, absence, and  space are treated as incidental clarificatory 
or effect devices. For example the last sentence is repeated here w ithout 
the incidental devices of space and punctuation.
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W ithout the necessity of em barking on a  process of deconstructing 
speech and presence in an  attem pt to earn  silence and absence the sam e 
sta tu s among other traditional rhetorical artifacts favored in m ost 
common rhetorical system s, the process of rhetorical criticism can 
commence squarely with the encounter of the curious artifact.
For this project, of all m ajor methodologies in rhetorical criticism, 
generative criticism and situational criticism offer the m ost attractive 
possibilities. Generative criticism (Foss, 2004) allows the critic enorm ous 
flexibility bu t also involves im portant coding processes which are difficult 
to perform with absence and silence which have limited availability of 
features th a t can be coded with certainty.
Situational criticism based on Bitzer’s rhetorical situation deals 
frontally with a  situation tha t invites a fitting response which may or 
may not materialize. Bitzer’s sem inal work draws on the usua l courtroom  
case as an  example of “situation which is complex and highly structu red  
(Supra, p. 67)” and by acknowledging th a t situations are not always 
accom panied by fitting responses (Id. p. 60), m akes room for absence 
and silence as legitimate objects of study in a  rhetorical situation.
Bitzer’s rhetorical situation has survived negating posm odernistic 
critique (Vatz, 1973) as well as elaborations in expansive categories and 
theory (Consigny, 1974; Jam ieson, 1975; Biesecker, 1989; Edbauer, 
2005) which perhaps fortuitously have served to intensify situational
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criticism as a veritable methodology with applicability to extensible 
categories of symbolic acts including absence and silence.
Carroll (2002) has indeed conducted a formal study of silence 
using Bitzer’s rhetorical situation. Many other studies and treatises of 
absence and silence (Jones, 1999; Kurzon, 1995; Lang, 1996 ) may be 
readily analyzed and  understood through the application of concepts and 
principles enunciated and discussed in works on rhetorical situation, 
particularly Bitzer’s “Rhetorical Situation”.
Germ an (supra a t p. 91) has stated  th a t "... methodologies have 
developed in response to questions asked by critics ...”, and  discusses 
methodologies th a t "... cover a  broad range of potential critical 
perspectives.” These include traditional criticism which “assum es th a t 
rhetoric functions as a m eans for discovering rational, tru th fu l appeals to 
audiences.”; situational criticism “focuses on the interaction of audience, 
exigencies, and  contingencies in creating the opportunity for a rhetorical 
response which is appropriate to the situation”; sociological criticism 
“focuses on language as a  response to social situations in which 
com m unication is a  m eans of action as well as a  record of thoughts, 
a ttitudes and values.”; genre or analog criticism “attem pts to identify 
types of rhetoric through the common characteristics or functions of the 
m em bers of th a t group”. State of union m essages and  press conferences 
are examples of genres each with its unique characteristics. Historically 
relevant theory focuses on the dom inant rhetorical ideas which
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influenced the rhetor when they “spoke” and extracts broader m eanings 
in the context of th a t immediate influence.
Situational Criticism
From these major perspectives, this d issertation has applied the 
methodology of situational criticism to the Suprem e Court phase of 
Grokster with a  focus on the absence and silence of university 
presidents.
Farrell and Young in The Art of Rhetorical Criticism, J . A. Kuypers, 
Ed. (2004) have repeated Bitzer’s definition of “the rhetorical situation” 
as:
a  complex of persons, events, objects and relations presenting 
an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or 
partially removed if discourse introduced into the situation can 
so constrain hum an  decision or action as to bring about the 
significant modification of the exigence (Id.).
Further, “in any rhetorical situation there will be a t least one 
controlling exigence which functions as the organizing principle; it 
specifies the audience to be addressed and the change to be effected 
(Farrell & Young, 2004).”
In Bitzer’s view, according to Farrell and Young, the situation in 
which rhetoric is called forth encom passes all of the elem ents th a t 
influenced the m om ent including the events, the individuals involved, the 
circum stances, and  the relationships among these factors (Id. a t p. 35).
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The critic m ust take into account the totality of the situation and  m ust 
consider the role played by each element.
Formally, Farrell and  Young prescribed four m ajor steps in 
situational criticism. The first is the generation of a  list consisting of each 
of the elem ents th a t constitute the particular situation. Initially th is list 
should be inclusive, even exhaustive; elements can be om itted later if the 
analysis dem onstrates their role to be negligible. The second task  is to 
analyze each element, in term s of the role each played; the th ird  task  is 
to determ ine the dom inant element or exigence tha t will govern the 
response and  the fourth task  is to analyze the response to determ ine if 
the exigence is modified and if the response is “fitting”.
Farrell and  Young adm it th a t the four steps described do not 
constitute an  exhaustive list of steps in situational criticism and tha t 
situational analysis is seldom used  as a stand  alone tool to evaluate a 
rhetorical artifict. More typically, according to the au thors, situational 
criticism enriches other analytical m ethods by providing a  deeper 
understanding  of context in all its dim ensions (Id. a t p. 35). It may also 
be analogized th a t other analytical m ethods may be referenced and  used 
to enrich situational criticism. Farrell and Young conclude th a t only by 
understanding  the full context of a rhetorical event can the critic 
com prehend and evaluate the artifact itself.
The first step in Farrell and Young’s four step procces is to 
generate a list of elem ents in the particular rhetorical situation. This was
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accomplished by applying the five questions suggested by Germ an to the 
Suprem e Court phase of Grokster. Additionally to aim towards the 
production of an  exhaustive list as recom mended by Farrell and  Young, 
concepts in the works of Bitzer and  other scholars will be applied to 
hopefully discover other elem ents to further expand the list of elements.
The next step in the four step process, namely analyzing each 
element in term s of the role each played, will also rely on the earlier 
referenced works on rhetorical situation by Vatz (1973), Consigny (1974), 
Jam ieson (1975), Biesecker (1989) and E dbauer (2005). This step is 
expected to situate the absence and silence of university presidents at 
the Grokster Court along with other elem ents whose salience will be 
thoroughly examined in the th ird  step, namely, determ ination of the 
dom inant element or exigence th a t will [should] govern the response. The 
fourth step in Farrell and Young’s scheme is an  analysis of the response 
to determ ine if the exigence is modified and if the response if fitting.
Four research questions have been probed and answered; these 
are: Did Grokster influence scholarly freedom or institutional autonom y? 
Utilizing rhetorical criticism, w hat were the implications of the absence 
and silence of higher education leaders a t the Grokster Court? W hat was 
the im pact of the United States Suprem e Court decision in G rokster on 
higher education? Have new issues been generated?
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Sum m ary
In th is chapter methodology was discussed in two parts; legal 
research was applied to the Grokster litigation to identify rhetors and 
audiences in the rhetorical situation a t the Suprem e Court. Also 
im portant discursively influential artifacts of text and  speech were 
identified. Absence and silence of university presidents and  university 
associations were established through legal research.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Application of Methodology in Grokster 
The situation of in terest is the Suprem e Court phase of the 
Grokster legislation construed in broad term s with elem ents th a t relate 
to discourse and discursivity in the situation. Formally, Farrell and 
Young have prescribed four major steps in situational criticism. The first 
is the generation of a  list consisting of each of the elem ents th a t 
constitute the particu lar situation. “Initially th is list sholild be inclusive, 
even exhaustive; elem ents can be omitted later if the analysis 
dem onstrates their role to be negligible.” The second task  is to analyze 
each element, in term s of the role each played; the third task  is to 
determine the dom inant element or exigence th a t will govern the 
response and the fourth task  is to analyze the response to determ ine if 
the exigence is modified and if the response is “fitting” (supra).
List of elem ents have been generated from three sources namely 
answers to G erm an’s Five Questions, Bitzer’s constituents comprising 
exigence, audience and constraints as well as other elem ents th a t the 
critic can provisionally appended and ultim ately justify. Obvious 
examples are elem ents from the category of au thor and also legal briefs. 
A tentative list of rhetors at the Grokster Court emerged through legal 
research; representing copyright owners in the entertainm ent industry.
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MGM et al. as Petitioners; representing peer to peer service providers, 
Grokster et al. as Respondents. At oral argum ents (MGM v. Grokster 
(2005a), appearances before the full house of Suprem e Court Justices 
were: Donald B. Verrilli, J r ., Esq., on behalf of the Petitioners; Paul D. 
Clement, Esq., Acting Solicitor General, D epartm ent of Justice , for 
United States, as am icus curiae, supporting the Petitioners and Richard 
G. Taranto, Esq., on behalf of the Respondents. This list will be expanded 
after exam ination of G erm an’s questions on m atching methodology and 
“artifact.”
G erm an’s Five Questions
G erm an’s five questions are used to ferret out as m any tangible 
elem ents as possible in the situation. This will be supplem ented by 
adding additional elem ents from the critic’s perspective to produce the 
exhaustive list th a t Farrell and  Young’s methodology recommend. 
Because of the complexity of Grokster, an  ecological expansion of 
situation will be applied to include elem ents of historical relevance such  
as the legal progression of p2p secondary liability jurisprudence from 
Napster (2000) through Aimster (2003) and Grokster (2004).
This legal history was thoroughly intertw ined with universities 
which typically operated powerful processing technologies and  embedded 
within unique university culture which governed how the use  of these 
technologies were m anaged and regulated. Thus university values and 
leadership will prove to be im portant elem ents in th is project.
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Starting with German, the first question is as follows: “Is there a 
prom inent element or several elem ents in the artifact which dom inate it?”
Although several prom inent elem ents will be uncovered in the 
analysis, the question presented by Petitioners a t the Court and  the 
complete absence and silence of higher education adm inistration are 
prom inent elements. Quoting Norton, “That which is omitted, absen t and 
silent is as im portant as th a t which is committed, present, and 
conspicuous” (Norton, 2004).
Rhetors from universities included professors in their individual 
roles as scholars and intellectuals (Foster, 2005; Pollack, 2005; Lessig; 
2005; Abelson, 2005). Their statem ents shed considerable light on issues 
of university and scholarly autonom y and serve to justify the 
problem atization of the absence and  silence th a t characterized the 
performance of university presidents a t Grokster.
The second question: “Is the rhetoric an  expression of its cultural 
milieu?”
Through an analysis of the rhetoric of absence and  silence in this 
case, a  deeper appreciation could be gained of ways in which external 
in terests and power can operate to constrain speech in certain 
constituencies and interpellate rhetors into roles tha t are patently 
problematic. In higher education culture, scholars have expressed 
concern over the extent to which research sponsored by external
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in terests can affect tenure and all m eanings of academic freedom at 
universities (Thomson, 1983).
The third question: “Is there an  interaction of elem ents in th is 
artifact which accounts for its unique character?”
The rhetorical situation in th is case is characterized by m ultiple 
interactions of the textual briefs of rhetors with distinct flavors in law 
(Pollack), culture (Lessig) and  technology (Abelson et al..), several of 
which related to some aspect of institutional and  scholarly autonom y 
and ultim ately the role of higher education in society and dem onstrated 
tha t legitimate university perspectives existed. These perform ances of 
presence and speech give a  uniquely curious character to the absence 
and silence or presidents of universities. O ther interactions were 
oppositional perspectives expressed by litigants and the United States 
D epartm ent of Justice  a t oral argum ents and interaction of m edia 
executives of AIAA and MPAA with university presidents while Grokster 
was progressing towards a  Suprem e Court showdown.
The fourth question: “When compared to other artifacts, does this 
rhetoric reveal unique characteristics it possesses or which characterize 
a  group of sim ilar artifacts?”
The absence and  silence of higher education adm inistration in 
Grokster possess unique characteristics compared with other categories 
of absences and silences such  as those th a t result from external
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suppression of speech or silences used  as resistance by persons and 
groups in positions of lesser power (Caroll, 2002).
The fifth question: “Does the rhetorical theory of the historical 
period lend understand ing  to the rhetorical artifact.”
The historical period is contem porary and as such  curren t ideas in 
critical theory, psychoanalytic process m anifested through desire, 
com m unication in different spheres and ethics will be draw n upon to 
illum inate the implications of absence and silence of university leaders a t 
the Grokster Court.
It is now time to apply Farrell and Young’s four step prescription 
for situational criticism. The first is the generation of a  list consisting of 
each of the elem ents th a t constitute the particular situation; the second 
task  is to analyze each element, in term s of the role each played; the 
third task  is to determ ine the dom inant element or exigence th a t will 
govern the response and the fourth task  is to analyze the response to 
determine if the exigence is modified and if the response is “fitting”.
List of Elements
Several rhetors appeared a t the Grokster Court. Petitioners and 
respondents had  sim ilar goals. Each sought to prevail over the other a t 
the conclusion of certiorari. This project identifies other categories of 
rhetors a t the Suprem e Court. These are university professors in their 
individual roles as scholars, university presidents in their roles as 
adm inistrative leaders of their institu tions and as leaders in higher
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education whose symbolic action gained salience in the form of absence 
and silence and, Suprem e Court Ju stices who used speech and text to 
arrive a t the final disposition of the case. Professors spoke through 
am icus curiae briefs from backgrounds of law, technology, and  culture. 
Supreme Court Ju stices spoke individually a t the oral argum ents on 
petition for certiorari and  as a  democratic body through textual rendering 
of their decision. Presidents of universities and colleges displayed 
absence and  silence a t the Suprem e Court phase of Grokster.
Actual and  potential exigencies always exist in a  court of law, 
particularly a t the Suprem e Court from where contending parties can 
launch no further appeals. Universities and colleges, though not a  party 
in the case potentially faced exigencies by virtue of the question th a t 
litigants placed before the Court. These exigencies, tentatively assum ed 
in the areas of institu tional autonom y and scholarly freedom, will be 
evaluated for their significance in th is project.
Practitioners in popular culture also faced potential th rea ts  to 
creativity of cultural artifacts as well as economic restrictions on the 
distribution of m usic. These exigencies will also be evaluated for their 
significance in th is project. Copyright holders who were not litigants 
faced the possibility of gross loss of royalty income and ren t if the Court 
were to affirm the 9 th  Circuit taking a  cue from the hysteria th a t followed 
the appellate court affirmation of the California District sum m ary 
dism issal in favor of Grokster.
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Audience in the Grokster situation extended far beyond the 
Suprem e Court Ju stices for whom deciding a case, as discussed by 
Cardozo, is a  complex interaction of both conscious and subconscious 
processes (Cardozo, 1949). The public and private sectors which, 
together, provide the major portion of financial support for colleges and 
universities take cognizance of positions taken by scholars of these 
institu tions no less th an  of decisions th a t come down from the Suprem e 
Court. The continuing evolution of the public view of the role of 
universities in society is not im m une to w hat m em bers of key 
constituencies in these institu tions say, do, and think.
W hat is not said or w hat is not done may be as im portant as w hat 
is said and done. As Norton d iscusses a t (Norton, p. 89 ) “That which is 
omitted, absent, and silent is as im portant as th a t which is committed, 
p resent and conspicuous.” As the public consciously or subconsciously 
m oulds its opinions of the higher education complex, the speech, actions 
and other behavior of university presidents may not go unnoticed.
By the sheer num ber of interested amici as m easured by a  count of 
briefs filed, over the subject m atter of availability and distribution of 
popular m usic, a  national activity which accounts for a  large proportion 
of commerce, it is fair to argue th a t American society a t large and 
possibly w estern society was listening attentively for the outcome of 
Grokster. Every listener in Grokster had a different personal or
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professional exigence th a t the Suprem e Court decision could dispel, 
aggravate or in some way affect.
All subject and  configurational positions a t Grokster were products 
of historical and  rhetorical processes, some, such as copyright, from the 
very birth  of the Constitution through several am endm ents and Suprem e 
Court cases all of which directed efforts towards cariying out the 
constitutional in ten t of balancing in terests of copyright holders through 
levels of com pensation th a t m aintained productive incentive to ensure 
public availability of creative works of art.
For universities, the natu re  and  responsibilities of the societal pact 
as well as conceptualization of privileges of academic freedom have 
developed over a  period of over a  cen tu iy  even predating the foundation 
of AAUP by lum inaries such  as Jo h n  Dewey. Academic freedom, perhaps, 
the m ost active and long enduring rhetorical site outside of Congress and 
popular politics, finds public education and  its institu tions and  values 
close to the center.
The above elem ents arising from the immediate G rokster Court 
gain salience from the questions presented for Suprem e Court Justices 
to decide. In Statem ent of the Case, Petitioners stated  th a t “This is one of 
the m ost im portant of copyright cases ever to reach this Court.
Resolution of the question presented here will largely determ ine the 
value, indeed the veiy significance of copyright in the digital era (MGM v.
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Grokster, 2005a). Petitioners, MGM and 36 of the largest en tertainm ent 
companies in the world presented the following question:
W hether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding, contrary to long- 
established principles of secondary liability in copyright law (and 
in acknowledged conflict with the Seventh Circuit), th a t the 
Internet-based “file-sharing” services Grokster and  Stream  Cast 
should be immunized from copyright liability for the millions of 
daily acts of copyright infringement th a t occur on their services 
and th a t constitute a t least 90% of the total use  of the services 
(MGM V. Grokster, 2005a).
Respondents Grokster and Stream Cast presented a different 
question:
W hether the court of appeals correctly ruled, on the only issue 
before it, th a t respondents’ distribution of the curren t versions 
of their file-sharing software does not render respondents 
secondarily liable for every direct infringement of petitioners’ 
copyrights committed by users of the software (MGM v.
Grokster, 2005b).
To th is som ewhat comprehensive list of elements, an  im portant 
element in this project was represented by m edia association executives 
from the Recording Industries Association of America (RIAA), and  the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). Like university presidents, 
neither the executives nor their associations were litigants a t any stage of
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Grokster. Also, like university presidents, neither they nor their 
associations RIAA and MPAA subm itted am icus curiae briefs.
The crucial difference is th a t the major companies who in fact 
make up  the m em bership of these two powerful m edia organizations were 
non other than  the Petitioners a t Grokster whereas for 39 listed 
university associations (NTLF, 2007) and over 200 presidents of research 
universities (Internet2, 2005), there was not a  single voice a t Grokster. 
The m ost prom inent association for university faculty, the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) also did not present an  
am icus curiae brief a t Grokster; however 14 briefs filed by their 
members; professors in their individual scholarly capacities covered 
issues of relevance to university faculty and higher education from the 
three major discursive positions. They filed 3 briefs in support of 
Petitioners, 10 briefs in support of Respondents and 1 brief in support of 
neither party.
Analysis of Elements
From Farrell and  Young’s suggested approach to situational 
criticism, the second step is to analyze each element in term s of the role 
each played, however the large num ber of elements interacted in several 
different dimensions. Farrell and  Young’ have stated th a t “As with any 
critical effort, it is the rhetorical artifact th a t will determ ine how the 
critical narrative develops.” (Farrell & Young, 2004 a t p. 35).
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Also they have indicated th a t "... more typically, it [situational 
analysis] enriches other analytical m ethods by providing a  deeper 
understanding  of context in all its dim ensions (Id.).” To conduct an  
analysis tha t reveals the role played by the m ost significant elem ents in 
the complex situation, a  dim ensional approach will be applied to 
supplem ent individual element analysis.
The Suprem e Court phase of Grokster is a  product of both direct 
and indirect cu ltural factors. Direct factors are constituted by the legal 
encounter a t the Court between Petitioners, MGM et al. and  Respondents 
Grokster and Steam Cast over principles of secondary liability in 
copyright law. Participants, petitioners, respondents, and  amici were 
actively present and  vocal using established Court processes in the form 
of briefs and  oral presentations, all of which are at a  minimum, 
processes th a t Suprem e Court Justices take judicial notice of and  m ost 
probably processes to which they a ttach  some weight. These direct 
factors deal with legal issues from concretized doctrines and codes of 
copyright law.
Indirect factors are less concrete bu t nevertheless contain issues of 
considerable significance to higher education in particu lar and to society 
in general. The vibrant rhetorical site of academic freedom experienced 
yet another set of traces of signification as did the role of higher 
education in a society with expressed and latent expectations in public
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ethics as well as expressed and latent expectations of leaders such  as 
presidents of institu tions of higher education.
Universities have been involved with the development and  use of 
network technology since Steve Crocker of UCLA first described basic 
peer to peer architecture (Crocker, 1969). Soon after Shawn Fanning 
created the file swapping service N apster in 1999, universities began to 
feel the im pact of m usic file sharing on their networks (McCollum, 
2000a). According to McCollum Napster file swapping activity a t 
universities escalated rapidly leading to excessive consum ption of 
available bandw idth and rapidly increasing cost for network access.
Several copyright owners through the RIAA regularly dem anded 
tha t colleges sh u t down online archives of illegal MP3s on their 
cam puses (RIAA, 2006) while others filed law suits against universities 
(Carlson, 2000b; Read, 2004). Read reported th a t RIAA law suit targeted 
over 75 network users in 21 universities. Massive file sharing created a 
panic in institu tions where the practice was ram pant as adm inistrators 
sought various m eans to deal with the crisis on their cam puses 
(Hennessy, 2004). The showdown a t the Suprem e Court m arked the 
culm ination of the legal fight between Petitioners and  Respondents. 
Legal dimensions
The Suprem e Court phase of Grokster was a determ ined and final 
effort by copyright owners to reverse the 9 th  Circuit decision which 
upheld a lower court’s sum m ary dism issal of the Petitioner’s com plaint
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against the file sharing services of Grokster and Steam Cast (545 U.S. 
913, 2005). Petitioners and  respondents relied on varying interpretations 
of the Sony “Betam ax” decision.
While respondents keyed in on the principle derived from paten t 
law th a t providers of products capable of substan tia l non infringing uses 
cannot be held liable for secondary infringement (Sony, 442), petitioners 
insisted on a calculus which gave weight to relative proportions of 
infringing and noninfringing uses. Petitioners essentially asked The 
Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit decision th a t “im m unized” Grokster 
and Stream  Cast from copyright liability in spite of “millions of daily acts 
of copyright infringement th a t occur on their services” and  th a t 
constitute over 90 percent of the total use of the services (Grokster, 545 
U.S. 913).
During the period of the Grokster lawsuit, over 200 universities 
were involved in the high speed Internet2 network research project 
developed to promote collaboration and innovation “th a t has a 
fundam ental im pact on the future of the Internet”. (Internet2, 2005). 
Chilling innovation in a  project as vast as Internet2 was a  concern of 
several university professors through their am icus curiae briefs. Also 
several law suits targeted u sers of the student-developed 12 hub  file 
swapping system  th a t operated over the Internet2 Consortium  Abilene 
network, a  network capable of supporting “lightening speed” file transfer 
processes (Read, 2005).
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Grokster had  succeeded in producing a file sharing system  th a t 
avoided the legal vulnerabilities of Napster and Aimster to two 
established principles of secondary liability, contributory and vicarious 
liability. To be liable through contributory principles, the secondary 
infringer m ust not only have knowledge of the direct infringing conduct, 
b u t m ust m ake m aterial contribution in the infringing process. 
Constructive knowledge was deemed insufficient as was actual 
knowledge gained a t a  time when the alleged contributory infringer can 
do nothing to stop the infringing conduct (Grokster, 2004, p. 13a).
Requirements for vicarious liability are financial benefit or in terest 
and the ability to supervise the infringing conduct. Direct financial 
benefit was dem onstrated in Napster, 239 F. 3d at 1023. Napster also 
required logins which empowered it to control access and therefore 
supervise file downloading activities. All major universities and colleges 
provide Internet access to studen ts, faculty and staff in offices, 
classroom s, com puter laboratories and m any provide access from home 
based com puters.
In Urofsky (121 U.S. 759), professors sought to remove chilling 
lim itations on w hat content may be accessed using com puters provided 
in university faculty offices. Although th is constraint was purely legal, it 
underscores the significance of ability to exercise control over university 
network access. According to Hennesey and Spanier (2004) access
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control was indeed one of the m ethods th a t universities used  to limit p2p 
file transfer activity.
Some of the indirect influences th a t operated during Grokster in 
fact operate in all cases before the Suprem e Court. The process by which 
Suprem e Court Justices arrive a t decisions as discussed in Cardozo 
( 1949) is a complex interaction of both conscious and subconscious 
processes, beginning with the search for a legal precedent. Cardozo a t p. 
31, discusses four m ethods in judicial decision making, the m ethod of 
philosophy or “the rule of analogy”, the m ethod of evolution along the 
line of historical development, the m ethod of tradition along the line of 
custom s of the com m unity and the m ethod of sociology along the lines of 
justice, m orals and social welfare.
Cardozo declined to expressly rank  the four m ethods, b u t declared 
th a t “Homage is due to it [rule of analogy] over every competing principle 
tha t is unable by appeal to history or tradition or policy or justice to 
m ake out a  better right (Id. a t p. 31).” Cardozo's thesis rests on the 
presum ption th a t Justices desire only to do the “right thing” and  take 
approaches which enable them  to actualize th a t desire. This view is 
consistent with concepts of ethics in the public sphere.
Kearney and Merrill (2000) discuss three pragm atic theoretical 
models of judicial decision m aking and their implications for am icus 
briefs. These are the legal model, the attitudinal model and the in terest 
group model. The legal model suggests th a t Justices rely on their
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understanding  of the requirem ents of relevant authorities which include 
the text, struc tu re  and  history of applicable constitutional and sta tu tory  
provisions, precedents of the Court, and argum ents about the policy 
consequences of different outcom es (p. 776).
In the a ttitudinal model Ju stices decide cases in accordance with 
their political and  ideological predispositions which rem ain relatively 
fixed throughout their career while in the interest group model, justices 
seek to resolve cases in accordance with the desires of the organized 
groups th a t have an  in terest in the controversy, (p. 783).
Kearney and Merrill from a  controlled statistical study  of Suprem e 
Court decisions reported th a t “institutional litigants” such  as the AC LU, 
the AFL-CIO, and the States enjoy above-average success with am icus 
curiae briefs. Also, am icus filers supporting respondents enjoy more 
success th an  do filers supporting petitioners. They conclude th a t am icus 
briefs clearly do m atter in m any contexts and tha t the Court is alm ost 
certainly influenced by additional information supplem enting tha t 
provided by litigants (p. 830).
Non litigants filed fifty five am icus curiae briefs in Grokster. 
Justices, who separately and collectively constitute perhaps the m ost 
im portant elem ents a t the Grokster Court, by Kearney and Merrill’s 
study are to some extent susceptible to the influence of both the text as 
well th a t of au thors of am icus briefs.
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With changes in technology and  operational procedures, Grokster 
presented major legal challenges over its immediate predecessor Napster. 
N apster’s reliance on a central indexing server under the control of 
Napster was no longer relevant in Grokster which relied on peer 
com puters th a t directly searched other com puters and  requested files to 
be downloaded w ithout any assistance or intervention of Grokster 
m achines. W hereas the Ninth Circuit closed down Napster, the same 
circuit completely absolved G rokster from charges of contributory and 
vicarious liability. Cardozo's “m ethod of philosophy” (p. 30) could not rely 
on any analogy between Grokster and Napster beyond the observation 
tha t both system s were used  for file swapping by prim ary infringers.
O ther m ethods of assistance to judicial decision m aking include 
consideration along lines of historical development. Evolution from the 
Sony case (Sony, 1984) through Napster to Grokster provides some 
progression in the calculus of proportions of infringing and  noninfringing 
uses. “Fair Use” had  been accepted as sufficient defense in Sony where it 
was noted th a t an  overwhelming proportion of use was to record 
program s which had  been offered for free viewing; viewers used  Betamax 
for “time shifting”.
In Napster, fair use  had been rejected in a  lower court (Napster II, 
2001, para. 21). Also availability of resources recorded could not be 
completely free as they were in Sony since these resources were offered 
by sources, other u sers of the file swapping services, w ithout any rights
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to copyrighted m aterial. Also the proportion of infringing uses was 
substantially  greater th an  in Sony.
Regardless of the m ethods by which a  Justice  arrives a t a  decision, 
litigants may increase the weight of their argum ent by addressing all the 
factors, philosophic, historical, traditional, and sociological, all of which 
may influence the inclination of a  Justice  in a  binary situation where 
petitioners and  respondents dem and diametrically opposing outcomes. 
Following th is line of thought, the realization th a t Ju stices take notice of 
am icus curiae subm issions m arks this legal artifact as a  possible source 
of influence beyond argum ents of direct litigants. Even though Justices 
become rhetors in cases before the Court, they are also audiences as the 
voice of other rhetors filter in through am icus curiae briefs.
Rhetoricity of briefs
The situation a t the Suprem e Court phase of Grokster was a 
complex web of cultural, legal and rhetorical factors. The immediate 
contest was a  legal showdown between Petitioners represented by MGM 
and Respondents represented by Grokster and  Steam Cast. Questions are 
repeated here for convenience. Petitioners had  asked the Court for an  
affirmative answ er to the question:
W hether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding contrary to long 
established principles of secondary liability in copyright law, 
th a t the Internet file sharing services of Grokster and  Steam Cast 
should be immunized from copyright liability for the millions of
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daily acts of copyright infringement th a t occur on their services 
and  th a t constitute a t least 90 percent of the total use  of the 
services. ( 545 U.S. 913, 2005, Petition for a  writ of certiorari)
Respondents also asked the Court for an affirmative answer, b u t to 
a different question:
W hether the court of appeals correctly ruled on the only issue 
before it, th a t respondents’ distribution of the cu rren t versions 
of their file sharing software does not render respondents 
secondarily liable for every direct infringement of petitioners’ 
copyrights committed by users of the software. (Id. Brief for 
Respondents).
With these textual artifacts, petitioners and respondents 
established their positions as major rhetors in the situation a t Grokster. 
Lawyers on both sides also presented oral argum ents in dialogic form ats 
in which Suprem e Court Justices interjected questions and com m ents at 
strategic points during the oral exercise of both petitioners and 
respondents (MGM v. Grokster, 2005a).
A more detailed rhetorical analysis of the way th a t the contending 
parties framed their questions before the Court reveals the use  of subtle 
persuasive approaches. On the one hand, petitioners’ goal was to reverse 
the Ninth Circuit decision which had  ruled th a t respondents could not be 
held liable on grounds of secondary liability and on the other hand  
respondents sought an  affirmation of th a t decision. However, both
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parties framed their questions, even before presenting any argum ents, in 
ways th a t appealed to different judgm ental inclinations.
Petitioners highlighted the Ninth Circuit by nam e, parenthetically 
contrasting its decision with th a t of the Seventh Circuit which is a  body 
of equal s ta tu s  and whose decision in the Re Aimster case had  been in 
effect affirmed by a  refusal of the Suprem e Court to grant certiorari while 
respondents used  the generic “court of appeals”. A particu lar instance 
from the class of appellate courts could be singled out for notoriety, while 
a court of appeals retains its institu tional s ta tu s  as a  clearing house for 
fundam ental principles.
Petitioners highlighted the preponderance of noninfringing uses of 
the file sharing services, appealing to the m ethods of history which, as 
Cardozo (1991, p. 51) has explained, can limit the tendency of a  principle 
to “expand itself to the limit of its logic”. W hereas in Sony, a  product with 
100 per cent of infringing use  could still pass the infringem ent test if the 
product is capable of substan tia l noninfringing use. Petitioners sought to 
bracket the Sony condition w ithin the historical period before the growth 
of the Internet th a t enorm ously facilitated reproduction of copyrighted 
works.
Respondents avoided any notion of a  proportionality calculus and 
subtly underm ine the reasonableness of any tendency which would 
condem n them  for “every single act of infringement”. The significance of 
this brief com parison of the rhetorical construction of the opening
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questions posed by Petitioners and Respondents is th a t rhetors appeal to 
different orientations which according to Cardozo, add weight to the 
inclination of Suprem e Court Ju stices towards a  desired opinion. O ther 
immediate rhetors use sim ilar approaches.
Amici curiae presented a total of 55 briefs, one of the highest 
num bers of subm issions in cases before the Suprem e Court, su rpassed  
by only two other cases, G rutter v. Bollinger (2003) and W ebster v. 
Reproductive Health Servs. (1989). As rhetors, the class of amici featured 
prom inently in Grokster using the well established textual artifact, the 
am icus curiae brief, to establish their presence and speech in the 
situation.
An am icus curiae highlights an  interest, a  requirem ent th a t 
presum es th a t such in terests face possible and potential th rea ts which 
m akes the absence and silence of persons or institutions, for which some 
vulnerable in terest may have existed, a  valid question of inquiry. All 
direct participants at the Suprem e Court, petitioners, respondents. 
Justices fulfill roles of rhetors as well as roles of audience.
However, the audience in Grokster was more expansive. M atters 
th a t escalate to the Suprem e Court, with as m uch in terest of amici, tend 
to com m and large active audiences th a t include substan tia l segm ents of 
the national public sphere and in the case of Grokster, public spheres 
tha t transcend national geographical and  cultural boundaries. Rhetors 
who performed with presence and  speech are easily identified. At
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Grokster, two classes of rhetors were absen t and  silent. One was the 
class of alleged prim ary infringers who where not represented a t any 
stage of Grokster; the other was the class of leaders of higher educational 
institu tions and their associations.
Since 2000 up  to certiorari a t the Suprem e Court in 2005, 
Universities continued to experience excessive bandw idth usage due to 
file sharing activities. Ruling in favor of respondents by an  affirmation of 
the 9 th  Circuit on Grokster would m ost likely open the floodgate to 
sophisticated file sharing network design based on the experience 
following the 9 th  Circuit affirmation of the Northern District California 
court sum m ary dism issal of the MGM su it against Grokster. Universities 
with powerful com puters and fast networks such as the Abiline network 
of the Internet2 consortium  would be the highly preferred target for file 
sharing network operation.
File sharing escalated after N apster was sh u t down as Grokster 
and others developed system s with greater technical flexibility and with 
reduced vulnerability to legal challenge. The modified designs passed the 
Sony test a t the 9 th  Circuit. Affirmation by the Grokster Court would 
challenge technically sophisticated university networks, divert more 
activity to less protected networks and cripple even weaker university 
networks. This scenario would follow if the Supreme Court decided in 
favor of Grokster.
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If Petitioners prevailed outright by an  unconditional reversal of the 
9th  Circuit, then  G rokster’s operation would be grounded as would the 
am bitions of aspiring m usic swapping file sharing ventures. Developers 
would then  have to live with a  Damoclean sword as suggested by Justice  
Souter (MGM v. Grokster, 2005a a t p. 14). Uncertainty of facing 
secondary liability law suits would impose a  chilling effect on all research 
and development of products, networks and  services th a t m ay be used  by 
third parties to infringe copyright. Designers would be forced to 
seriously consider ways of modifying their products with features th a t 
would block infringing uses of their products or systems.
This scenario of prior restra in t on research would th reaten  
principles of scholarly academic freedom enunciated by the AAUP (AAUP, 
1940), acknowledged by opinion a t the Suprem e Court (Urofsky, 2001) 
and widely affirmed by university faculty (Aby, S.H & Kuhn IV, F. C. 
2000). It is fair to expect th a t this aspect of scholarly freedom, being a 
value of fundam ental im portance to the knowledge generation m ission of 
universities and  within the possibility of m aterialization by a decision of 
the Court, would be defended by non reticent response of university 
leaders.
Dom inant Element or Exigence
The th ird  step in Farrell and  Young’s prescription for conducting 
situational criticism is to determ ine the dom inant elem ent or exigence in 
the situation.
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At various periods during the p2p phenom enon, institu tions 
w itnessed various classes of exigencies which continued to dom inate 
attention a t institu tions of higher education. Soon after Fanning 
launched Napster in 1999, universities faced immediate and urgent 
th rea t of network congestion. Peer to peer file sharing placed 
unprecedented dem ands on network bandw idth and as reported by 
Foster (2000), networks a t m any institu tions were unable to handle the 
sudden increase in bandw idth requirem ents. The problem worsened as 
more and more users caught on to the ease of swapping popular m usic 
files.
After the demise of Napster, the new generation of file sharing 
services represented by Grokster and  M orpheus were designed with the 
capability of facilitating hefty video files (Carlson, 2001) with a 
dram atically increased consum ption of network resources. As Grokster 
progressed through legal channels, institu tions continued to grapple with 
network congestion th a t starved and disrupted routine faculty academic 
and research functions as well as adm inistrative functions th a t are 
heavily dependent on network availability.
Another category th a t contributed to university immediate concern 
were dem ands th a t copyright owners and their organizations issued to 
universities to take certain prescribed actions against alleged infringers 
and sometimes against all u sers  including those who used  peer to peer 
services for noninfringing purposes. Demand for information on studen ts
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escalated as copyright owners bom barded university adm inistrators with 
legal notices and  filed law suits against studen ts, nam ing the colleges 
themselves as defendants (Carlson 2000; Carlson 2001).
While congestion and resulting dim inution in network speed placed 
technical constraints on the use of the network for faculty research, 
dem ands of copyright in terests in day to day network m anagem ent and 
in dictating enforcement procedures against alleged infringers strained 
the capacity of university adm inistration to respond to these dem ands 
and at the sam e time m aintain routine adm inistrative functions. Both 
classes of exigence persisted for m any institu tions up  to the Suprem e 
Court phase of Grokster.
At the Court, Petitioners asked the Suprem e Court to reverse the 
Ninth Circuit decision based on the Sony principle th a t exempted 
developers of products used  to infringe copyright provided th a t the 
product was capable of substan tia l noninfringing uses. With Sony in 
place, faculty researchers would not need to be concerned th a t products 
of their research may be used  for copyright infringement. The possibility 
tha t the Court could overturn Sony would create an  exigence for 
researchers who would be open to law suits if they developed products 
tha t were subsequently  used for copyright infringement.
Alternatively researchers would need to contem plate design 
features th a t would frustrate  the use  of their products for infringing 
purposes; and  even such features could be defeated through clever
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“reverse engineering” leaving them  still unprotected against possibility of 
secondary liability lawsuits.
The situation before the Grokster Court posed exigencies which 
were substantially  addressed by university adm inistrators using a  variety 
of approaches. Exigencies a t the G rokster Court th a t could substantially  
affect the role of universities in society arose from possible disposition of 
Petitioners’ question in a m anner th a t would in any way constrain  faculty 
research.
Fittingness of Response
The fourth and final task  in Farrell and Young’s prescription for 
situational criticism is to analyze the response to determ ine if the 
exigence is modified and if the response is “fitting”. Significant rhetor 
positions and responses were: Petitioners Brief, Respondent Brief, Amici 
Briefs, Suprem e Court Decision and symbolic action of university 
presidents.
Petitioners brief argued in favor of the question th a t Petitioners 
urged the Court to decide, namely to declare th a t Grokster was not 
im m une from secondary liability. Grokster distributed software capable 
of substan tia l non infringing uses as acknowledged by Ju stice  Stevens a t 
Oral Arguments (MGM v. Grokster, 2005a a t p. 3) and  by stare decisis 
falls w ithin the widely quoted Sony precedent (Sony, 1984) delivered by 
Justice  Stevens “The Betamax is, therefore, capable of substan tia l 
noninfringing uses. Sony’s sale of such  equipm ent to the general public
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does not constitute contributory infringement of respondents’ 
copyrights.” (Sony, 1984 a t p. 16). Reversal of the 9 th  Circuit would 
am ount to abandonm ent of the Sony doctrine. Researchers would then  
be open to secondary liability law suits for developing products th a t 
others chose to use for copyright infringement. The response of 
Petitioners would aggravate and consecrate the exigency by stare  decisis 
subject to fresh direction of Congress and consequently is not a  fitting 
response to the exigence.
Respondents brief argued against petitioners question and for 
Respondents question which urged the Court to affirm the 9 th  Circuit. 
With the Sony doctrine intact, this response would remove the exigence 
of prior restra in t on research and product development, bu t would revive 
the exigence of unbridled p2p file sharing with serious im pact on all 
universities and colleges and particularly devastating im pact on 
universities financially or technically unable to fortify their networks and 
network equipm ent from conscription and use in more sophisticated p2p 
file sharing designs. This resu lt renders Respondents’ response not a 
fitting response.
Amici briefs covered the space of theoretical responses omitting 
only the absu rd  response of supporting both parties. From the 14 briefs 
subm itted by university professors in their individual capacities as 
scholars, 3 briefs supported Petitioners, 10 briefs supported 
Respondents and  1 brief supported neither party. The briefs in
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supporting Petitioners or Respondents suffer the sam e dispositions 
accorded Petitioners and R espondents’ briefs and  are not fitting 
responses.
Brief of Professor Lee A. Hollaar as am icus curiae in support of 
neither party  concluded as follows "... th is Court should vacate the 
decision of the Ninth Circuit in th is case and rem and for further 
proceedings to determ ine if the defendants are secondarily liable for the 
inducem ent of the copyright infringements of their users" (Hollaar, 2005 
at p. 25). Hollaar’s response would retain  the sanctity of the Sony 
doctrine and protect researchers from secondary liability law suits for 
developing products th a t may be used  for direct copyright infringement 
thus removing the exigence of prior restraint. The response also had  the 
chance of removing the exigence of unbridled p2p operation th a t operates 
to cripple university networks based on the rem and instructions to the 
lower court. Professor Hollaar’s response is therefore a fitting response.
The decision of the Suprem e Court delivered by Ju stice  Souter 
concluded th a t “There is substan tia l evidence in MGM's favor on all 
elements of inducem ent, and sum m ary judgm ent in favor of Grokster 
and Stream Cast was error. On rem and, reconsideration of MGM's motion 
for sum m ary judgm ent will be in order.” Continuing, Ju stice  Souter 
ordered th a t “The judgm ent of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and  the 
case is rem anded for further proceedings consistent with th is opinion 
(MGM V. Grokster, 2005b a t p. 24).” This definitive ruling left the Sony
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doctrine and stare decisis unscathed  thereby protecting researchers from 
constraints of anxiety towards possible secondary liability law suits. The 
response also had  a  rem arkable chance of controlling reckless expansion 
of p2p file sharing activity which also removes the exigence of 
susceptibility of university networks to congestive a ttack  from p2p file 
sharing users.
Drawing from an  array of past cases, Justice  Souter has written 
tha t "Evidence of active steps ... taken  to encourage direct infringement 
... such as advertising an  infringing use  or instm cting  how to engage in 
an  infringing use, show an  affirmative in tent th a t the product be used  to 
infringe ... (Id a t p. 18).” The conclusion is th a t the response occasioned 
by the Suprem e Court decision as well as by Professor Hollaar’s brief was 
fitting responses.
The Suprem e Court, ruling from the pinnacle in the hierarchy of 
courts, by its decision instantly  removed the exigency. The absence and 
silence of university presidents would have no effect in persuading 
Suprem e Court Justices through discourse to modify their individual or 
collective inclinations to affirm the 9 th  Circuit or to abandon the Sony 
doctrine. This absence and silence also would have had  no effect on the 
likelihood of expansion of p2p th a t could re tu rn  to plague university 
networks had  the Suprem e Court Justices affirmed the 9 th  Circuit. 
Probably it had  no persuasive am icus curiae effect on Ju stices who 
traditionally are sym pathetic to argum ents th a t promote institu tional
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autonom y (Grutter, 2003) or merely em anate from universities as 
suggested by Standler (Standler, 2000). The conclusion is th a t the 
symbolic action of absence and silence of university presidents did not 
constitute a  fitting response. These findings inform the answ ers to all the 
research questions in the following section.
Research Questions: Answers 
Analysis of the research questions helps to underscore the urgency 
for a  more fitting rhetorical response th an  the response of absence and 
silence th a t presidents of institu tions of higher education exhibited at 
certiorari in Grokster.
Research Question 1 : Did Grokster influence academic freedom or 
institutional autonom y?
The Suprem e Court phase of Grokster in 2004 with a  2005 
decision was the culm ination of the peer to peer file sharing saga which 
started  in early 2000. Throughout th is period, universities experienced 
worsening conditions of network congestion precipitated by the use  of 
first Napster and quickly followed by the use  of other p2p services such 
as Grokster and M orpheus by Stream Cast (McCollum, 2000a; Carlson, 
2001a; Carlson 2001b; Strahilevitz, 2003).
Escalating stress on university networks followed the trend of 
sophistication in p2p network design and the pattern  of court decisions 
th a t sh u t down centralized system s such as Napster and Aimster and 
absolved de-centralized system s such  as Grokster and  M orpheus from
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charges of secondaiy liability (Napster, 2000; Napster, 2001; Aimster, 
2004; Grokster, 2004). As reported, use  of external p2p file sharing 
services severely stressed university networks and reduced bandw idth 
availability for routine academic and  adm inistrative functions.
Internal Internet2 p2p file sharing system s proved even more 
devastating in speed although confined to the Abiline network developed 
for cooperative research among m em bers of the Internt2 Consortioum  
(Dela, 2005; Gross, 2005). Results are not available to indicate th a t use 
of the dedicated Abiline network relieved conventional university 
networks from bandw idth consum ption. The conclusion is th a t Grokster, 
along with other p2p services, contributed substantially  to the 
degradation of university network functionality.
Academic freedom is an  intense rhetorical site with wide latitudes 
of discursivity among scholars in and out of the academe (Tight, 1985; 
Buckley, 1986; Sykes, 1988; Aby & Kuhn, 2000; Standler, 2000). 
Violation of scholarly freedom to teach and conduct research w ithout 
undue constrain ts or restra in ts has been alleged in a  wide variety of 
circum stances such  as in Urofsky (2000) which challenged a  state  law 
prohibiting state  employees, including university faculty, of using state  
owned com puters to view “im proper” sites.
In Urofsky, petitioners’ argum ent th a t the state  law ham pered the 
research and knowledge generation functions for which university faculty 
are engaged found sym pathetic grounds with Chief Justice  W ilkinson’s
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rem ark th a t the State Act constitu ted a  prior restra in t because it “chills 
Internet research before it happens (Urofsky, 2000).”
Some universities during the p2p file sharing phenom enon 
rebuffed instructions from external m edia powers to sh u t down p2p 
operation on their networks on the basis th a t they [universities] were 
committed to the protection of academ ic freedom by m aintaining 
unfettered network access (Abrams, 2000; Carlson, 2000a; Foster, 2000).
It seam s fair to assert th a t the role of p2p file sharing in congesting 
university networks rendered these networks less accessible to faculty. In 
the m ildest case, th is am ounts to a theoretical th reat to scholarly 
freedom of faculty to teach and conduct research w ithout undue 
constraints. Severe network congestion would am ount to a  practical 
th rea t for which university faculty would be forced to substantially  
modify details of their research and  teaching schedules. Unchecked 
escalation of file sharing uses of Grokster and other p2p services would 
alm ost certainly disable m any university and  college networks and 
jeopardize In ternet based research and instruction.
Institutional autonom y describes the right of universities to 
essentially m anage their affairs w ithout undue intervention of external 
power. Cases such as (Grutter, 2003; Urofsky, 2000) leave no doubt 
regarding Suprem e Court affirmation of this right. As widely reported, 
during the p2p crisis, copyright owners, represented by the RIAA and 
MPAA m ade dem ands th a t am ounted to undue intervention. These
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external in terests prescribed network policy (Carlson, 2000a; Carlson, 
2002b; Read, 2006), dem anded release of information on alleged studen t 
copyright infringers in total disregard of due process of law (RIAA v. 
Verizon, 2003; Abrams, 2000; Foster, 2000), dem anded unprecedented 
access to university networks and  backed these dem ands by th rea t of 
law suits to which some university leaders capitulated (Madigan, 2002; 
Mitrano, 2004).
Generally, university leaders expended substan tia l effort to counter 
th rea ts to network degradation and in m any cases rebuffed direct 
external dem ands while collaborating in m utually beneficial efforts 
through joint committees to develop approaches which institu tions could 
then consider and, a t their discretion, apply to their particu lar situations 
(ACE, 2002; Hennessy & Spanier, 2004).
At the Suprem e Court, Petitioners’ question posed no th rea t to 
institutional autonom y. Briefs subm itted by petitioners and  respondents 
addressed theories of secondary copyright liability derived from the Sony 
precedent which both parties claimed supported their positions.
The th rea t to scholarly freedom was embedded in the dem and of 
petitioners to reverse the 9 th  Circuit decision absolving Grokster of 
secondary liability under any condition based on the Sony principle tha t 
the distributor of a dual use  product capable of both infringing and 
noninfringing uses is presum ptively protected from secondary liability
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challenges and the possibility th a t the Court could accept the argum ent 
and act as urged (MGM v. Grokster, 2005b; Hollaar, 2005).
As pointed out earlier, outright reversal would m ean th a t the Sony 
principle in spite of stare decisis could not be counted upon to protect 
researchers who develop products th a t are capable of copyright 
infringement from secondary liability even when these products had  been 
developed for noninfringing uses. This would am ount to prior restra in t 
on research and product development since the researcher would have 
no protection against subsequent use  of their products by th ird  parties 
for direct copyright infringement (MGM v. Grokster, 2005a; MGM v. 
Grokster, 2005c).
Such restra in t would violate the principle of unrestra ined  faculty 
research clearly enunciated by the AAUP (AAUP, 1940) and  would be 
im m utably etched in legal precedence by virtue of Suprem e Court 
jurisprudentia l finality until Congress acted to modify the effect of such 
an  outcome. The consequence of such  a  determ ination would be far more 
serious th an  the constraint on faculty research occasioned by complete 
network breakdown due to p2p file share excesses. Suprem e Court 
Justices (Breyer a t p. 11; Scalia a t p. 12 a t Oral Arguments) wondered 
how technology such  as the G utenberg press or iPod could have fared 
with the “Damoclean sword” (Souter a t p. 14), under petitioners position.
In conclusion to th is first research question, G rokster did grossly 
affect functionality of university network and operation and opened the
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gate for intrusive dem ands by copyright owners both of which affected 
institutional autonom y. Grokster and p2p activity also threatened  to 
cripple network availability for faculty teaching and research and thereby 
adversely affected scholarly freedom. These circum stances were m anaged 
adequately to substantially  neutralize their effects on the two classes of 
academic freedom.
Grokster a t the Suprem e Court posed a graver th rea t to scholarly 
freedom by the possibility th a t the Court may have unconditionally 
reversed the 9 th  Circuit and consequently underm ine the Sony protective 
veil for researchers and  developers of dual use  products. Alternatively, 
the Court may have unconditionally affirmed the 9th  Circuit and  opened 
the flood gate for unprecedented onslaught of p2p file sharing activity on 
university networks. This outcome would adversely im pact both scholarly 
freedom and institutional autonomy.
Research Question 2: Utilizing rhetorical criticism, w hat were the 
implications of absence and silence of higher education adm inistration at 
the Grokster Court?
From G rutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, (2003), p. 20, Justice  
O’Connor’s observation th a t cultivating leadership who have legitimacy 
in society require confidence in the openness and integrity of educational 
institu tions places a  great deal of responsibility on educational 
institu tions themselves. It is fair to assum e th a t presidential leadership 
m ust exude integrity and openness within the university semi public
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sphere to m aintain legitimacy among in ternal constituencies of faculty 
and studen ts while not jeopardizing its credibility and  s ta tu s  in the wider 
external public and semi-public spheres of tax payers, legislators and 
aspiring students.
As discussed earlier, m ost presidents with serious p2p activity on 
their cam pus networks reacted in various ways to reduce or eliminate 
the problem of congestion caused by these activities (Hennessey and 
Spanier, 2004). They recognized the im pact of p2p m usic and  video file 
sharing on day-to-day adm inistrative and academic functions of their 
cam puses and took action to rem ain functional.
Reaction to th rea ts on the scholarly freedom of their faculty and 
th rea ts to the institu tional autonom y of their institu tions varied. 
Reactions included rebuffing encroaching dem ands in their responses to 
legal notices (Foster, 2000; Nordin, 2000; Abrams, 2000), aligning 
themselves into collaborative roles (Joint Committee, 2002), outright 
compliance with dem ands (Mitrano, 2004) and independent attem pts 
toward dialogic resolution reported by Carlson (2001) under (New 
Patterns, para. 3)
At the Suprem e Court, every president was absen t and  silent. As 
may be derived from a study by (Kearney and Merrill, 2000, p. 831), in 
the entire history of the Suprem e Court, only two cases attracted  more 
interest m easured in term s of am icus curiae briefs filed, than  the 
Grokster case. These are G rutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306 (2003) with
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92 am icus briefs over consitutionality of university adm ission policies 
(Find Law, 2007) and  W ebster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 
490 (1989) with 78 am icus briefs over constitutional aspects of abortion 
(Kearney and  Merrill a t p. 831). Several universities, as constituted 
institu tions and academic un its  w ithin institu tions independently filed 
briefs to defend their in terests in G rutter and  Webster.
In Grokster with 55 am icus curiae briefs filed, neither universities 
nor academ ic un its  within universities nor did associations representing 
universities file any briefs. However, several scholars, in their individual 
and private capacities file briefs, 3 supporting petitioners, 10 supporting 
respondents and  1 supporting neither party. In Regents of the Univ. of 
Gal. V. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) over constitutionality of affirmative 
action, amici filed 54 briefs (Kearney and Merrill a t p. 831).
Awareness by universities of the process and expected value of 
intervention a t the Suprem e Court through am icus curiae briefs should 
eliminate the possibility th a t ignorance played any part in their rhetorical 
response of absence and  silence. In their study Kearney and Merrill 
(Supra, p. 830) concluded th a t am icus briefs clearly do m atter in m any 
contexts and  th is m eans th a t “...the Court is alm ost certainly influenced 
by additional information supplem enting th a t provided by the parties to 
the case”.
Further, they found th a t institutional litigants such as the Solicitor 
General, ACLU, the AFL-CIO, and the S tates enjoy above-average
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success. Although the study m ade no m ention of the success rate  for 
universities and  their associations, the deference with which the Court 
has treated universities in cases related to academic freedom suggests 
tha t university briefs defining a clear position in the file sharing case 
would receive sym pathetic judicial notice.
Standler (2000, under Sec. titled Academic Abstention) has argued 
tha t “universities nearly always win in court” and has referred to a 
doctrine of “academ ic abstention” under which plaintiffs against 
university positions face the added barrier of judicial reluctance to 
intervene in the internal affairs of an  educational institu tion (Standler, 
Id.).
Although universities were not litigants in Grokster, the th rea ts to 
scholarly freedom of their faculty and  the th rea ts to institutional 
autonom y of their universities th a t would follow unqualified aquiesance 
of Suprem e Court Ju stices to litigants’ questions created an  exigence 
(Bitzer, p. 66) th a t required a  rhetorical response of university 
presidents.
It is noteworthy th a t the C ourt’s disposition in G rokster followed to 
the letter, the argum ent of the brief from a  university scholar who 
supported neither party. Hollaar, 2005, discouraged overboard 
in terpretation of Sony, em phasized inducem ent as another category of 
secondary liability, and  asked the Court to vacate the decision of the 9 th
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Circuit appellate court and  rem and for further proceedings based on the 
inducem ent theory.
Hollaar’s conclusions and recom m endation adequately addressed 
the chilling effect on academic and scientific research th a t would ensue if 
the fear of future liability were to limit or constrain the exercises of 
scholarly freedom to conduct research and  search for knowledge w ithout 
external imposition of preconditions.
The absence and silence of university presidents representing 
higher education from the defense of a  cardinal pre-requisite of scholarly 
research is problematic. Jan is  has presented a m atrix of different 
decision m aking pathw ays and the probability tha t a  given pathw ay 
results in a  “high quality” decision. All pathw ays sta rt with an  exigence,
“a problem posed by challenging event or com m unication (conveying 
serious threat)”. Assuming th a t the problem is not a non-routine or a  
relatively unim portan t one, only one of J a n is ’s pathw ays term inates in a  
high quality decision.
In th is pathway, the decision m aker judges correctly the 
im portance of the challenge and expects to manage all constraints; 
personality deficiencies th a t affect responsiveness to pertinent 
information do not exist; and no over-riding problem solving, affiliative or 
egocentric constrains exist. The pathw ay th a t satisfies all of these pre 
conditions leads to vigilant problem solving and a low probability of 
avoidable errors (Janis, p. 35).
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Among the 17 cognitive, affiliative, or egocentric personality 
deficiencies enum erated by Ja n is  (Id.), only a  few may be fairly applied to 
university presidents. These are a  strong need for social approval, strong 
need for power and sta tu s , and  high dependency on a  cohesive group of 
fellow executives. Along any pathway, the presence of these and other 
listed deficiencies act as constrain ts against high quality decision 
making.
However, when examining the ethical and  moral implications of 
conduct, the critic m ust exercise great caution and as Jones advises (p. 
23), “m aintain a  certain level of moral modesty ...”. As such  th is work 
excludes consideration of m ost of the other personality deficiencies 
enum erated by Jan is  (Id.). Examples of such, from the 17 listed 
deficiencies are lack of conscientiousness, low self-confidence with 
chronic sense of low self-efficacy, negativism or hostility towards the 
organization and  several more.
In the context of the holocaust, Jones at p. 15 notes th a t one who, 
motivated by greed, and with indifference to the harm  caused to others, 
commits a  reprehensible act, is morally blameworthy. Jones a ttaches 
concepts of motivation, intentionality, and severity of effects in a  theory 
of moral responsibility and contrasts “retrospective responsibility” which 
applies to past act or omission with “role responsibility” expressed in 
term s of “duties of office”.
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In the university setting, legitimacy and moral responsibility are 
implicated as in E dm undson's (p. 135), contradicting or failure to 
reverence firmly entrenched conventional moral views such  as views of 
m ost university faculty on the basic assum ptions of scholarly academic 
freedom. These assum ptions are often affirmed in Suprem e Court 
decisions and routinely advanced by faculty and the AAUP a t least in 
defense of tenure, bu t also as a  precondition for the generation and 
dissem ination of knowledge, a  widely acknowledged public good.
The exigencies of a  determ ination in Grokster with a potential of 
chilling the free exercise of scholarly freedom established a  moral 
responsibility on university presidents in their “role responsibility”
(Jones, p. 26), to m arshal a  fitting response (Bitzer, p. 66), bracket 
another incidence of poor judgm ent (Janis, p. 15) and  avoid judgm ental 
blam eworthiness (Jones, p. 16). The conclusion is th a t the absence and 
silence of university presidents a t Grokster rem ain blameworthy.
Jones on p. 21, has established a  subtle yet im portant distinction 
between the “judgm ent and the blam e”. The conclusion th a t the 
rhetorical response of absence and silence of university presidents to the 
exigencies a t Grokster was blameworthy was derived w ithout reference to 
intention and motives. According to Jones on p. 15, “[t]he degree of 
blam eworthiness increases with the seriousness of the wrong act and  the 
badness of the motives”. It is useful to expand the scope of factors tha t 
could aggravate or alleviate the degree of blam eworthiness. These relate
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to intentionality and  motivation, as well as to the constrain ts of personal 
deficiencies (Janis), and constraints arising from the existence and 
operation of external sources of power and influence. (Foucault).
Following Jan is 's  pathw ays, the presence of personal deficiencies 
leads to the conclusion of high probability of avoidable error. This 
approach is fraught with dangers of fatalism , if persons are unable to 
escape from the boundaries of their personal deficiencies in a  J a n is ’s 
pathw ay or are trapped within their virtues and vices under the core 
content of morality advanced by Jones (p. 38). No reliable m ethods exist 
for calculating values of personal deficiencies nor for m easuring 
virtuosity and viciousness and for th is reason, I propose an  alternate 
approach in C hapter 5 th a t avoids the need to attem pt such 
m easurem ents.
The rhetorical criticism analysis supports the conclusion th a t 
absence and  silence of university presidents a t the Grokster Court did 
not constitute a fitting response to the th rea ts th a t the questions of 
litigants posed to scholarly freedom by way of chilling prior restra in t and 
to institutional autonom y by the likelihood of unbridled p2p file sharing 
expansion. The implications for role responsibility of absence and silence 
by university presidents, when param eters of core values of scholarly 
freedom and institutional autonom y were open to considerable 
modification by the possibilities in a  binary decision of the Suprem e 
Court a t Grokster, rem ain problematic.
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Research Question 3; W hat was the im pact of the United S tates Suprem e 
Court decision in Grokster on higher education?
To analyze th is question fully, it is instructive to consider the 
acknowledged conflict between the 7th  and 9 th  Circuit appellate 
disposition in Re Aimster and Grokster and how the G rokster Court 
resolved th is issue. An appreciation of the inclinations of the Suprem e 
Court in copyright cases involving peer to peer technology would aid the 
assessm ent of the im pact of the Grokster Court decision on higher 
education.
Seventh and Ninth Circuit conflict
Petitioners specifically highlighted the conflict between the Seventh 
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit in the appellate courts’ application of the 
landm ark Suprem e Court Sony “Betam ax” decision (464 U.S. 417, 1984). 
In Re Aimster Copyright Litigation (334 F. 3rd 643, cert denied), the 7th 
appellate court upheld the lower court decision to sh u t down the Aimster 
file sharing service. Aimster provided software th a t u sers downloaded 
free of charge from Aimster’s website and  were then able to access 
Aimster’s services. For a  fee u sers could join “Club Aimster” also owned 
by the sam e operator and  com m unicate directly with other u sers  in a  
buddy system  using the AGL Instan t Messaging application to contact 
other u sers who were on line a t the sam e time and download files of 
popular m usic whose titles had  been stored on searchable folders on 
servers operated by Aimster. The Aimster server then instructed  the
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com puter on which the shareable folder existed to download the file to 
the requesting computer.
Both the requesting com puter and the sharing com puter ran  
Aimster software which facilitated these transactions (In Re Aimster, 
2003). Aimster did not store actual m usic files and used  encryption to 
m ask the identity of information on file titles th a t were available for 
downloading a t com puters running  the Aimster software. Judge Posner 
of the 7th Circuit asserted  tha t lack of constructive knowledge of 
infringing activity does necessarily insulate a  person from contributory 
liability bu t ruled th a t “willful b lindness” self-imposed by the use  of 
encryption to shield Aimster operators from actual knowledge of 
infringement by its u sers  cannot absolve Aimster from secondary 
copyright liability.
The 9 th  Circuit appellate court had come to a  sim ilar decision in 
Napster where servers operated by Napster m aintained and updated  
search indexes of titles of m usic files and also m atched requests with 
information on com puters th a t locally stored actual files of requested 
m usic titles. In both Napster and  Aimster, servers owned by these 
companies facilitated the process of discovery of the location of 
downloadable m usic files and  provided information th a t enabled u sers to 
directly connect to each others com puters and  thereafter, freely 
download m usic files.
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Grokster used  a  different network architecture which did not 
involve central facilitating servers in the entire cycle of discovery and 
transfer of m usical files. Grokster, som ewhat analogously to Sony, 
merely supplied the enabling system. While Sony distributed a  video 
home recorder “Betamax”, Grokster distributed a  downloadable piece of 
software m ade available a t their website th a t enabled users, 
independently of Grokster, to discover locations of m usic files which they 
then  downloaded to their local com puters.
The only apparen t conflict between the 7th Circuit decision in 
Aimster and the 9 th  Circuit decision in Grokster is perhaps the trivial 
observation th a t the 7th  Circuit decision sh u t down Aimster while the 
9th  Circuit decision failed to sh u t down Grokster by its affirmation of a  
lower court sum m ary dism issal of the MGM suit to sh u t down Grokster. 
The failure of petition for certiorari in Aimster followed by success of 
certiorari in Grokster may have signaled th a t Justices of the Court had 
concerns about the wholesale validity of the 9 th  Circuit affirmation of the 
lower California court decision in favor of Grokster.
Wu has revealed the power and deliberate use of code in strategies 
to avoid copyright liability with consequent increase in the cost of 
enforcement (Wu, p. 711). Grokster and m uch other post-N apster 
system s succeeded rem arkably in implementing new designs tha t 
eliminated involvement of their servers in p2p file sharing.
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As affirmed by Cardozo (Supra, a t p. 20), stare decisis though 
serving as the everyday working rule of law nevertheless leaves room for 
relaxation of the rule in exceptional circum stances, and  if a rule 
continues to work injustice, it will eventually be reform ulated (p. 23). The 
guiding principle from the Sony decision was th a t a  d istributor of a 
product th a t was merely capable of substan tia l noninfringing uses 
cannot be held liable for its subsequent use  by third parties for copyright 
infringement. The 9 th  Circuit, ju s t  as the lower California court, relied 
absolutely on th a t principle of the Sony doctrine and refused to involve 
itself with the acknowledged shifting calculus of in terests which only 
Congress was empowered to consider.
The loud claims of grave financial losses brought upon the m usic 
distribution industry  (Starr et al., 2005), although widely disputed 
(Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2005b; Ben-Atar, 2005), nevertheless, 
gave credence to the proportionality indications in the petitioner’s 
question and argum ents before the Court. Petitioner’s question drew 
attention to “the over 90 percent” use of respondents’ system s for 
copyright infringement, an  assertion difficult to ignore in com parison 
with the observation in Sony th a t m ost u sers copied program s th a t were 
already freely aired in their hom es as a  fair use  “time shifting” strategy to 
enable them  view these program s a t a  later time.
Also in Sony particu lar note was m ade of the fact th a t the 
corporation merely distributed its product and  had no further role in
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w hat u sers did with these m achines. The 7th Circuit noted th a t Aimster 
was not only involved in transactions th a t facilitated infringem ent bu t 
actually encouraged them.
The conclusion is tha t there was no fundam ental conflict between 
the interpretations of Sony by the Aimster and Grokster appellate courts. 
Both used  portions of ideas and  principles in the Sony decision th a t 
m irrored their peculiar circum stances and sought to ignore or minimize 
the relevance of portions th a t were more remote from factualities of their 
positions.
Resolution of 7th and 9th appellate court decisions
As argued here, there was no fundam ental conflict in the reading 
of Sony by the 7th  and  9th  Circuits. W hereas the Ninth Circuit based its 
decision in Grokster on the single cardinal principle th a t the supplier of a 
product th a t is capable of substan tia l noninfringing uses should be 
imm une from secondary liability charges, the Seventh Circuit based its 
decision in Aimster on a num ber of practical details which though 
supportive of the disposition of Sony were not explicitly integrated by the 
Sony Court as conditions necessary or required to establish the validity 
of the Sony cardinal pronouncem ent on unshakable grounds. Petitioners 
in their brief a t certiorari pointed out several of these details.
Petitioners stated  th a t Aimster forced courts to apply a 
proportionality test as well as a  cost and  benefit analysis to 
accommodate copyright holders’ in terest in preventing infringem ent while
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protecting the public use  of products for noninfringing uses (MGM v. 
Grokster, 2004, Sect. II, p. 24). They revealed tha t for the Ninth Circuit, 
only the possible existence of noninfringing uses needed to be asserted  
(Id. p. 25). Petitioner’s brief pointed out th a t the Aimster Court required 
the provider of the service to show th a t re-design to eliminate and reduce 
infringing uses would be “disproportionately” costly (334 F. 3d a t 653) 
while the Ninth circuit found it irrelevant to consider possible design 
alternatives.
A significant argum ent of petitioners was th a t the Court had  
established long standing principles of secondary liability th a t have been 
recognized in virtually all areas of law including copyright. (Grokster, 
2004, p. 2). These principles pre-dated Sony and applied equally to post 
Sony situations. Petitioners asserted  th a t these principles had been 
affirmed in Sony and th a t the Ninth Circuit had  erroneously interpreted 
Sony as imposing lim itations and  higher standards for contributory 
infringement th a t were foreign to these established principles. As 
declared by Bainwol and  Glickman, (2006), in a  unanim ous ruling, the 
Supreme Court “cut to the heart of the m atter”.
From the Suprem e Court perspective, the question was under w hat 
circum stances the distributor of a  product capable of both lawful and 
unlawful use “is liable for acts of copyright infringement by th ird  parties 
using the product”. The Court held th a t distribution of a  device with the 
object of promoting its use  to infringe copyright, as shown by “clear
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expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringem ent” is 
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties (545 U.S.
913, 2005, p. 1).
Intentional inducem ent or encouragem ent, in no way foreign to 
decisions on copyright liability as indicated in Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists M anagement, Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162, 1971, had 
been a long standing principle prior to Sony. The Court sta ted  th a t 
nothing in Sony required courts to ignore evidence of in tent and  tha t 
Sony was never m eant to foreclose rules of “fault-based liability derived 
from the common law“. It is also the case th a t nothing in Sony required 
courts to consider such  evidence.
For higher education institu tions, the Suprem e Court decision in 
Grokster has produced two categories of im pacts. Firstly, the expected 
liquidation and discontinuance of affected file sharing services such  as 
Grokster, Stream  Cast and several others can be expected to rem arkably 
reduce the pressure th a t p2p activity placed on university networks.
Universities started  to notice excess load on their networks in the 
early m onths of 2000 (McCollum, 2000) with the operation of Napster. As 
Napster was moving through phases of litigation other com panies had 
already developed system s which were poised to exploit the certain 
emergence of legal loopholes (Wu, p. 726). These new designs essentially 
eliminated the use of any centralized servers in the discovery and
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transfer process through which u sers identified and downloaded desired 
m usic files (Id. 734).
Design compromises encouraged the design of hierarchical 
system s consisting of powerful com puters th a t served as supernodes 
while other less powerful com puters rem ained as regular m achines, able 
to search the supernodes which organized and adm inistered collections 
of titles of desired m usic files. According to Wu, Id. a t p. 734, m achines 
located on university cam puses, on account of their superior processing 
capabilities, became prime candidates for supernodes in the hierarchical 
designs which succeeded Napster. This s ta tu s  aggravated the congestion 
of cam pus networks.
The p2p file sharing crisis forced universities to find solutions tha t 
ranged from dialog and com m unication within the university sphere to 
more deliberate responses such  as term ination of access, in some cases, 
w ithout respect to the u sua l procedures th a t characterize dialog in the 
semi public sphere of higher education institutions. By 2005 when the 
Suprem e Court decision re em phasized common law secondary liability 
param eters th a t would m oderate the development and expansion of p2p 
file sharing applications, m ost colleges had in one way or another either 
contained the problem or a t least substantially  reduced its impact.
The Suprem e Court decision in Grokster assured  universities th a t 
the worst days of p2p file sharing were over. By clarifying the basis for 
secondary liability beyond the mere capability of substantial
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noninfringing uses, the C ourt’s decision has increased the burden  on 
p2p developers who seek immunity.
The second category of im pacts draws attention to behavior which 
may resu lt in secondary liability. It is doubtful th a t universities and 
colleges would chose to engage in conduct th a t qualifies as vicarious or 
contributory liability. The Suprem e Court decision highlighted other 
circum stances under which third party  u sers of a product would attach  
secondary liability to the distributor of the product. For clarity, the 
conditions for vicarious and contributory liability are restated.
Vicarious liability involves the distributor of a  product over which 
the distributor has the right and ability to supervise bu t fails to exercise 
tha t right and derives financial benefits as a result of the infringement. 
This is the classic dance hall case exemplified in Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. V. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963). The classic contrast 
is the land lord tenan t case (Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F. 3d 259, 
1996), in which having rented out prem ises, the landlord thereafter 
retains no right to control infringement th a t the tenan t commits in the 
prem ises and consequently escapes vicarious liability.
Contributory infringement applies when one with knowledge of the 
infringing activity m aterially contributes to the act of infringem ent as has 
been dem onstrated in Gershwin v. Columbia, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 
1971). Contributory, and vicarious liability are only two of m any possible 
circum stances in which a  party  can be held liable for the activities of
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another party. The Suprem e Court clarified in its decision in Grokster 
that:
one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use 
to infringe copyright, as shown by a  clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties. (545 U. S. 913, 
2005).
This condition formally adds another pa th  to secondary liability 
theories. The existence of other possible pa ths should encourage 
universities who provide high speed access to their studen ts , faculty and 
staff on college networks, to consider how close their operations may be 
to implicating them  in secondary liability. Can a  college enticem ent of 
students with prom ises of high speed Internet connections (Mangan, 
2002) be seen as “clear expression to foster infringement”.
Many colleges and universities have developed additional policy 
statem ents to supplem ent their copyright and com puter use policies. 
O thers have used  a  variety of strategies to control p2p file sharing 
activities (Hennessey and Spanier, 2004). If as surm ised by Bainwol and 
Glickman, su p ra ., and theorized by Wu (Id. p. 734), new system s emerge 
to confound old protective m easures, w hat further m easures would be 
expected from universities to avoid th rea ts of distractive lawsuits.
Ultimately, as suggested by Crews (1993, p. 122) in copyright and 
Hennessey and  Spanier (2004) in p2p file sharing, institu tions will
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individually need to develop policies th a t are consistent with their 
academic, ethical and strategic orientations.
Research Question 4: Have new issues been generated?
The decision of the Suprem e Court in Grokster merely clarified the 
error in the wholesale application of the single cardinal sta tem ent in 
Sony to the complete exclusion of circum stances in th a t case from which 
tha t statem ent crystallized. The notion th a t the distributor of a product 
capable of both infringing and  non infringing uses is im m une from 
secondary liability provided th a t the product is capable of substan tia l 
non infringing uses would empower the technology connected segm ent of 
society to perm anently avoid copyright ren ts (Wu p. 745).
Although, as Wu has pointed out, the constitutional intention of 
promoting public availability of works of a rt would not be frustrated  if 
tha t were the case (Id. 747), the economic burden of encouraging art 
production through paym ent for copyrighted products would be shifted 
to, and borne by the less technologically connected in the society. Such a 
th reat to ethical economy in the public sphere of consum ers of m usic 
would become a  perm anent economic externality as well as a 
contradiction in democratic society.
Many universities have introduced novel practices in attem pts to 
a ttrac t studen ts (Kiernan, 2004; Mangan, 2002). Based on the principles 
in the Grokster Suprem e Court decision, a  fine line separates the 
promise of large bandw idths to increase the quality and num ber of
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studen ts from inducem ent if these studen ts use these large bandw idths 
for copyright infringement. The recom m endation th a t a university m ust 
approach the file sharing phenom enon from a  holistic evaluation of its 
mission and its ethical orientations (Hennessey and Spanier, 2004; 
Mitrano, 2004) challenges universities to revisit their copyright and 
com puter use  policies.
With regard to university adm inistration, the concerns attending 
leadership of higher education institu tions have been highlighted 
through a critical analysis of their performance in Grokster, Particularly 
revealing is the perform ance of absence and  silence in the rhetorical 
situation a t the Suprem e Court. Concerns about higher education 
leadership, relevance of universities in contem porary society and 
intermingling of academ ic freedom and tenure have been brought to light 
from several sources (Readings, 1996; Sykes, 1988; Buckley, 1986). 
Rather th an  uncovering or generating any new issues, th is study has 
expanded the scope of significance of situations tha t along with others, 
increase the probability th a t these concerns will not simply fade away.
Sum m ary
In th is chapter, rhetorical analysis of the Grokster Court has been 
conducted through situational analysis in accordance with Farrell and  
Young’s schem e (2004). Also, the four research questions have been 
answered based on the results of the application of legal research and 
situational criticism to the rhetorical situation in Grokster. Review of
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litigation docum ents leads to the conclusion th a t Grokster, in the context 
of the p2p file sharing phenom enon, posed substan tia l th rea ts  to 
university networks and overburdened networks in ways th a t would 
im pact academic, research and adm inistrative functions of major 
universities.
University presidents reacted in various ways to contain the 
disruptive possibilities of p2p file sharing activity on their networks; 
however they subm itted no briefs a t the Suprem e Court in the Grokster 
litigation.
Answers to the research questions, based on analysis of Court 
docum ents, indicated th a t Grokster posed a  th rea t to scholarly freedom 
and institu tional autonom y and th a t the symbolic action of absence and 
silence of university presidents a t the Suprem e Court analyzed through 
the framework of situational criticism dem onstrated a  failure to provide a 
fitting response to the exigencies th a t litigants’ questions and  possible 
reaction of Justices posed to scholarly freedom and institutional 
autonomy.
The implications of the Suprem e Court decision in the Grokster 
litigation for universities were analyzed for the effect of the decision on 
policies th a t regulate p2p file sharing on university networks as well as 
the effect on university recruitm ent strategies. For the question 
regarding generation of new issues, it was found th a t Grokster added to
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concerns of existing issues of university leadership in its in ternal and  
external dim ensions.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
Sum m ary and  Conclusions 
The rhetorical situation a t the Suprem e Court in Grokster was the 
culm ination of several years of litigation and lower court decisions on file 
sharing activity th a t was supported by technology whose rapid evolution 
related to strategies th a t developers and providers of file sharing software 
and services used  to avoid adverse legal determ inations against them.
Wu (2003, p .683) has asserted  th a t p2p file sharing represented the 
m ost am bitious effort to underm ine an  existing legal system  using 
com puter code. University networks were drafted into central roles in the 
im plem entation of th a t effort.
Initial difficulties in pure p2p system s had  been overcome in the 
KaZaA FastTrack engine by the introduction of a  hierarchical design in 
which com puters running  the Grokster and Steam Cast software became 
supernodes based on detected bandwidth. Wu (Id. p. 734) explained th a t 
students on university networks topped the list of com puter u sers with 
the highest available bandwidth. Consequently, college cam pus 
com puters became prom inent candidates to become supernodes in the 
p2p hierarchy, generating file sharing activity a t levels th a t choked 
college networks (McCollum, 2000), challenged college adm inistrators
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(Carlson, 2000), and  brought colleges into the file sharing limelight 
(Mitrano, 2004, para. 2).
Immediate Threats
For university leaders, file sharing created an immediate and 
urgent threat. W ithout resolution, college networks a t certain universities 
could not meet the day to day adm inistrative and  m ission critical 
functions of teaching and research. Foster indicated in (Foster 2000, 
para. 8) th a t studen t use  of N apster had been so extensive th a t networks 
a t m any institu tions had  been unable to handle the load, a  scenario 
which became even more aggravated with the emergence of more 
powerful file sharing system s th a t facilitated swapping of hefty video files 
(Carlson, 2001).
Another category of immediate and urgent th rea ts th a t confronted 
college leaders was in the legal arena as copyright owners and their 
organizations bom barded universities with legal notices and filed 
law suits tha t nam ed college studen ts and the colleges them selves as 
defendants (Carlson, 2000; Carlson, 2001). University leaders recognized 
and reacted to the th rea t of law suits through their legal staff (Nordin, 
2000; Abrams, 2000).
Many college leaders generally recognized the problem s and issues 
tha t p2p file sharing raised for their institutions; took various actions 
regarding legal notices, law suits and  cam pus network congestion caused 
by file sharing activity and also reacted to th rea ts to institutional
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autonom y by rebuffing external dem ands to shutdow n studen t network 
access (Abrams, Id, para. 1; Nordin, Id., para. 2), g rant access to outside 
in terests to m onitor in ternal networks (Young, supra, para. 7), and 
install specific software on college networks (Read, 2004). Some reacted 
to the influence of external power through prom pt compliance with 
intrusive dem ands to term inate studen t access (Carlson, 2001, para. 9) 
and, as Mitrano (2004) pointed out, disclose studen t identities in 
subpoenas not backed by a  law suit as required by the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Verizon v. RIAA or by forming collaborative alliances which 
mostly served the in terests of m edia organizations (Joint Committee of 
the Higher Education and  Entertainm ent Communities, 2002; Hennessey 
and Spanier, 2004).
Beyond the proximate th rea ts of network congestion, legal notices 
and law suits, college presidents either rem ained unaw are of, or else 
decided to ignore completely, fundam ental issues th a t had  far reaching 
implications for their institu tions and all of higher education a t the 
Suprem e Court phase of Grokster. For four years, since Napster, 
universities had rem ained hot beds of file sharing activity on account of 
the large bandw idths th a t they have established in p u rsu it of their 
academic m ission of teaching and research. Although m any had 
successfully contained the immediate strain  on their technology and 
adm inistrative resources, the Suprem e Court had been poised to rule on
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issues th a t could potentially im pact secondary liability for researchers, 
inventors, developers of technology protocols, and operators of networks.
Petitioners asked the Suprem e Court to reverse the Ninth Circuit 
decision anchored on the Sony doctrine th a t a  developer of a  product 
th a t is even merely capable of substan tia l noninfringing uses cannot be 
held liable for copyright infringement based on theories of secondaiy 
liability. Over 200 institu tions of higher education participated in the 
lnternet2 consortium  which had  developed the Abiline network with 
enorm ous operational bandw idth th a t facilitate more extensive file 
sharing possibilities th an  other networks available through the Internet.
There were already several indications th a t the decision of the 
Court in Grokster could resu lt in a new era of secondaiy liability for 
institu tions of higher education. Young (2004, para. 8) reported th a t 
influential congressional sources apparently allied to petitioners in terests 
had suggested th a t lnternet2 had  been “unwilling to prevent piracy on its 
netw orks” and followed with an  u n u su a l proposal th a t lnternet2 grant 
access to individuals and  organizations outside its m em bership for the 
express purpose of not only monitoring, bu t also of “enforcing” their 
intellectual property rights.
M angan (2002, para. 2) quoted Zuck, president of the Association 
of Competitive Technology, in a  forum sponsored by U.S. Representative 
Lamar Smith, th a t universities th a t lure studen ts with prom ises of 
increasing bandw idth were not only vulnerable to increasing liability bu t
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also ran  the risk of compromising their legitimate education purposes. 
Other contributors w arned th a t universities should be careful not to 
stifle the legitimate uses of peer to peer networks through overzealous 
restrictions (Id. para. 8). In letters urging large universities to block 
access to Napster, King (2000) w arned colleges to take appropriate steps 
to avoid becoming willing participant in, and enablers of p2p copyright 
theft. Many of the colleges addressed took exception to the 
appropriateness of m easures prescribed by copyright owners represented 
by King, one of such  being a prom pt ban  on the entire university 
comm unity on the use  of Napster (McCollum, 2000). Several of the 
targeted colleges responded with affirmation of their com m itm ent to 
academic freedom and in tent to provide uncensored online services and 
access to its faculty, students, and staff (Abrams, su p ra .; Nordin, 
supra.).
Colleges had taken widely different approaches in containing or 
mitigating the im pact of p2p file sharing activities on cam pus networks 
(Hennessey and Spanier, 2004; Kiernan, 2004). The Suprem e Court 
decision in Grokster was poised to establish criteria on limits and  extent 
of responsibilities th a t system  operators would exercise to escape 
secondaiy copyright liability.
Respondents requested the absolute Sony standard  th a t a  system, 
product or service be judged solely on its capability for substan tia l 
noninfringing uses as determ ined in 1984 by the Sony Court (Sony,
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1984, sect. Ill) and  countenanced by the Ninth Circuit (Grokster, 2003, 
sect. Ill, A-2) over fifteen years later. Petitioners wanted substan tia l 
abandonm ent of the Sony standard  through references to proportionality 
and behavioral factors (Grokster, 2004, Petition for certiorari).
Universities had a  constructive in terest in the decision th a t the 
Suprem e Court would ultim ately fashion from which they could be 
confident in extracting guidance as to the criteria of vigilance th a t they 
would need to exercise to sim ultaneously escape secondaiy copyright 
infringement liability and  rem ain faithful to the pu rsu it of their academic 
mission. The Suprem e Court phase of Grokster presented critical 
exigencies for all cu rren t and  future inventors, researchers and operators 
among whom universities could not be more centrally positioned. 
Exigence
As one of three com ponents of “The Rhetorical S ituation”, exigence 
embodies a  num ber of im portant concepts discussed here in relation to 
the situation a t the Suprem e Court in Grokster. Drawing from Carroll 
(2002, p. 33), among num erous exigences th a t may be present, one 
controlling exigence will function as one which dem ands a  rhetorical 
response capable of modifying or transform ing characteristics of the 
exigence.
At the Court in Grokster, two exigencies existed for universities. 
First was the possibility of substan tia l modification of the Sony standard  
which had  served as a shield th a t protected researchers and developers
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of products and  system s from a priori secondaiy liability provided th a t 
the products of these researches, as designed under the uncensored 
criteria of the researcher, were judged capable of substan tia l 
noninfringing uses even when there is constructive knowledge of their 
use for copyright infringement. Such an  action, for which there could be 
no further appeal, would adversely im pact scholarly academ ic freedom 
tha t operates in university research activities by burdening the 
researcher with the m onum ental task  of anticipating possible forms of 
infringing uses and modifying design criteria to avoid liability (Grokster, 
2002, Brief for Creative Commons, sect. 11).
Drawing from Bitzer’s model, Carroll (supra, p. 33) suggests tha t 
critics may judge responses to be excellent or poor, ethical or unethical, 
fitting and unfitting by m atching the needs of the situation, the 
understanding  of the situation by the rhetor and the expectations of the 
audience. To properly locate the discourse, the critic needs to consider 
the entire rhetorical situation, including audience, constrain ts and 
histoiy. White (1992, p. 25) has stated  th a t any com m unication should 
be understood and explored as “historical configuration”.
C onstraints of the rhetorical situation are factors which have the 
power to contain responsive action needed to modify or transform  the 
exigence. Carroll lists beliefs, a ttitudes, or tradition as constrain ts on 
rhetorical silences. D iscussing silences, in relation to Heidegger’s 
complicity with the Nazi government, Carroll (p. 42) argues th a t
227
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
collaborative silences [in the Heidegger case] establish the guilt of the 
silent individual. Although silences, categorized under “resistan t silence”, 
function as agency against power, collaborative silences generally imply a 
desire for alignm ent with institu tions of power for personal gain or for 
self-preservation. Carroll concludes th a t collaborative silences often 
establish the guilt of the silent individual for failure to speak out against 
the oppression of the power institution.
Although the rhetorical situation a t the Suprem e Court in Grokster 
is in no way comparable to circum stances th a t existed in Nazi Germany 
(Lang, 1996; Jones, 1999), nevertheless, it is conceivable th a t the 
influence of institu tions of power, as was being exhibited through the 
dem ands of petitioners, could place difficult constraints on presidents 
who might have contem plated a  response th a t urged the Court to give 
due consideration to the burdensom e effects th a t its opinion could 
impose on scholarly academic freedom and on institutional autonom y 
relevant to university research activity. This would bolster Foucault’s 
observation th a t the relationship between desire, power and in terest are 
complex (Foucault, 1972, p. 207) and th a t the intellectual’s role has 
become the struggle against the forms of power th a t transform  him [or 
her] into its object and instrum ent in the sphere of knowledge, tru th , 
consciousness and discourse (Foucault, Id. p. 208).
By its very natu re  silence and absence can be am biguous. This 
ambiguity requires the critic to exercise extremely caution in drawing
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conclusions about the m eanings of these forms of rhetorical responses to 
exigencies in a given rhetorical situation. Carroll (p. 50) suggests tha t 
Lang’s m ethod offers a more complete model for studying collaborative 
silences and  in determ ining if a  response of silence and absence has 
been calculated and deliberate or merely an indication of indifference or 
ignorance.
Lang (1996, p. 15) has dram atized the ambiguity of silence; the 
silence of horror can mimic the silence of consent; the silence of 
conspiracy or of pleasure may be as wordless as the silence of suffering. 
Further inquiiy can serve to distinguish motivations for silence and 
absence. Not being a legally nam ed party  in the case, the silence and 
absence of university leaders in the final stages of Grokster m ay appear 
inconsequential to the casual observer. The point rem ains though th a t 
universities and scholars had noted the th rea t to academ ic freedom 
during the early stages of the p2p file sharing crisis. Foster (2001) has 
reported th a t diverse groups of law professors, com puter scientists, and 
library groups had filed docum ents arguing th a t the ruling of a  D.C. 
Appellate Court judge to block publication of a  decryption software code 
violated the First Am endment and stifled scientific research.
Felten, a  professor in the research team  th a t unscram bled 
encryption codes of digital m usic em phasized the collaborative na tu re  of 
science as lawyers for the universities involved in the research decided to 
delay publication out of concern that, following the anticipated ruling of
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the appellate judge, their institution might be in violation of the digital 
copying act. Foster (2002) reported th a t Felten eventually presented his 
research findings a t a  com puter security conference after industry  
officials backed down from their th rea ts to prosecute, one of the 
strategies th a t Wu enum erated in an economic model th a t copyright 
in terests employed to “reduce th rea t to their copyright ren ts .” (Wu, 2003, 
p 705). Such events had  already begun to reveal ways in which 
unconstrained regulation could ham per research activity and  scholarly 
academic freedom.
Responses by university lawyers of targeted institu tions to 
dem ands by powerful in terests in the entertainm ent industry  clearly 
em phasized the comm itm ent of the institu tion to academ ic freedom and 
provision of uncensored access to the Internet (Abrams, 2000; Nordin, 
2000). It is fair to conclude therefore and  in spite of the pronouncem ents 
of the American Council of Education, reported by Kiernan (2002) th a t 
only a  fragm ent of university presidents have any knowledge about the 
[file sharing] issue, th a t indeed universities targeted by m edia industry  
cam paigns were aware of the im pact of file sharing on academ ic freedom 
and institutional autonomy.
By 2004 when plaintiffs in Grokster filed for certiorari and 
escalated the case to the Suprem e Court m ost of the universities 
embroiled in the p2p crisis had already contained the im pact of file 
sharing on their networks and  substantially  contained the th rea t to
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scholarly research and  teaching caused by network congestion 
(Hennessey and Spanier, 2004). In the height of p2p file sharing activity, 
m edia industry  executives had  succeeded in the rhetorical 
subjectification of targeted universities with such  suggestive and 
implicative insinuations as “unwillingness to prevent piracy on its 
networks ...” (Young, 2004); luring studen ts with prom ises of increasing 
bandwidth (Mangan, 2002); m isappropriation of university-provided 
facility for nonacadem ic use  (Kiernan, 2002); knowing facilitation of 
massive copyright infringements as willing participants in and enabler of 
intellectual property theft (King, 2000; Carlson, 2000). Thus m edia 
executives had  already begun the relentless cam paign to bracket targeted 
universities and their presidents into subjectified positions as 
accomplices in unethical and  illegal practices of copyright infringement.
Given all of the p2p related experiences of universities and their 
astu te  aw areness, dem onstrated in contemporary history, in aggressive 
fights to preserve institutional autonom y through actions a t the Suprem e 
Court (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; Regents of the Univ. of California v. 
Bakke, 1978), it becomes problematic th a t universities responded with 
absence and silence a t the Suprem e Court in Grokster where scholarly 
freedom of researchers faced serious potential th rea t from the chilling 
effect th a t departure from the strict Sony doctrine would impose on 
innovation in products with legitimate uses. (Lessig, 2005, sect. Ill, p. 18; 
Page, Baker, Neco, Taranto and Cohn, 2005, sect. 1 C, p. 24).
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Applying the broad binary classification of silence provided by 
Carroll (p. 38), resistive and  collaborative, there is no evidence th a t 
silence and absence of university presidents a t the Suprem e Court in 
Grokster can be classed among resistive silences generally associated 
with tactics of the weak against power (De Certeau xix; Carroll, supra, a t 
p. 40). On the contrary, the urge to class th a t response among 
“collaborative silences” is pressing. Carroll explains collaborative silences 
as acts of alignm ent with power.
Although there is ample evidence th a t several university presidents 
actively collaborated with petitioners through joint committees 
(Hennessey and  Spanier, 2004) and to a large extent shared and echoed 
the discourses of the powerful m edia executives with whom they aligned, 
care m ust be exercised in the consideration of Carroll’s totalizing 
inference of the operation of motives of personal gain, self-preservation 
and guilt (Supra, p. 47).
Although these sam e m edia executives had  earlier threatened 
targeted universities with law suits and actively pursued  their studen ts 
with formal legal action, the possibility exists tha t university leaders, 
confident of their intentions not to operate any services along the lines of 
services operated by Grokster and other file sharing services tha t 
threatened to sh u t down their networks, would be silently supportive of a 
Suprem e Court determ ination against Grokster.
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If the Court accepted petitioners request to rule th a t G rokster and 
sim ilar file sharing services not be immunized from copyright 
infringement th a t occur on their services, the result m ost certainly would 
be the shutdow n of Grokster, a  final deterrent to the emergence of 
substitu tes, and  a  welcome relief for university network adm inistration.
A response in support of Grokster would not only anger the m edia 
industry  who had m anaged to interpellate university presidents into 
collaborative roles, bu t also would be quite contraiy to the self in terest of 
universities in their effort to preserve their network bandw idth for 
legitimate academ ic and  adm inistrative functions. However, other 
possible responses were available to university leaders.
While petitioners asked the Suprem e Court to reverse the 9th  
Circuit interpretation of Sony, the possibility existed also th a t the Court 
could affirm the appellate court decision. Such an outcome would 
compound the th rea t to college operated networks and substantially  
frustrate  Internet supported research activity throughout university 
cam puses. Colleges would rem ain embroiled in an  endless struggle 
against th rea ts from increasingly more sophisticated and elusive p2p 
system s. It is reasonable to assum e th a t university leaders were capable 
of fashioning a fitting rhetorical response to contain the adverse 
consequences of a t least two possible outcom es in a  Suprem e Court 
determ ination in Grokster, both particularly detrim ental to the operation 
of scholarly academic freedom.
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Universities have dem onstrated this skill and insistence a t the 
Suprem e Court on m atters th a t they judged to be critical to the 
preservation of their institutional autonom y. Their ambivalence at 
protecting scholarly freedom, a  privilege tha t generally accrue to 
university faculty, has been a  regular source of concern within the 
academ e of universities th a t expect ethical behavior from their 
presidents. It is possible th a t such  positional contradictions aggravate 
issues of leadership th a t plague the ability of leaders of higher education 
institu tions to respond to the challenges of contem porary society.
Other issues of substan tia l significance albeit with less prom inence 
in the judicial a rena are issues of leadership in the internal and  external 
relationships involved in the m anagem ent of academic, adm inistrative 
and financial resources in all of which technology m aintains an 
indispensable role. Zusm an (1999) has surm ised on p. 141 th a t although 
higher education will need greater leadership in the periods th a t lie 
ahead, the exercise of effective leadership may become more difficult 
especially a t public universities. Regarding technology, Gum port and 
Chun (1999) have concluded th a t technology will have far-reaching 
im pact on higher education. Awareness by university presidents of issues 
generated by applications of technology is therefore a valid concern.
In Grokster one or more of the following three scenarios are 
interesting; first, the possibility th a t university presidents were not aware 
tha t any th rea t existed a t the Suprem e Court phase of the Grokster
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litigation; second, university presidents were aware b u t judged such 
th reat to be unim portan t beyond immediate issues in their 
adm inistration ; third, university presidents were aware bu t chose to 
avoid confrontation with powerful external interests.
Not aware th a t any th rea t existed
The rhetorical situation in which presidents functioned during 
Napster and  until Grokster was complex. Their institu tions faced serious 
th reats from network congestion (McCollum, 2000a; Carlson, 2001a; 
Carlson, 2001b), external and  powerful in terests flooded them  with 
aggressive and intrusive dem ands (Carlson, 2000a; Young, 2004) in 
effect penetrating the arm or of protective institutional autonom y th a t the 
Court through num erous decisions had  cloaked them  with (Standler, 
2000; Urofsky, 2000; G rutter, 2003). Network congestion restricted 
bandw idth available for research and for the daily practice of scholarly 
freedom.
W ithout urgent action, the core mission of the institu tion within 
society, teaching and research could have been seriously im paired and  
adm inistrative functions paralyzed. Various constituencies within the 
university public had  different priorities. S tudents in dorm s were 
allegedly engaged in activity which devoured huge proportions of 
bandw idth (Kiernan, 2004; Carlson, 2000; Carlson, 2001b). Major 
challenges of leadership confronted the decision m aking faculties of the 
president in the immediacy of the file sharing crisis.
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Threats to the integrity of institu tional autonom y could easily be 
accomm odated even by presidents who the American Council on 
Education claimed lacked knowledge about the [file sharing] issue 
(Kiernan, 2000). The im portance of the Suprem e Court consideration of 
Grokster and  the significance for academ ic freedom and creativity posed 
by petitioners’ question before the Court may easily elude some 
presidents whose institu tions, after all, were not parties in the Grokster 
litigation.
It is unlikely th a t a  president in the class of institu tions defined in 
this d issertation was not aware th a t p2p file sharing posed any threat. 
Presidential aw areness had  clearly been dem onstrated by exhibition of 
concern (Carlson, 2000a), weighing alternative responses (Foster, 2000; 
Carlson, 2001c), collaborating with entertainm ent industry  executives 
(Hennessy and Spanier, 2004) or handing legal notices to internal or 
retained legal specialists (Kiernan, 2000).
Aware bu t judged unim portan t beyond immediate issues
As in the first scenario, university presidents dem onstrated 
aw areness of the immediate challenges th a t file sharing posed and 
responded to these in various ways (Hennessy and Spanier 2004; 
Kiernan, 2004). They judged as im portant, the internal th rea ts to 
cam pus networks (McCollum, 2000; Carlson, 2000a) and th rea ts of 
law suits if they failed to comply with dem ands of powerful entertainm ent 
industry  organizations (Carlson, 2000b; Mangan, 2002).
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Some universities dem onstrated aw areness of th rea ts to 
institutional autonom y and resisted such in trusions on various grounds. 
Congressional committee m em ber’s suggestion to grant access to 
individuals and organizations outside the lnternet2 consortium  to police 
their intellectual property rights (Young, 2004) was rebuffed on behalf of 
university dom inated m em bership as Young quoted Greg Wood, 
spokesm an for lnternet2 "... it was up  to ln ternet2 ’s m em bers to 
determine w hether Abiline’s rules were being followed on issues such  as 
file sharing.”
Even before the Suprem e Court phase of Grokster, individual 
scholars recognized and resisted th rea ts tO scholarly academ ic freedom. 
Foster (2001), reported briefs filed by law professors Yochai and  Lessig 
arguing against anticircum vention provisions of the digital-copyright act 
on the basis of the preservation of fair use (para. 12) after a  lower court 
judge decided to stop the publication of software code th a t decrypts 
digital data. Foster (2000) reported the rejection by 14 universities of 
requests by Metallica and  rap a rtist Dr. Dre to block s tu d en ts’ access to 
Napster. These responses dem onstrate an  astu te  aw areness th a t such 
requests were inconsistent with university educational and  research 
mission (Nordin, 2000), inconsistent with the university’s com m itm ent to 
academic freedom and to the provision of uncensored online services and 
access (Abrams, 2000).
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In th is scenario, a  president was not only aware of in ternal th rea ts 
to university networks (Carlson, 2001b) bu t took action of some sort to 
reduce or eliminate the adverse im pact on bandw idth needed to fulfill the 
mission of the university in teaching, research and public service 
(McCollum, 2000; Kiernan, 2004). Many presidents recognized external 
th reats to institu tional autonom y posed by dem ands from powerful 
entertainm ent organizations and  artists th a t they represented and 
sometimes rebuffed these intrusive advances on both legal and 
ideological grounds (Nordin, 2000; Abrams, 2000; Mitrano, 2004). O thers 
sometimes sought refuge in legal technicalities and totalizing rhetoric on 
ethics (Carlson, 2001c; Hennessey and Spanier, 2004). Some exhibited 
uneasiness and a  sem blance of apprehension a t being dragged into 
law suits over acts th a t lawyers representing copyright owners labeled as 
theft (King, 2000).
Having contained th rea ts of direct lawsuits, a  president in this 
scenario may not be excited by w hat appeared to be a  remote contest 
between powerful entertainm ent industry  corporations and  associations 
as petitioners and as respondents, developers of the file sharing system s 
tha t precipitated m ajor network and  ethical crises on their cam puses. 
Aware bu t chose to avoid confrontation
In th is scenario a president may have been aware of internal 
th rea ts to network availability as well as encroachm ent into the protected 
territory of institu tional governance by external power. Faced with a
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possible confrontation with the sam e forces of external power a t the 
Suprem e Court in a  case in which their institution had  not been nam ed 
as a party, they simply decided not to get involved a t the Court.
Recommendations 
Further Research Directions
In the analysis of moral responsibility conducted in th is work, the 
class of university presidents has been considered as a  whole. Although 
application of a  theory of ethical economy would forestall actual blame 
even when a finding of blam eworthiness was arrived at, the class 
grouping is hardly fair especially when personal constrain ts are likely to 
assum e im portant roles in determ ining how persons are driven to 
responses. Although De Certeau (1984, p. xi) describes each individual 
as the locus of interaction of the plurality of socially determ ined 
relationships in an apparent concern over “the historical axiom of social 
analysis [which] posits an  elem entary un it -  the individual -  on the basis 
of which groups are supposed to be formed ...”, eidetic theory allows 
these interactions to be processed in the internal network of hum an  
cranial struc tu res (Arduini, 1992) and  ultim ately the individual may 
shoulder a  substan tia l portion of responsibility for their decisions 
although a  group is often nam ed as au thor of integrated personal 
decisions of its m em bership.
In th is regard, there exists definite value in following up  with 
further research on the underlining m otivations and attitudes of selected
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presidents on a  broad range of issues including views on scholarly 
academic freedom in circum stances such  as obtained a t various phases 
of Grokster up  to the rhetorical absence and  silence th a t all university 
and college presidents performed a t the Suprem e Court.
Another research direction may focus on the evolution of p2p 
policies a t colleges and universities sim ilar to the work done by Crews 
(1993) in regards to copyright policies a t higher education institutions. 
Crews had  concluded then  th a t universities tended to be overly 
conservative in their copyright policies. The vast majority of institu tions 
gravitated towards Copying Guidelines developed by and large by 
powerful copyright in terests and  distanced their organizations from the 
American Library Association (ALA) guidelines based on a more liberal 
view of copyright sta tu tes. Crews has recommended (Id., p. 122) th a t 
university leaders m ust be a ttuned  to the operation of environm ental 
pressures and consciously determ ine the extent tha t they will allow these 
forces to shape institutional policy and decision making. It may be noted 
th a t in this critical aspect of the academ ic affairs of higher education, 
scholars in their individual capacities, notably Jo h n  Stedm an and S tuart 
Gullickson challenged the overly restrictive Copying Guidelines and 
developed alternate requirem ents which later became the basis for the 
ALA model (Id., p. 48).
During the p2p crisis, institu tions adopted a wide variety of 
approaches as the file sharing phenom enon developed from Napster
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(2000) to Grokster (2005). Various avenues of investigation in the social 
sciences and law would go a  long way to illum inate the interplay of 
organizational politics and external power in directing the revision of 
com puter use policies for institutional networks.
Another area  of further studies arises from the voiced concerns 
over presidential leadership and dialog on alternative models of 
presidential leadership. According to B irnbaum  (p. 342), calls for 
strengthening university and college presidency abound. Of the several 
models th a t have been discussed, no serious dialog has been floated in 
the public sphere of the possibilities of searching for presidential 
leadership from among the ranks of academic faculty for whom the 
defense of scholarly academic freedom has been an unfailing passion.
Due to major struc tu ra l differences between the system  of 
presidential adm inistration and the faculty senate system  and their 
relative susceptibilities to various power vectors, there m ight be hope 
th a t a  serious dialog will reveal the personal and  professional 
characteristics capable of balancing the dem ands of powerful 
constituencies and the tran sparen t comm itm ent to academ ic freedom if 
such freedom is judged to be an  essential condition th a t seals the 
societal contract for institu tions of higher education as producers and 
dissem inators of knowledge.
W hat passes for personal deficiencies under Jan is  m ay be 
expanded to no avail. If the problem of university leadership is indeed a
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struc tu ra l one, any individuals, as soon as they are th ru s t into positions 
of institutional leadership and regardless of all a ttem pts to eliminate 
these “personal deficiencies” become trapped in a  configuration of forms 
of power, desire and  the effects of differands of ethical economy operating 
in all the spheres in which university constituents participate. Any hope 
for fundam ental restructuring  of contem porary configurations in higher 
education leadership will find its dynamics through public dialog on all 
possible options.
Another area of further work is in the development of a  theory of 
spherical ethical economy. In th is work, the only requirem ent for ethical 
economy in any sphere is the assum ption of efficient com m unication 
within the sphere. This m eans th a t participants within the sphere have 
no u n u su a l restrictions on adding information to or extracting 
information, as they desire, from the stream s tha t come into existence 
within the sphere. Theories of the private, public and cosm opolitan or 
global spheres have been extensively developed. There is only scan t work 
on the private personal sphere as a sphere of comm unicating 
com ponents operating with the sam e assum ptions of ethical economy as 
has been applied to all other spheres. Postulating th is private personal 
sphere in a  unified theory of spheres has m ade the separation of moral 
responsibility and blam ew orthiness, from actual blame and moral 
sanctions less problematic.
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The im pulse to link moral blam eworthiness to the necessity of 
some form of sanction as suggested by Edm undson (p. 128) and  the 
burden of care th a t Jones (p. 22) dem ands from those who judge the 
morally questionable actions of others become irrelevant under a  theory 
of ethical economy. As an  example, finding th a t the absence and silence 
of university presidents in Grokster has indicated an  indifference to the 
fundam ental value of academ ic freedom in the public sphere and in the 
semi private university sphere does not foreclose the usefulness of 
further inquiry in the personal private spheres of the presidential 
au thors of silence and  performers of absence. Such an inquiry has 
assum ed th a t principles of ethical economy operate with equal validity in 
any and in all spheres.
Alternate Conceptualization of Discursive Spheres
According to Kuypers (2004 a t p. 5), "... a t the s ta rt of the twenty- 
first century the study of rhetoric has expanded greatly, as have its 
definitions." Kuypers has offered the following definition: “The strategic 
use of com m unication, oral or written, to achieve specifiable goals.” Foss 
has w ritten "Rhetoric m eans the use  of symbols to influence thought and 
action. ... Rhetoric is communication; it is simply an  old term  for w hat is 
now called communication..." Also "Rhetoric is not limited to w ritten or 
spoken discourse... [Any] message, regardless of the form it takes or the 
channel of com m unication it uses, is rhetoric."
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All concepts and definitions of rhetoric assum e th a t rhetoric 
applies when one entity is able to influence a  different entity through 
discourse. I propose a  further expansion of rhetoric to include the more 
general case in which an entity is also able to influence itself through 
discourse and through any category of symbolic action. Although such 
influence may a t first appear local, I now dem onstrate th a t the 
repercussions can be global. After all, “to be, or not to be, th a t is the 
question.”
First, the well known case of the symbolic movement and action of 
university studen ts a t the height of opposition to the Vietnam War during 
which President Johnson  announced th a t he would not seek re-election; 
it is difficult to imagine th a t the em battled president did not have quiet 
m om ents of reflection with or w ithout aids, family and  associates in 
which his thought processes persuaded him to relinquish a  second term  
presidential quest, a  rare occurrence in American politics.
Another well known case was the pardon of President Nixon by 
President Ford. Interviews granted long after President Ford left office 
disclosed th a t the first appointed American president had m om ents of 
contemplation in which he weighed the turm oil th a t would face the 
nation through a criminal trial of a former American president and 
persuaded him self th a t an  unconditional pardon was the preferred 
alternative.
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Well known narratives in the Christian religion rem ind the faithful 
of the creation of the world through soliloquy of a single and om nipotent 
deity; soliloquies of Je su s  C hrist a t Cethsem ane and a t other solemn 
locations abound in Christian texts, m any of which have persuaded and 
continue to persuade hoards of believers into passionate action. To these 
well known narratives may be appended an  endless list of cases and 
categories of personal reflections, soliloquies and  other categories of 
symbolic thought capable of immense personal, private and public 
impact.
Categorization of Spheres
Categories of hum an spheres of discourse may commence with a 
phenomenological u n it such as an  individual who can consciously 
com m unicate with and influence themselves and thus establish  the 
category of the private personal sphere. I foresee no conflict with 
psychoanalytical study of th is sphere a t other levels of investigation. 
Individuals may also com m unicate with one or more individuals through 
socially sanctioned protocols and  create private categories such  as 
families. Goodnight has discussed conversation in the “personal sphere” 
in which “discussions sometimes has repercussions beyond the 
relationship (Goodnight, 1987 a t p. 428)” Goodnight’s personal sphere 
falls under private categories. Such private categories are not p re­
occupied with the enlargem ent of discursive space in F raser’s public
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sphere as are F raser’s “subaltern  counterpublics (Fraser, 1992 a t p. 
123).”
Before returning to refine categories of private and public spheres, 
it is now useful to s ta rt from the global perspective and declare global 
categories which transcend national boundaries and promote common 
agendas and  ideologies such  as global warming, hum an rights and  world 
peace. Using “cosmopolitan public” apparently in the global parlance. 
Bowman and Lutz-Bachm ann have stated  th a t “the cosm opolitan public 
is the broadest possible audience (Bowman & Lutz-Bachm ann, 1997 a t 
p. 183).”
The public sphere is perhaps the m ost widely analyzed category. 
Although boundaries and m em bership are extensible, the public sphere 
proposed in th is work, is nominally a national space coincident with 
political boundaries with m em bership th a t minimally include nationals 
and residents of the political u n it regardless of their physical domicile. 
There is no requirem ent th a t participants or m em bers of the public 
sphere or any other sphere enjoy equality of sta tus. On the contrary, 
inequalities in participant social and  economic properties or in their 
political or ideological in terests encourage the emergence of F raser’s 
counterpublics and resu lt in “a  widening of discursive contestation” 
(Supra, a t p. 124). F raser’s alternate publics include “counterpublics” 
whose emergence become necessary because of hegemonic discursive 
distortions usually  ascribed to dom inant ideology.
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For w ant of a  more illum inating nom enclature, I have suggested 
the semi-public sphere which would include all of F raser’s 
counterpublics, weak publics "... whose deliberative practice consists 
exclusively in opinion formation and does not also encom pass decision 
m aking “and strong publics “in the form of self-managing institu tions ... 
which could be arenas both of opinion formation and decision m aking 
(Fraser 1992 a t p. 134).”
I designate the category of private spheres to be spheres with 
theoretically no in terest in public sphere ideological contestations. 
Inclusion of groups in th is category may be rhetorically challenged and 
defended. Examples of groups in this category are open clubs such  as 
boy scouts, as well as exclusive clubs such as country clubs with forceful 
declarations of their ideological neutrality.
To sum m arize, the categories th a t will be applied in th is work are 
the individual personal private, the private, the semi public, the national 
public and the global or cosmopolitan public spheres. Each and  every 
sphere depends on com m unication to susta in  its existence and  promote 
its objectives. Ideally, efficiency of com m unication is desirable to ensure 
tha t participants have no u n u su a l restrictions to injecting information 
into, or extracting information from the stream  of information th a t is 
generated by participants, enters into, circulates within, or exits the 
sphere. Some participants may chose to use  television and the Internet 
while others chose to use  newspapers, street corner soap boxes, coffee
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houses or beer parlors. There are no pretentions of equality of s ta tu s  or 
parity in any sphere or universal access to any m eans of com m unication. 
Indeed non-uniform  accesses to certain com m unication resources 
produces, potentially, deliberate or unin tended distortions to narratives 
tha t emerge, dom inate or are suppressed.
Ethical Economy
C haracteristics of different spheres impose different criteria for 
ethical economy in th a t sphere and internally construct functions for 
which a  m axim and may be derived. A m axim and, a  function of the 
sphere, is a  set of results th a t represents the closest approach to 
satisfying the objectives of participants. Maximand is analogous “optimal 
mix” th a t results from allocative efficiency in classical microeconomic 
theory.
Allocative efficiency refers to a situation in which the limited 
resources of a  country are allocated in accordance with the wishes of 
consum ers. An allocatively efficient economy produces, in the parlance of 
microeconomics, an  "optimal mix" of commodities. Operation of freedom 
of choice as well as availability of perfect information is prerequisite in 
the production of an  optimal mix. Such a  choice assum es th a t 
individuals act to maximize their individual utility functions in an  
environm ent free from “externalities” imposed by state  policy or by moral 
influences such  as collusions and deceptive promotions (Samuelson & 
Nordhaus, 2001).
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However, individual choice cannot be relied upon to maximize all 
functions in a  society. A theory of desirable outcom es or a  theory of 
ethical economy is required to seek m axim ands in spheres. In the 
national public sphere, one framing of ethical economy m ay be in term s 
of the resu lts th a t discourse in th is sphere achieves in the area  of public 
policy; in democratic society such  framing may be m onitored by tracking 
public opinion.
A fundam ental requirem ent of any sphere is the lack of u n u su a l 
restriction to com m unication within the sphere. The ubiquitous 
operation of power tends to frustrate  these requirem ents. C onstant 
vigilance is useful in reducing the effect of power on com m unication 
within the sphere and in increasing the probability of improved ethical 
economy. O ther th an  in the private personal sphere which requires more 
elaboration, the requirem ents of spherical ethical economy are sim ilar in 
public private spheres such  as university departm ents or associations.
The private personal sphere requires more elaboration for a t least 
three reasons; firstly, the inherent complexity of the hum an  brain  which 
has been theorized to predom inantly control psychological functions 
such as ideas, learning, emotions, judgm ent, personal desires, and 
decision m aking (Arduini, 1992); secondly, all spheres are fundam entally 
composed of individuals who live also within their own private personal 
spheres and thirdly, the notion of a private personal sphere is a  novel 
concept in rhetorical scholarship.
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Nevertheless, as will be seen later the concept proves to be 
particularly useful in the critical analysis of the effects and products of 
leadership within any sphere. The requirem ents, functioning and effects 
of ethical economy in the global cosmopolitan public sphere produce 
different effects th an  ethical economy in the national public sphere or in 
the uniquely different private personal sphere. Although ethical economy 
ideally assum es unrestricted  spherical com m unications as a  requirem ent 
for achieving m axim ands within the sphere, spherical m axim ands are 
theoretically non-identical and are differentiated by differands which may 
describe substan tia l differences am ong m axim ands of different spheres. 
Application of Ethical Economy in Grokster
The various categories of spheres, global or cosmopolitan, public, 
semi-public, private and personal are constituted by struc tu res th a t 
define the boundaries of ethics in the sphere and confine participants 
within those boundaries. The personal sphere is unique, singular, and 
shared by no other person or persons. The structu res and functioning of 
the personal sphere may produce results th a t violate the ethical economy 
of other spheres while m aintaining consistency in the ethical economy of 
the personal sphere. A discussion of critical ethics in any sphere requires 
consideration of morality. Jones (1999, p. 23) has underscored the 
im portance of holding people to account for their blameworthy actions as 
well as the obligation to ensure th a t only the blameworthy is subjected to 
blame.
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To varying degrees, all spheres are represented in public and  large 
private universities with activities th a t add complexity to the challenges 
tha t leaders m ust address. Although th is study ultim ately focuses on 
theories of the private personal sphere as an  aid in the evaluation of 
actions or inactions of individuals in the scenario constructed in the 
rhetorical situation a t the Suprem e Court phase of Grokster, an 
understanding  of concepts such as ethical economy within spheres is 
helped by a brief description of other spheres which exist a t 
contem porary institu tions of higher education.
According to Altbach, 1999, p. 15, the contem porary university 
serves as home to complex system s of journals, books and  databases 
tha t com m unicate knowledge worldwide and sim ultaneously as centers 
of political thought, political action and political action. Faculty and 
studen ts a t universities initiate and engage in discourses in the 
cosmopolitan global public spheres with issues of concern to all nations 
and countries on the planet and  with agendas dom inated by such  issues 
as world peace, environm ental integrity and hum an rights.
In the national public sphere faculty, students and other 
participants outside the immediate confines of higher educational 
institu tions engage in discourses on issues of national culture with 
strong intentionality towards production of improved public policy on 
such wide ranging issues as national debt, social security, foreign 
affairs, marriage, and  abortion. The semi public sphere, represented by
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departm ents, S tudent Government, professional associations and 
unions, together, produces curren ts and  cross curren ts of issues and 
positions th a t occupy presidents, deans and m yriads of cam pus 
committees.
Private spheres within S tudent Government may focus on 
circum scribed positional activities which sometimes create 
reverberations th a t spill over from the desk of the chief institu tional 
adm inistrator into the a rena  of the external public sphere and all the way 
to the Suprem e Court (Chairsell, 2001). All of these on-going activities in 
various spheres, in which university constituencies continuously 
participate, engage the attention of adm inistrative leaders, and 
depending on the peculiar characteristics of issues th a t surge into 
dom inating prominence, enorm ous adm inistrative, technology and legal 
resources may need to be reallocated to deal with challenges th a t 
develop.
All stages of Grokster added to the m atrix of challenges th a t 
confronted higher education leadership and the governance of their 
institu tions and require a  suitable framework to accommodate. The 
framework th a t th is work constructs is th a t of ethical economy which 
can be applied generally to all spheres, global, national public, semi 
public, private and  the unique private personal sphere constitu ted by all 
the faculties and  functions th a t operate within the individual.
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Following Ja n is ’s pathways, the presence of personal deficiencies 
leads to the conclusion of high probability of avoidable error. This 
approach is fraught with dangers of fatalism  if persons are unable to 
escape from the operation of their personal deficiencies as in J a n is ’s 
pathw ays (Janis, 1992) or rem ain trapped within their virtues and  vices 
under the core content of morality advanced by Jones (p. 38). No reliable 
m ethods exist for calculating values of personal deficiencies nor for 
m easuring virtuosity and viciousness. For th is reason the alternate 
approach th a t I propose avoids the tem ptation to attem pt a  definition 
and fundam ental quantification of these factors.
The principles rely on notions of ethical economy within spheres.
As indicated under C hapter 4, Findings of the Study, universities actively 
participate in virtually all construction of spheres, the national public 
sphere, the cosmopolitan or global public sphere, sem i-public and 
private spheres of national, international, local and personal significance 
as well as the individual private personal sphere in which all the effects 
and forces of ethical economy in other spheres interact.
A fundam ental assum ption was th a t if unfettered com m unication 
existed within a  sphere, then the sphere tends towards a  state of ethical 
economy in which the satisfaction of a  subset of spherical aspirations 
cannot be increased w ithout decreasing satisfaction of a t least one of the 
aspirations of the sphere. This is analogous to concepts of economic 
efficiency in classical economics in which the operation of unfettered
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com m unication within a  m arket resu lts in optimal production and 
distribution of goods (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2001).
Distortions due to externalities of government fiscal intervention, 
obstructions in free flow of information and  outright fraud work against 
a ttainm ent of economic efficiency. Communication in the haberm asian 
public sphere alm ost ceased to be democratic as m edia interests 
struggled over control of m eans of com m unication available to 
participants within the sphere. The resu lt is a  com m ensurate departure 
from a state  of ethical economy within the sphere. Ethical economy in a 
university should operate to maximize the aspirations of studen ts for 
access to knowledge, faculty for continuous relevance in society, 
professional protection of tenure, and  continuity of support for academ ic 
freedom w ithout which it would be difficult to justify the existence of 
universities in society. Failure of a  university president to defend the 
university against all th rea ts to academ ic freedom dim inishes ethical 
economy in the university and  problematizes the legitimacy of 
presidential leadership.
As observed earlier, several universities made efforts to protect 
institutional autonom y from the dem ands of external entertainm ent 
industry  interests. In prom inent cases (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; Board 
of Regents v. Bakke), universities sought to m aintain if not advance their 
institutional autonom y in law suits which scaled all the way up  to the 
Suprem e Court. Lack of comparable zeal in the defense of scholarly
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freedom a t Grokster indicates indifference to fundam ental values of 
academic freedom th a t university faculty commonly hold. This attitude 
would increase blam ew orthiness under Jo n e s’s theory of moral 
responsibility.
In Grokster, external power operated in direct ways through 
dem ands for compliance, th rea ts of lawsuits, and persisten t rhetorical 
onslaught. Foucault has observed (Foucault, p. 207) th a t the 
intellectual's role has become the struggle against forms of power th a t in 
essence interpellate him  or her into agency roles. University leaders, in 
joint committees with entertainm ent industry  leaders, in roles 
categorized by Carroll as roles of “collaborative silences” (Carroll, Id. p. 
42) aligned them selves with power. If their absence and silence a t the 
Suprem e Court in Grokster was motivated by reluctance to offend the 
powers with whom they had  clearly aligned, th a t would increase the 
blam eworthiness of their response.
However acting in a  way th a t dim inishes ethical economy in the 
semi public university sphere and  becoming blameworthy on accounts of 
collaboration with external power, reluctance to offend these powers, or 
relative indifference to the value of academic freedom to scholars in 
higher education does not necessarily justify a progression to actual 
blame. Jones provides rationale for distinguishing between judgm ents of 
blam ew orthiness and actual pronouncem ent of blame. (Jones, p. 22). 
This distinction is entirely consistent with the application of ethical
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economy in the private personal sphere in which a university president, 
like any other person, exists.
Arduini has hypothesized an  eidetic event, such  as an  idea, as a  
state  of "concerned nervous structures". Emotions of anger, joy, desire, 
and greed may act as weights th a t alter the significance of other elem ents 
or constitute frameworks of reference in which alternate logics of 
judgm ent operate. Such phenom ena may have a  fundam ental reliance on 
an individual's cranial architecture within whose purview, traces of 
im pulses from the ethical economy of other spheres in which the 
individual participates become integrated and assim ilated to promote 
ethical economy in the personal private sphere.
Consequently, although absence and silence of a university 
president in Grokster may be judged as a  morally blam eworthy act, the 
critic is obliged to properly segm ent the sphere of relevance and the effect 
of the act on the ethical economy of th a t sphere. Though spheres may be 
described hierarchically, ethical economy is invariant to such  
descriptions. Ethical economy is as valid in one sphere as in any other 
sphere. Achieving a  congruence of effects of ethical economy operating in 
different spheres would be ideal in cases of leadership where the leader 
acts in a way th a t advances and defends the aspirations of the sphere in 
which the leader exists and sim ultaneously “feels a t ease” internally with 
the performed response and  its im pact on his or her personal in terests 
and values.
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In th is work, the only requirem ent for ethical economy in any 
sphere is the assum ption of efficient comm unication within the sphere. 
This m eans th a t participants w ithin the sphere have no u n u su a l 
restrictions on adding information to or extracting information, as they 
desire, from the stream s th a t come into existence within the sphere. 
Theories of the private, public and cosmopolitan or global spheres have 
been extensively developed.
There is only scan t work on the private personal sphere as a  
sphere of com m unicating com ponents operating with the sam e 
assum ptions of ethical economy as has been applied to all other spheres. 
This has m ade the separation of moral responsibility and 
blam eworthiness, from actual blame and moral sanctions less 
problematic. The im pulse to link moral blam eworthiness to the necessity 
of some form of sanction as suggested by Edm undson (p. 128) and the 
burden of care th a t Jones (p. 22) dem ands from those who judge the 
morally questionable actions of others become irrelevant under a theory 
of ethical economy.
As an  example, finding th a t the absence and silence of university 
presidents in Grokster has indicated an  indifference to the fundam ental 
value of academic freedom in the public sphere and in the semi public 
university sphere does not foreclose the usefulness of further inquiry in 
the personal private spheres of the presidential au thors of silence and 
performers of absence. Such an  inquiry would rely on the assum ption
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th a t principles of ethical economy operate with equal validity in any and 
in all spheres. This operates to bracket the scope of sanctions th a t may 
be validly considered from moral or ethical infractions in a  different 
sphere or spheres.
FTiblic Sphere and Democracy
The alternate conceptualization th a t 1 have presented m akes no 
pretentions tha t public sphere discourse provides the best or for th a t 
m atter any protection to democracy. The American public sphere which 
includes all who reside in the United States as well as all American 
nationals who reside anywhere in the world is open to stream s of 
com m unication from all within th is national public sphere. Nothing 
deters sta te  and religious leaders from access to pulpits to promote 
ideology and dogma. B runer (2002) has discussed the use  of “limit work” 
to expose hegemonic and skewed characterization of national identity 
and uncover competing narratives.
While au thoritarian  regimes usually  present a  single or no choice 
a t all to their citizens, m ost choices in American democracy are 
ultim ately binary. The m ulti-dim ensional flourishes of public discourse 
have to be tunneled into unavoidable binarism s which raise valid 
questions on the probability th a t public sphere discourse in the widely 
idealized public sphere actually m akes any difference to public policy 
and democratic practice. Apprehensions about the decline of public 
debate due to the rise in television consum erism  (Zarefsky, 1998) may
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also be ignoring the possibility th a t participation in democracy is entirely 
voluntary.
The operation of three equal branches of government, the 
Executive, Congress, Suprem e Court, guided by the United States 
Constitution, go a  long way towards sanctification and  sanitization of 
democratic practice. With m uch help from the Constitution and its 
Am endments, unfettered freedom of the press, university scholars with 
tenure and  resources for unrestra ined  research and reverberations or 
echoes from willing participants in the public sphere, democracy has a  
good chance of achieving immortality, perhaps in a  form th a t m ay not be 
easily improved. With a  powerful and om niscient military to check 
th rea ts to democracy from external principalities, perhaps only extra 
terrestrial th rea ts need be of concern.
Sum m ary
In th is chapter, the th rea ts to scholarly freedom and institutional 
autonom y as well as the exigence a t the Grokster Suprem e Court are 
sum m arized. The judgm ental com ponent of situational criticism is 
discussed in relation to aw areness of university leaders to issues 
generated by technology, as well as in relation to expectations of ethical 
and moral responsibility in the university setting.
Recom mendations for further research recognize the flaw in 
grouping university presidents especially when ethics and  moral 
responsibility are discussed and  the need for further inquiiy into factors
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of personal motivation or constrain ts in situations such  as existed a t the 
Grokster Court. O ther areas of research span  from an  assessm ent of p2p 
policies a t universities to dialog on leadership search param eters if 
indeed the protection of academic freedom is a  valid concern. Finally I 
have suggested th a t evaluation of moral and ethical issues involving 
persons with roles in any sphere would be less problematic in an  
alternate conceptualization of discursive spheres.
In th is chapter, I have described particulars of such  
conceptualization th a t includes declaration and justification of a 
personal private category as well as a  theory of ethical economy which 
operates with non-hierarchical validity in a  hierarchical system  of 
spheres. I have further applied the alternate concepts to the absence and 
silence of university presidents in Grokster. Finally I have offered my very 
personal insights on the requirem ents for democracy in an  attem pt to 
decouple public sphere discourse from common symbiotic 
presuppositions linking public discursivity and democracy in m uch of 
rhetorical scholarship. The motivation for this lies in the limited 
conceptualized characteristic of unfettered com m unication as a  defining 
characteristic of any sphere.
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